In re Taffi

• Decision Date: 17 August 1992
• Docket Number: Adv. No. LA 91-07518-VZ.,Bankruptcy No. LA 91-76720-VZ
• Citation: 144 BR 105
• Parties: In re Donald & Madelaine TAFFI, Debtors. Donald & Madelaine TAFFI, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, and the Franchise Tax Board for the State of California, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Central District of California

144 B.R. 105 (1992)

In re Donald & Madelaine TAFFI, Debtors Donald & Madelaine TAFFI, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, and the Franchise Tax Board for the State of California, Defendants.

Bankruptcy No. LA 91-76720-VZ, Adv. No. LA 91-07518-VZ.

United States Bankruptcy Court, C.D. California.

August 17, 1992.

A. Lavar Taylor, Burd & Marshack, Santa Ana, Cal., for debtors.

Lourdes G. Baird, U.S. Atty., Mason C. Lewis, Asst. U.S. Atty., Chief, Tax Div., Michael S. Noble, Sp. Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for U.S.

OPINION

VINCENT P. ZURZOLO, Bankruptcy Judge.

Donald and Madelaine Taffi (the "Taffis"), plaintiffs in this adversary proceeding and reorganized debtors in this chapter 11 case, seek a judgment dividing the pre-bankruptcy tax claim of creditor and defendant the United States of America and its agency the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") into secured and unsecured claims. The parties have properly presented their dispute to me by cross motions for summary judgment as they have stipulated to most pertinent facts and the remainder are not in dispute.

I. FACTS

The Taffis owe the IRS $496,940 for tax liabilities that arose in 1980 and 1981 (the "IRS Claim"). To secure payment of the IRS Claim, the IRS recorded a notice of federal tax lien on October 12, 1989 (the "Tax Lien"). The Tax Lien attached to the Taffis' personal residence (the "House"). Liens totaling $233,942.38 that encumber the House (the "Senior Liens") are prior in time and right to the Tax Lien.

In addition to the House, the Taffis own personal property worth approximately $10,000 (the "Personal Property"). The Personal Property is encumbered by a lien imposed by the IRS (the "Personal Property Tax Lien").

The House is worth $300,000 if sold to a willing and fully-informed buyer under normal market conditions (the "Fair Market Value"). The transactional costs of such a consensual sale would be $27,000. If, however, the IRS liquidated the House to satisfy its claim, the IRS would recover only $240,000 (the "Liquidation Value").

On May 22, 1991, the Taffis commenced this chapter 11 case by filing a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11. They initiated this adversary proceeding by filing a complaint on December 30, 1991. After appropriate disclosure, balloting, notice and hearing, I confirmed the Taffis' plan of reorganization (the "Plan") and the clerk of the court entered my order confirming the Plan on February 27, 1992. In the Plan, the Taffis provided for treatment of the secured and unsecured claims of the IRS. Under the Plan, the Tax Lien is to be released when the secured claim of the IRS is satisfied. The IRS made no objection to the Plan and the order confirming the Plan is final and has not been appealed or challenged in any way.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

The parties present the following issues:

1. What is the amount of the IRS's allowed secured claim?

This question requires me to choose the appropriate standard of value — Fair Market Value or Liquidation Value. To answer it I must consider In re Mitchell, 954 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.1992).

2. Is the Tax Lien void to the extent it corresponds to the unsecured portion of the IRS Claim?

This issue turns on the meaning and effect of 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). The United States Supreme Court has recently construed this subsection of Title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") in Dewsnup v. Timm, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992).

The irony inherent in this dispute is that the Taffis urge me to apply the doctrine of stare decisis to the first issue and not to the second, while the IRS requests the converse.

III. DISCUSSION

My decision on these issues turns on the application of the doctrine of stare decisis. Before I explain my application of that doctrine to these issues, I will set out my understanding of it.

A. STARE DECISIS

"Stare decisis is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as meaning `to abide by, or adhere to, decided cases.' Black's Law Dictionary 1406 (6th ed. 1990)." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 92 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8982, 9012 ("Casey") (opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia and Thomas joining, concurring and dissenting in part). The doctrine is not founded on any statute. Rather, it is a judge-created rule grounded in fundamental policies respected by one of our most innovative jurists. For example, Justice Cardozo wrote:

In a system so highly developed as our own, precedents have so covered the ground that they fix the point of departure from which the labor of the judge begins. Almost invariably, his first step is to examine and compare them. If they are plain and to the point, there may be need of nothing more. Stare decisis is at least the every day working rule of our law.

Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 20 (1921).

In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970) the Court overturned one of its prior decisions by creating a remedy for wrongful death under federal maritime law. Justice Harlan, in writing for the Court, explained the significance of stare decisis:

Very weighty considerations underlie the principle that courts should not lightly overrule past decisions. Among these are the desirability that the law furnish a clear guide for the conduct of individuals, to enable them to plan their affairs with assurance against undue surprise; the importance of furthering fair and expeditious adjudication by eliminating the need to relitigate every relevant proposition in every case; and the necessity of maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments.

Id. at 402, 90 S.Ct. at 1788.

The Court has recently struggled with the application of stare decisis in reviewing its own precedents. See, e.g., Casey; Payne v. Tennessee, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), reh'g denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 28, 115 L.Ed.2d 1110 (1991). It is uncontested, however, that inferior federal courts, including circuit courts of appeal, district courts and bankruptcy courts, are absolutely bound by the decisions of the Court on issues of law. Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners, 459 U.S. 1314, 103 S.Ct. 842, 74 L.Ed.2d 924 (1983) (acting as circuit justice, Justice Powell stayed district court's judgment authorizing prayer in public school in knowing disobedience of prior decisions of the Court). This is true even if in the opinion of the inferior court, the Court has erred, Id. at 1315, 103 S.Ct. at 842-43, or the decision of the Court was summary and not plenary, Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 2289, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975) (district court bound by Court's summary determination that there was no substantial federal question).

It is also true that in the absence of a decision of the Court on an issue of law, the decision of a court of appeals is binding on all inferior courts in that circuit. Zuniga v. United Can Co., 812 F.2d 443, 450 (9th Cir.1987). This is so even if a split of opinion exists between the controlling circuit and another circuit court of appeals and the inferior court believes that the controlling circuit court is in error. Id. at 450; Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 663 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied 459 U.S. 828, 103 S.Ct. 63, 74 L.Ed.2d 65 (1982).

This hierarchical dimension of stare decisis is crucial to the efficient operation of the federal judicial system. If this hierarchy is not observed, then the goals expressed by the Court in Moragne cannot be accomplished. Second, and equally important, if inferior courts do not adhere to the precedents of the Court and circuit courts of appeals, those inferior courts usurp the role of the appellate courts and ultimately, Congress, which acts as the primary maker of law in our system of government. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.

Unfortunately, not all statutes enacted by Congress are precise in their wording and meaning. Federal courts must then construe those statutes. When the Court construes a statute, that construction is final and is deemed to become part of the statute, until or unless it is overturned by Congress. Gulf, C. & S.F.R. v. Moser, 275 U.S. 133, 136, 48 S.Ct. 49, 50, 72 L.Ed. 200 (1927). This is especially true when the Court construes a statute affecting rights in real property. U.S. v. Title Ins. Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486, 44 S.Ct. 621, 623, 68 L.Ed. 1110 (1924). With the foregoing principles in mind, I turn to the issues before me.

B. VALUING THE HOUSE UNDER SECTION 506(a)

11 U.S.C. § 506(a) provides:

An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor\'s interest in the estate\'s interest in such property, . . . and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor\'s interest . . . is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor\'s interest.

11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (emphasis added).

It would appear from the above-quoted language that the value of a lien creditor's interest in collateral that is property of a bankruptcy estate must be determined after considering two factors: (1) the purpose of the valuation and (2) the proposed disposition or use of the property. In Mitchell, the Ninth Circuit applied this test to a used car.

The debtors in Mitchell proposed a plan in their chapter 13 case. At the hearing on confirmation of the plan, the bankruptcy court was asked to determine how much of the claim held by the creditor with a security interest in the Mitchells' Cadillac was secured. This determination was important because only the secured portion of the undersecured creditor's claim would be...