In re Telemark Management Co., Inc., Bankruptcy No. EF7-81-00747 to EF7-81-00751.
Citation | 51 BR 623 |
Decision Date | 07 November 1984 |
Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. EF7-81-00747 to EF7-81-00751. |
Parties | In re TELEMARK MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., The Telemark Company, Inc., Telemark Land Company, Inc., Historyland, Incorporated, Thaw, Inc., Wisconsin Corporations, d/b/a Telemark Enterprises, Debtors. |
Court | United States Bankruptcy Courts. Seventh Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Western District of Wisconsin |
William A. Adler, Adler & LaFave, Eau Claire, Wis., for Telemark Lodge Owners Assn.
Lawrence J. Kaiser, Eau Claire, Wis., trustee.
Stephen H. Cohen, Robins, Zelle, Larson & Kaplan, Minneapolis, Minn., for trustee.
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDERS (1) DENYING MOTION TO VACATE (2) EXTENDING TIME TO ACCEPT OR REJECT (3) DENYING MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
Telemark Lodge Owners Association (TLOA), by Adler & LaFave, having filed a Motion to Vacate; and Trustee Lawrence J. Kaiser, by Robins, Zelle, Larson & Kaplan, having filed a Motion for Order for Extension and a Motion for Order Sanctioning; and a hearing having been held; and TLOA appearing by Attorney William A. Adler; and the Trustee appearing in person and by Attorney Stephen H. Cohen, the Court, being fully advised in the premises, FINDS THAT:
1. On May 17, 1984, this Court, 41 B.R. 501, converted the above captioned bankruptcy proceeding from Chapter 11 reorganization of the Bankruptcy Code to Chapter 7 liquidation of the Bankruptcy Code.
2. On July 12, 1984, this Court entered an Order extending the time for the Trustee to assume or reject executory contracts until September 14, 1984.
3. On September 10, 1984, the Trustee commenced an adversary proceeding against other parties with an interest in the Telemark Lodge — including members of the Telemark Lodge Owners Association (TLOA). The Trustee alleged, inter alia, that:
In 1978 the TLOA entered into a contract agreement with Telemark Management Company, Inc., entitled the Lease and Management Agreement, on behalf of defendants herein or their predecessors in interest. That agreement provided that Telemark Management Company, Inc. would assume certain duties and obligations that the tenants would otherwise have had under the Uniform Lease Agreement. Said Lease and Management Agreement is an Executory Agreement within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Trustee prayed that the Court would:
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Kaiser v. Allison, et al., Adv. No. 84-214-7 (Bankr.W.D.Wis. filed Sept. 10, 1984).
4. On September 11, 1984, this Court entered an Order extending the time for the Trustee to assume or reject executory contracts until November 13, 1984.
5. On September 20, 1984, TLOA filed a Motion to vacate this Court's September 11 Order. TLOA supported the Motion by arguing that this Court was without jurisdiction to extend the time for the Trustee to assume or reject.
6. On October 18, 1984, the Trustee filed a Motion to extend the time for the Trustee to assume or reject executory contracts until further order of this Court. The Trustee supported the Motion by arguing that he can not make an informed decision whether to assume or reject its agreement with TLOA until the Kaiser v. Allison, et al. matter is resolved.
7. On the same day the Trustee filed a Motion for an order sanctioning TLOA for the September 20 Motion, Paragraph 5 supra. The Trustee supported the Motion by arguing that TLOA's motion was not based upon a reasonable inquiry and examination of bankruptcy law.
8. 11 U.S.C. sec. 365. Under Section 365(d)(1), "if the trustee does not assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor within 60 days after the order for relief, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day period, fixes, then such contract or lease is deemed rejected."
9. TLOA relies upon the language of Section 365(d)(1) to argue that this Court has no authority, after 60 days after the order for relief, to extend the time for the Trustee to assume or reject. See 73 Am. Jur.2d Statutes sec. 211 (1974) ( ).
10. While "`the starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself'", the "ascertainment of the meaning apparent on the face of a single statute need not end the inquiry." "`Statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.'" Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265-266, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 1677, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981) (citations omitted).
11. The only function of a corporate Chapter 7 proceeding is to liquidate the debtor's assets in a commercially reasonable fashion and equitably distribute the proceeds of that liquidation to the corporate creditors. See 11 U.S.C. sec. 704(1) ( ). Cf. 11 U.S.C. sec. 727(a)(1) ( ).
H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 348 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5787, 5963, 6304; S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5787, 5845.
13. Section 365(d)(1) strikes a balance between the trustee (who is obligated to liquidate the estate in a commercially reasonable manner) and other parties to estate executory contracts (who are entitled to receive a prompt resolution of their rights and remedies): The trustee must act to assume, reject or request an extension within 60 days of the order for relief. If there is "cause", i.e. the trustee can not make an informed determination of the best interests of the estate within 60 days, the Court is empowered to grant an extension for such time as is required. .)
14. Reading Section 365(d)(1) to prohibit an extension of the original extension would lead to absurd results: A trustee making a good faith request for a brief extension would be punished if future events proved the extension too short. Accordingly, trustees would be encouraged to request the longest arguable period — and the statutory goal of prompt resolution of the status of executory contracts would suffer. Because any fixed period may prove too short, a prudent trustee would seek an extension "until further order of the court" — turning the statute inside-out and shifting the burden to act to the other executory contract parties.
15. When the apparent meaning of a statute produces results plainly at variance with the legislative policy, this Court must follow the legislative policy. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 399-400, 86 S.Ct. 852, 856-857, 15 L.Ed.2d 827 (1966).
16. The inference is inescapable that Congress did not, by enacting Section 365(d)(1), mean to preclude a Bankruptcy Court from granting, after 60 days after the order for relief, an extension of the time for the trustee to assume or reject executory contracts. .)
17. To say that Section 365(d)(1) does not preclude this Court from acting is not to say that this Court has authority to act.
18. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b). Under Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9006(b)(1), "when an act is required ... to be done ... within a specified period ... by order of court, the court for cause shown may ... order the period enlarged if the request therefor is made before the expiration of the period ... as extended by a previous order ..."
19. However, Bankruptcy Rules do not affect Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction. Fed. R.Bankr.P. 9030. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 2075 (1984) ( ); compare 28 U.S.C. sec. 2075 (1976) ( ) with 28 U.S.C. sec. 2075 (Supp. II 1978 & 1984) (clause 4 deleted). Cf. Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9006(b)(2) & (3) ( ).
20. 11 U.S.C. sec. 105(a). Under Section 105(a), this Court "may issue any order ... that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code."
21. An order to extend, for cause, the time for the Trustee to assume or reject executory contracts may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
22. In the absence of an expression...
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