In re Taylor

• Decision Date: 15 February 1949
• Parties: In re TAYLOR.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

217 S.W.2d 954

309 Ky. 388

In re TAYLOR.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

February 15, 1949

Original motion by the Board of Bar Examiners, through the Attorney General, for a rule against Louis C. Taylor to show cause why his license to practice law in Kentucky should not be revoked.

Judgment in accordance with opinion.

A. E. Funk, Atty. Gen., and Wm. F. Simpson, Asst Atty. Gen., for relator.

C Ewbank Tucker, of Louisville, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

By original proceedings in this Court, the Board of Bar Examiners, through the Attorney General, has moved for a rule against Louis C. Taylor, respondent, to show cause why his license to practice law in Kentucky should not be revoked. On November 30, 1938, respondent filed application by motion for admission to practice law in Kentucky, stating that he had been a regularly licensed and practicing attorney in good standing in Illinois from 1927 to 1938; the application appeared to meet all requirements and the Board recommended that he be granted license and we approved the recommendation on April 19, 1939.

Seven years later the Board was advised that respondent had been permanently disbarred by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1928. Upon receipt of this information this court issued the rule. At the time respondent's license was granted by this Court, KRS 1944, 30.080(2) provided:

'If any license is procured by fraud, the Court of Appeals may revoke it at any time within two years of the date it was issued.'

This subsection was repealed in 1946, but respondent pleads it as a bar. A similar plea was made in Harrison v. Commonwealth ex rel. Kash, 305 Ky. 379, 204 S.W.2d 221, 222, but was rejected by the Court, saying:

'However, since an attorney is an officer of the court, the court has the inherent power to investigate and punish a member of the bar who has been found to be guilty of unprofessional conduct meriting censure, suspension or disbarment. There can be no limitation on this right and duty of the courts.'

Respondent also pleads in bar KRS 413.120(12), the pertinent part of which reads: 'An action for relief or damages on the ground of fraud or mistake * * * shall be commenced within five years after the cause of action accrued.' In support of this plea he cites the case of Johnson v. Fetter, 224 Ky. 788, 7 S.W.2d 241, and other cases dealing with adversary proceedings, wherein this Court held that one defrauded cannot institute suit to recover after a period of five years, where his failure to discover alleged fraud within that time was due to his own negligence. Those cases are not applicable. An inquiry into the qualification of an attorney to continue the practice of law is not an adversary proceeding. An attorney may be disbarred for any act which tends to bring the authority of the court and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard, such as dishonesty, personal misconduct, questionable moral character or unprofessional conduct. Lenihan v. Com., 165 Ky. 93, 176 S.W. 948, L.R.A. 1917B, 1132; Louisville Bar Ass'n v. Mazin, 282 Ky. 743, 135 S.W.2d 771. If one fraudulently obtains a license and enters into and continues the practice of law, such conduct constitutes a contempt of court as long as the licensee holds himself out as an attorney in good standing. The passing of time increases the enormity of the offense. In his brief we find respondent saying:

'Respondent contends that the base of this action is on a public record, namely; the records of the Supreme Court of Illinois, and the Relator having the privilege of corresponding with the officials of the Supreme Court of Illinois, or examining the records of the Supreme Court, or the Supreme Court reports of Illinois, and failing to do either which would have revealed the true fact, or facts, was due to his own negligence and no fault of Respondent.'

This court has never subscribed to such doctrine in disbarment proceedings. It is the duty of the applicant for a license to disclose facts pertaining to his qualifications, and all facts that would put the Board or the court on notice of any disqualifications.

In his response and motion to discharge the rule, respondent challenges the validity of the order of the Supreme Court of Illinois on several grounds, none of which is meritorious. That judgment which has been properly authenticated under the Act of Congress reads:

'Now on this day the court having duly considered the motion of Relator to make the rule absolute and the court having also considered the Information and Answer herein, and being now...