In re Taub, 375.
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit) |
| Writing for the Court | MANTON, SWAN, and AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit |
| Citation | 98 F.2d 81 |
| Parties | In re TAUB. |
| Docket Number | No. 375.,375. |
| Decision Date | 05 July 1938 |
98 F.2d 81 (1938)
In re TAUB.
No. 375.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
July 5, 1938.
Stanley H. Rubinowitz, of New York City (Roy Berlin, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.
Jacob Marx, of New York City, pro se.
Before MANTON, SWAN, and AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judges.
SWAN, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal by the bankrupt from an order denying him a discharge. Upon
The first question is the propriety of allowing the amendment after the time for filing specifications of objection had passed. Since the specification without the amendment presented no valid objection to the discharge, the appellant argues that the amendment adds a new objection and in effect extends the time for filing specifications beyond the return day, in violation of General Order 32, as amended in 1933, 11 U.S.C.A. following section 53; Lerner v. First Wisconsin Bank, 294 U.S. 116, 55 S. Ct. 360, 79 L.Ed. 796. This contention is unsound. The amendment did not present a new ground of objection; it merely cured a defective statement of the old objection and conformed it to the statutory requirements. It caused neither delay nor surprise to the bankrupt. The district judge was clearly correct in allowing it. Northeastern Real Estate Securities Corp. v. Goldstein, 2 Cir., 91 F.2d 942; In re Weston, 2 Cir., 206 F. 281; In re Knaszak, D. C., 151 F. 503.
Likewise without merit is the contention that the specifications of objection were insufficient because verified upon information and belief. No particular form of affidavit to specifications of objection to a discharge is prescribed by the Bankruptcy Act...
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In re Portner, Bankruptcy No. 89 B 00255 J
.... . . In the absence of clear proof of fraudulent intent, we do not think a bankrupt should be denied his discharge. . . . In re Taub, 98 F.2d 81, 82 (2d Cir.1938) (emphasis added). In Bank of Pennsylvania v. Adlman (In re Adlman), 541 F.2d 999, 1005 (2d Cir.1976) the Second Circuit reverse......
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In re Mayo, Bankruptcy No. 86-00146
.... . . In the absence of clear proof of fraudulent intent, we do not think a bankrupt should be denied his discharge . . . In re Taub, 98 F.2d 81, 82 (2d Cir.1938) (emphasis supplied). Accord, Bank of Pennsylvania v. Adlman (In re Adlman), supra, 541 F.2d at 1005 (2d Cir.1976). The Second Ci......
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U.S. v. Grant, 90-2193
...any substantial right."). 19 Although de minimis value may be probative evidence of the absence of an intent to defraud, cf. In re Taub, 98 F.2d 81, 82 (2d Cir.1938) ("[l]ack of value in the property omitted from the schedules tends to negative fraudulent intent") (objection to discharge un......
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In re Natale, Bankruptcy No. 190-15846-353
...petitions or schedules do not necessarily establish fraudulent intent. In re Lovich, 117 F.2d 612, 613-614 (2d Cir. 1941); In re Taub, 98 F.2d 81, 82 (2d Cir. 1938); Interfirst Bank Greenville v. Morris (In re Morris), 58 B.R. 422, 427 (Bankr. N.D.Tex.1986); Discenza v. MacDonald (In re Mac......