In re Tamara R., 275

CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland
Citation136 Md. App. 236,764 A.2d 844
Docket NumberNo. 275,275
PartiesIn re TAMARA R.
Decision Date29 December 2000

Seri A. Wilpone, Hughesville, for appellant.

Mary M. Pizzo, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before HOLLANDER, THIEME1 and ADKINS, JJ.

ADKINS, Judge.

In this appeal we are asked to decide the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to grant sibling visitation in a CINA proceeding, and to balance the sibling's need for visitation against the constitutional rights of a parent who opposes it. Tamara R. ("Tamara"), appellant, a child found to be in need of assistance ("CINA"), petitioned the juvenile court for visitation with her brother and her half-sister, who remained in the care and custody of their father and have never been found to be in need of assistance.2 On appeal, appellant contends that the Circuit Court for Saint Mary's County, sitting as a juvenile court, erred in ruling that (1) it did not have jurisdiction to entertain her petition for visitation; and (2) a grant to Tamara of the right to visit with her siblings would unduly interfere with the constitutional right of her father to raise his other children as he saw fit.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

On August 11, 1999, the Saint Mary's County Department of Social Services ("DSS"), filed a petition alleging that Tamara, age 14, was a CINA. The petition was based on Tamara's allegations of sexual abuse by her father. Before the September 22, 1999 adjudication hearing, Tamara recanted, and then reasserted her allegations of sexual abuse. At the hearing before a master, the allegations of sexual abuse were not resolved because the parties agreed that appellant was a CINA due to "the special needs of the child and parent/child conflict."

A disposition hearing was held on November 17,1999. At the hearing, the master recommended that DSS be given care and custody of Tamara and that DSS should facilitate an appropriate schedule for Tamara to visit with her siblings. On December 8, 1999, the master recommended that Tamara "have visitation with her siblings twice a month...." Tamara's father timely noted exceptions to this recommendation. The father contended, inter alia, that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over appellant's siblings because they were never adjudicated CINA, and that a grant of visitation would interfere with his constitutional rights to raise his own children as he saw fit.

On February 11, 2000, a hearing was held on the father's exceptions. During the hearing, exhibits were introduced into evidence that indicated that it would be beneficial for appellant to have visitation with her siblings. Tamara's therapist reported:

Given [the] allegations of sexual abuse and the resulting circumstances, it is my impression that Tamara is experiencing a great deal of anger, sadness, betrayal and confusion. She has lost daily contact with her nuclear family, and she especially misses interacting with her siblings. Since Tamara has not been able to see her brothers and sister regularly, she misses them very much, which has further contributed to her feelings of depression and isolation. I believe it would be to Tamara's therapeutic benefit to have regular visitation with her siblings; the regular contact with them would provide her with some of the family interaction she has lost, and would help her by supporting the continuation of the sibling relationship.

The court, however, did not address the merits of Tamara's petition for visitation because it ruled that (1) it did not have jurisdiction over appellant's siblings; and (2) an order for visitation would interfere with the constitutional rights of Mr. R. [T]here is no authority to exercise and extend the jurisdiction [of the juvenile court] over siblings who are not already before the Juvenile Court under any proceedings ... the siblings being the ones who [appellant] wishes to visit with. The [c]ourt further finds that the extension of jurisdiction to allow the [c]ourt to order visitation ... would undermine clearly ... the relationship between the [appellant], and her father and the entire family unit by ... forcing a parent who is otherwise raising his children as he sees fit, [and to order visitation] would indicate that this is not in the best interest of the whole family unit, and that is what this is all about. And the [c]ourt, therefore, cannot, under any existing law or authority in this case, I think there are serious constitutional questions as to [the father's] right under these proceedings and in this particular environment.... Yes, there is a provision in the law that allows a petition by any sibling to have visitation with another, but that has to be generated by the siblings [not adjudicated CINA].... In this case it is not. And it flies in the face of this family unit and trying to get this family back together.... In this [c]ourt's opinion there is no justification legally to court order and force the visitation of minor children who are in the custody of a parent who is presumed to be raising them in the manner in which he sees fit....

Additional facts will be added as necessary to our discussion.

DISCUSSION

Tamara contends that the juvenile court erred in ruling that it did not have jurisdiction, and that granting visitation rights would not interfere with her father's constitutional rights as a parent. We agree that the juvenile court did have jurisdiction, and conclude that Mr. R.'s constitutional rights as a parent would not necessarily have been interfered with by a grant of visitation.

A. Jurisdiction Of Juvenile Court

Tamara relies on Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), Section 5-525.2 of the Family Law Article ("FL"), which provides:

(a) Petition for visitation rights.—Any siblings who are separated due to a foster care or adoptive placement may petition a court, including a juvenile court with jurisdiction over one or more of the siblings, for reasonable sibling visitation rights.
(b) Role of court.—If a petitioner under this section petitions a court to issue a visitation decree or to amend an order, the court:
(1) may hold a hearing to determine whether visitation is in the best interest of the children;
(2) shall weigh the relative interest of each child and base its decision on the best interest of the children promoting the greatest welfare and least harm to the children; and

(3) may issue an appropriate order or decree.

Tamara contends that section 5-525.2 confers jurisdiction upon the juvenile court in this instance. Mr. R., on the other hand, contends that "a much sounder interpretation of the statute would deem that it is designed to `provide a mechanism for interested non-[party] siblings who have a sibling under the jurisdiction of the [j]uvenile [c]ourt ... to file in that child's CINA case and ask the court to give them visitation.' " The cardinal rule in statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the true intention of the legislature. See Hyle v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 348 Md. 143, 148, 702 A.2d 760 (1997)

. In determining legislative intention, we look to the general purpose, aim, or policy behind the statute. See Condon v. State-Univ. of Maryland, 332 Md. 481, 491, 632 A.2d 753 (1993). Ordinarily, we look to the words of the statute to determine its intent. See Gordon Family P'ship v. Gar on Jer, 348 Md. 129, 137, 702 A.2d 753 (1997). "On the other hand, while the language of the statute is the primary source for determining the legislative intention, the plain meaning rule of construction is not absolute; rather, the statute must be construed reasonably with reference to the purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body." Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590 (1992). Indeed, a statute's purpose "`is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down.'" Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514, 525 A.2d 628 (1987) (quoting United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143, 25 S.Ct. 406, 408, 49 L.Ed. 696 (1905)). We will not interpret a statute in isolation; but rather, we will look to the statutory scheme as a whole because legislative intention "is to be discerned by considering [a statute] in light of the statutory scheme." GEICO v. Ins. Comm'r, 332 Md. 124, 132, 630 A.2d 713 (1993). In this instance, we find that the plain language and the statutory purpose are consistent, and that both support Tamara's position that the juvenile court has jurisdiction to consider her petition for visitation with her siblings.

Section 5-525.2 gives a juvenile court jurisdiction to decide visitation rights with siblings who are separated if it has jurisdiction "over one or more of the siblings." Here, the juvenile court had jurisdiction over Tamara. A plain reading of the statute causes us to reject the limitation requested by appellee—that the court must have jurisdiction over the sibling being visited, rather than the sibling petitioning for visitation. Had the legislature intended to so limit jurisdiction, it would have placed the words "with the sibling or siblings adjudicated CINA" at the end of subpart (a) of section 5-525.2, following "for reasonable sibling visitation rights." In the absence of such language, the plain meaning of the words is that siblings who are separated by foster care or adoptive placement may petition for visitation with each other, regardless of whether they have all been adjudicated CINA.

Appellee argues that the legislative history reported in the Session Review, a summary of the legislative session prepared by the Department of Legislative Reference, supports its view that in order for the juvenile court to order that a child be visited without the child requesting it, the court must have adjudicated the child a CINA. He relies on the italicized language in the following excerpt from the Session Review:

Under current law, an equity cou
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