In re TC, No. 01-318
| Citation | 2001 MT 264,307 Mont. 244,37 P.3d 70 |
| Decision Date | 13 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-319., No. 01-318 |
| Parties | In the Matter of T.C. and W.C., Youths In Need of Care. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Montana |
For Appellants: Daniel R. Sweeney, Attorney at Law, Butte, Montana (for Todd) Frank Joseph, Attorney at Law, Butte, MT, (for Christie).
For Respondent: Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Tammy K. Plubell, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, MO, Robert M. McCarthy, Silver Bow County Attorney, Butte, MO, Ross Richardson, Henningson, Vucurovich & Richardson, Butte, MO.
¶ 1 Christie and Todd appeal from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County, terminating their parental rights with their two minor children, W.C. and T.C. The District Court treated the two youth in need of care cases as separate causes of action but held a single hearing regarding the petition for permanent custody of the children. Thus, the facts and procedural history for these two cases are identical. This opinion consolidates the appeals concerning W.C. and T.C. We reverse.
¶ 2 The following issues are dispositive:
¶ 3 1. Whether the District Court erred in terminating Christie's parental rights for violating the treatment plan?
¶ 4 2. Whether the District Court's decision to allow the Department of Public Health and Human Services to amend the pleadings during the termination hearing violated Christie's due process rights?
¶ 5 3. Whether the District Court erred in terminating Todd's parental rights under a theory of abandonment?
¶ 6 W.C. and T.C. are twelve and eleven years old, respectively. Christie is their mother and Todd is their father. The parents are divorced, and Christie originally had custody of the children. On October 27, 1999, after learning that Christie was being arrested for a probation violation, the Department of Public Health and Human Services ("DPHHS") filed a petition with the District Court to investigate whether W.C. and T.C. were abused or neglected. The District Court granted the petition on a preliminary basis. A DPHHS caseworker first placed the children with their maternal grandmother but, eventually, placed them in a foster home.
¶ 7 On October 30, 1999, Christie was released from jail on bond but failed to appear for a scheduled Show Cause hearing on November 18, 1999. The District Court then granted DPHHS's petition for temporary investigative authority, finding that it was in the best interest of the children to be removed from the home. Under the order, the court required Christie to complete a chemical dependancy and psychological evaluation. The court also appointed Geralyn Driscoll as the guardian ad litem for W.C. and T.C. During this time, Christie's whereabouts were unknown. In November 1999, a social worker, Patti Randall, established contact with Todd, who was living in Florida at the time.
¶ 8 On December 20, 1999, Christie was arrested in Bozeman, Montana. During the same month, Todd was arrested in Florida for aggravated assault and a parole violation. He remained in jail until March 2000, when the charges were dismissed. Christie was charged with misdemeanor drug possession and released on bond on January 3, 2000. On January 12, 2000, she contacted her probation officer and the DPHHS caseworker. During a meeting with her probation officer, she failed another drug test and was arrested on a parole violation.
¶ 9 On February 15, 2000, DPHHS filed a Petition for Temporary Legal Custody and Protective Services. Based on a stipulation between DPHHS and Christie, the court adopted an order on February 28, 2000, granting DPHHS temporary custody for six months. Three days earlier, Christie had been arrested for possessing illegal drugs and was released the following day. She left Montana but was arrested in Florida on drug charges in May 2000.
¶ 10 While Christie was incarcerated in Florida, DPHHS filed a Motion to Approve a Treatment Plan on May 15, 2000. A copy was faxed to Christie, but she refused to sign it. On May 17, 2000, the Second Judicial District Citizen Review Board recommended that DPHHS should terminate both parents' parental rights, based on their criminal history, the social history of the case and the children's need for permanence. On June 8, 2000, the District Court approved the treatment plan without Christie's signature. DPHHS filed a petition on August 22, 2000, to terminate Christie and Todd's parental rights for failure to comply with the treatment plan. The District Court appointed separate counsel for both parents.
¶ 11 The District Court held a hearing on November 15, 2000, on the permanent custody of the children. After the first witness, DPHHS moved to amend the pleadings to add a claim of abandonment. Christie's counsel objected, but the District Court allowed DPHHS to amend the pleadings.
¶ 12 On March 12, 2001, the District Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. The Court found that both Christie and Todd had abandoned the children, that the children were previously adjudicated as youth in need of care and that Christie had not complied with the treatment plan. The District Court terminated Christie and Todd's parental rights. Christie and Todd both appeal.
¶ 13 The decision to terminate parental rights is within the discretion of the trial court, and we review such a ruling for an abuse of discretion. In re Custody of C.F., 2001 MT 19, ¶ 11, 304 Mont. 134, ¶ 11, 18 P.3d 1014, ¶ 11. We review findings of fact to determine whether they are clearly erroneous. In re C.F., ¶ 11, 18 P.3d 1014; In re C.D.S., 2000 MT 313, ¶ 5, 302 Mont. 466, ¶ 5, 14 P.3d 1248, ¶ 5; In re J.H., 2000 MT 11, ¶ 20, 298 Mont. 41, ¶ 20, 994 P.2d 37, ¶ 20. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if substantial evidence does not support it; if the district court misapprehended the effect of the evidence; or if, after reviewing the record, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the district court made a mistake. In re C.F., ¶ 11, 18 P.3d 1014; In re Custody of T.Z., 2000 MT 205, ¶ 10, 300 Mont. 522, ¶ 10, 6 P.3d 960, ¶ 10; In re Adoption of Snyder, 2000 MT 61, ¶ 10, 299 Mont. 40, ¶ 10, 996 P.2d 875, ¶ 10 (citing In re J.N., 1999 MT 64, ¶ 11, 293 Mont. 524, ¶ 11, 977 P.2d 317, ¶ 11). As a general rule, we review a district court's conclusions of law to determine if they are correct. In re M.J.W., 1998 MT 142, ¶ 7, 289 Mont. 232, ¶ 7, 961 P.2d 105, ¶ 7.
¶ 14 Whether the District Court erred in terminating Christie's parental rights for violating the treatment plan?
¶ 15 Under Montana law, a court may terminate the parent-child legal relationship upon a finding that:
the child is an adjudicated youth in need of care and both of the following exist: (i) an appropriate treatment plan that has been approved by the court has not been complied with by the parents or has not been successful; and (ii) the conduct or condition of the parents rendering them unfit is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
Section 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA. Therefore, before a court may address the treatment plan, the court must first judge the child as a "youth in need of care." See In re M.J.W., ¶ 11, 961 P.2d 105. Without such a determination, a court may not sever a parent's parental rights. See In re M.J.W., ¶ 11, 961 P.2d 105.
¶ 16 Christie argues that the District Court erred in terminating her parental rights because W.C. and T.C. were never adjudicated as youth in need of care. Instead, the District Court simply referenced an earlier order, stating that the children were "adjudicated as abused, neglected, or dependent within the meaning of § 41-3-102, MCA, by Order of this Court dated November 1, 1999." Both parties agree, however, that the November 1, 1999, Order did not adjudicate the children as youth in need of care. That Order was only a probable cause finding and did not establish that the children were abused or neglected. See In re M.J.W., ¶ 12, 961 P.2d 105. Therefore, the court's finding is plainly wrong, and it does not support a finding that the minors were youth in need of care.
¶ 17 The State argues that the court's Order on February 29, 2000, granting temporary custody of the children to DPHHS, implies that they were youth in need of care. In that Order, the District Court found that "continuation in the home would be contrary to the welfare of [W.C. and T.C.]." The court's Order was based on the stipulation entered into by Christie and DPHHS. The parties to the stipulation agreed to let the court give temporary legal custody of W.C. and T.C. to DPHHS but did not stipulate that W.C. or T.C. were youth in need of care.
¶ 18 The State contends that a stipulation by a parent that a child is a youth in need of care empowers the court to transfer legal custody from the parent to DPHHS. See In re Custody of J.H., 1998 MT 128, ¶ 16, 289 Mont. 111,
¶ 16, 958 P.2d 1191, ¶ 16. This may be, but the parties' stipulation was not that W.C. and T.C. were youth in need of care. Furthermore, the court's adoption of the stipulation that allowed DPHHS to gain temporary custody of W.C. and T.C. does not imply that the court found the children as youth in need of care. A court may only make such a finding through an adjudicatory hearing as mandated by § 41-3-437, MCA. See In re M.J.W., ¶ 12, 961 P.2d 105 (). Without such a specific adjudication, the statutory requirement is not met. See In re M.J.W., ¶ 14, 961 P.2d 105.
¶ 19 Therefore, because W.C. and T.C. were never adjudicated as youth in need of care, we conclude that the District Court erred in terminating Christie's parental rights for violating the treatment plan.
¶ 20 Whether the District Court's decision to allow...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Z.N.-M.
...of parental rights. In re M.O. and M.O., 2003 MT 4, ¶ 12, 314 Mont. 13, 62 P.3d 265 (citing In re T.C., 2001 MT 264, ¶ 15, 307 Mont. 244, 37 P.3d 70; In re M.J.W., 1998 142, ¶ 11, 289 Mont. 232, 961 P.2d 105). ¶26 Jurisdiction refers to a court's authority to adjudicate a case before it. A ......
-
In re H.T., DA 14–0076.
...the statute.” In re B.N.Y., ¶ 22 (citing §§ 41–3–406(1)(c), 41–3–420(1), and 41–3–609(1)(f), MCA ); In re T.C., 2001 MT 264, ¶ 15, 307 Mont. 244, 37 P.3d 70. ¶ 16 A parent may stipulate that the child meets the definition of a youth in need of care. Section 41–3–434(1), MCA. “A parent's val......
-
In re J.C.
...nearly identical circumstances, we have held such a finding "plainly wrong" without equivocation. Matter of T.C., 2001 MT 264, ¶ 16, 307 Mont. 244, ¶ 16, 37 P.3d 70, ¶ 16. We should do so here and, on that basis, ¶ 59 My remaining disagreements with the Court's opinion are numerous and subs......
-
In re B.J.J.
...of a fair proceeding are notice and an opportunity to be heard." In re C.J. , ¶ 27 (citing In re T.C. and W.C. , 2001 MT 264, ¶ 22, 307 Mont. 244, 37 P.3d 70 ). In this case, however, Father was afforded fundamentally fair procedures and had equal opportunity to present evidence and test th......