In re Teter

Decision Date25 January 2021
Docket NumberCase No. 19-11224
PartiesIn re: MEGAN MARIE TETER, Debtor.
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Courts. Sixth Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Ohio

The court incorporates by reference in this paragraph and adopts as the findings and orders of this court the document set forth below. This document was signed electronically on January 25, 2021, which may be different from its entry on the record.

Chapter 7

Judge Arthur I. Harris

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION1

This case is currently before the Court on the motion of the debtor, Megan Marie Teter, for an award of attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. The debtor seeks an award of attorney's fees based on the U.S. Trustee's filing of a motion to dismiss the debtor's bankruptcy case for abuse under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b), a position the debtor maintains was not substantially justified. As explained more fully below, the debtor's motion for attorney's fees must be denied because a debtor who successfully defends acontested matter within a bankruptcy case is not a "prevailing party" in a "civil action" under 28 U.S.C. § 2412 and therefore falls outside the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity provided under the EAJA.

JURISDICTION

This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (O). The Court has jurisdiction over core proceedings under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(a) and Local General Order 2012-7 of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.

BACKGROUND

The debtor filed for relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on March 7, 2019. In the schedules filed with her petition, the debtor listed nonpriority general unsecured debt totaling $96,538.05, which included $56,321.31 in student loan debt. The debtor claimed that her debts were primarily business debts and filled out a statement of exemption from presumption of abuse under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (Docket No. 1).

Under § 704(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the U.S. Trustee must review all materials filed by chapter 7 debtors who are individuals and, not later than ten days after the date of the first meeting of creditors, file with the court a statement as to whether the debtor's case would be presumed to be an abuse under § 707(b). TheU.S. Trustee must then, within thirty days, either file a motion to dismiss or convert under § 707(b) or file a statement setting forth the reasons the U.S. Trustee does not consider such a motion to be appropriate. See 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2). The U.S. Trustee must perform these duties even for cases in which debtors assert that their debts are not primarily consumer debts, such as the current case.

On April 25, 2019, the U.S. Trustee timely filed a statement of presumed abuse (see docket entry dated April 25, 2019). On May 28, 2019, the U.S. Trustee timely filed a motion to dismiss the debtor's case for abuse under § 707(b) (Docket No. 15). In the § 707(b) motion, the U.S. Trustee argued that, notwithstanding the debtor's assertions to the contrary, the debtor's debts were primarily consumer debts because a majority of the debtor's total debt, including debt from student loans, was "incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." See 11 U.S.C. § 101(8). The U.S. Trustee also claimed that, based on the U.S Trustee's own calculations, there was a presumption of abuse under § 707(b)(2), despite the debtor's Schedule J which listed a net monthly income of negative $84.91. The U.S. Trustee claimed that several expenses listed on the debtor's Schedule J were without substantiation or explanation. The U.S. Trustee argued that if the contested expenses were adjusted, the debtor's net monthly income would increase and the debtor would have the ability to repay her creditors,justifying a dismissal under § 707(b)(2). The U.S. Trustee also argued, in the alternative, that the totality of the debtor's circumstances necessitated a dismissal under § 707(b)(3).

On June 5, 2019, the debtor filed an amended petition and schedules in which she claimed her debts were neither primarily consumer debts nor primarily business debts (Docket No. 18). On the same day, the debtor also responded to the U.S. Trustee's motion to dismiss (Docket No. 19). The debtor argued that, under the profit motive test, her student loan debt was not "consumer debt" and, taking into account all of her debt, she was not a debtor "whose debts are primarily consumer debts" within the meaning of §§ 101(8) and 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. The debtor also claimed that she provided all information necessary to confirm the expenses contested in the U.S. Trustee's motion to dismiss. The debtor asserted that the U.S. Trustee's motion was in reality a disguised motion for extension of time because the U.S. Trustee's calculations were based on what the U.S. Trustee merely believed a properly calculated means test would show.

The Court held an initial hearing on June 18, 2019, and scheduled an evidentiary hearing for November 14, 2019 (Docket No. 23).

On October 14, 2019, the debtor moved for summary judgment on the U.S. Trustee's motion to dismiss (Docket No. 29). The debtor argued that, becauseher student loan debts were not consumer debts, she was not a debtor "whose debts are primarily consumer debts" under § 707(b). According to the debtor, she incurred her student loan debt "in the furtherance of her undergraduate education," and "[h]er purpose in undertaking those obligations was to pay for an education and earn a degree that would maximize her opportunity for employment in business" (Docket No. 29, pg. 3).

The Court denied the motion on December 11, 2019 (Docket Nos. 35 & 36). In denying the motion, the Court noted that there is conflicting case law and no binding precedent as to whether student loans constitute "consumer debt" within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(8). Without adopting any particular line of case law, the Court indicated that the test in the treasury regulation governing deductibility of expenses for education may perhaps serve as a useful framework.

Under Section 262 of the Internal Revenue Code, a taxpayer may not deduct "personal, living, or family expenses." This language is close to the definition of "consumer debt" contained in the 1978 Bankruptcy Act"debt incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose." The treasury regulation governing deductibility of expenses for education, 26 C.F.R. 1.162-5, is apparently unchanged since 1967. It provides that educational expenditures in order to meet the minimum educational requirements for employment are generally personal expenditures and are not deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.

(Docket No. 35, pgs. 6-7) (internal citations omitted). This framework has the advantage of not relying on a debtor's subjective intent for obtaining a college degree. Id. In denying summary judgment, the Court noted:

At this stage, the Court is uncertain as to what is the best line of case law for analyzing whether the debtor's student loan debt constitutes "consumer debt." If the better approach is to find that the debtor incurred the debt to attend college and attempt to obtain a college degree, full stop. Then the debt will most likely qualify as a "consumer debt" because there are few things more personal than obtaining an education. Nor would there be any need to inquire as to a debtor's many reasons for obtaining that education. Under this approach, the debtor in the current case would not be entitled to summary judgment. Nor has the U.S. Trustee filed his own motion for summary judgment on this issue.
On the other hand, if the better approach is to inquire further as to why the debtor wanted to attend college and obtain a college degree, then the issue of summary judgment is a closer one. The record contains some evidence that the debtor wanted to obtain a college degree in order to qualify for a job with the best salary she could obtain. But at the summary judgment phase, the Court must construe the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and questions of intent may not be best suited for summary judgment. Rather, the Court has reason to believe, in the language of Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), "that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial." For example, it may turn out that the U.S. Trustee's 707(b) motion must be denied even if the debtor's debts are "primarily consumer debts." In short, the Court believes that the better course is developing a complete record on all 707(b) issues, including whether the debtor's debts are "primarily consumer debts," especially if one or more of these issues is to be heard by a reviewing court.

Id. at 8-9.

On December 19, 2019, the Court denied the debtor's motion for reconsideration in a brief marginal order and set a new evidentiary hearing date of April 23, 2020 (Docket Nos. 41 & 42). On the same day, the chapter 7 trustee reported that there were no assets to administer for the benefit of creditors (Docket No. 40).

On January 15, 2020, the Court issued a second amended scheduling order moving the evidentiary hearing date to May 11, 2020 (Docket No. 45).

On March 2, 2020, the debtor again moved for summary judgment. The debtor argued that, even using all the U.S. Trustee's other figures for calculating the means test, there would be no presumption of abuse if the Court were to find that the "imputed income" reported on the debtor's payment advices for health insurance for the debtor's domestic partner was not "income received" under 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (Docket No. 48).

On March 11, 2020, the Court held a telephonic status conference at which it set briefing deadlines regarding the debtor's most recent motion for summary judgment and directed the parties to continue exchanging information in hopes of reaching a consensual resolution.

On March 24, 2020, the U.S. Trustee withdrew the § 707(b) motion to dismiss, stating that the U.S. Trustee had become aware of facts and...

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