In re Tex. Educ. Agency

• Decision Date: 19 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-0404,20-0404
• Citation: In re Tex. Educ. Agency, 619 S.W.3d 679 (Tex. 2021)
• Parties: IN RE the TEXAS EDUCATION AGENCY; Mike Morath, Commissioner of Education in His Official Capacity; and Doris Delaney, in Her Official Capacity, Relators
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

619 S.W.3d 679

IN RE the TEXAS EDUCATION AGENCY; Mike Morath, Commissioner of Education in His Official Capacity; and Doris Delaney, in Her Official Capacity, Relators

No. 20-0404

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued October 27, 2020

OPINION DELIVERED: March 19, 2021

Benjamin Castillo, Austin, David Jay Campbell, Kevin T. O'Hanlon, Austin, Audra Welter, for Real Party in Interest.

Cynthia Akatugba, Bill Davis, Emily Ardolino, Jeffrey C. Mateer, Austin, Atty. Gen. W. Kenneth Paxton Jr., Philip A. Lionberger, Austin, Kyle D. Hawkins, Esteban M. Soto, Kyle Highful, Ryan Lee Bangert, for Relators.

Justice Guzmandelivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Lehrmann, Justice Boyd, Justice Devine, Justice Blacklock, Justice Busby, Justice Bland, and Justice Huddle joined.

When a state agency or department head files a notice of appeal, enforcement of an adverse judgment or order is automatically suspended without bond or other security.¹Section 22.004(i) of the Texas Government Code provides that this supersedeas right "is not subject to being counter-superseded" under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.2(a)(3)"or any other rule" except in "a matter that was the basis of a contested case in an administrative enforcement action."²In this ultra vires dispute, state regulators appealed an adverse temporary injunction, but the trial court allowed the plaintiff school district to counter-supersede the injunction so the regulators could not undertake any unauthorized actions absent success on appeal.

The court of appeals reversed the counter-supersedeas order as contrary to Rule 24.2(a)(3)andSection 22.004(i).³But to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm, the court issued its own temporary order continuing the injunction pending disposition of the appeal.⁴The purely procedural question presented in this mandamus proceeding is whether the appellate court's temporary order conflicts with Section 22.004(i).We hold it does not and therefore deny mandamus relief.Section 22.004(i)'s prohibition against counter-supersedeas is textually limited to the supersedeas context and does not purport to constrain an appellate court's power to issue temporary orders under other authority.The court of appeals' temporary order may have the same practical effect as denying supersedeas of the trial court's injunction, but it is not counter-supersedeas relief within the meaning of the statute.

I.Background

In the underlying suit, the Houston Independent School District(HISD) seeks a declaration that the Texas Education Agency(TEA), Commissioner Mike Morath, and Dr. Doris Delaney(collectively, Relators) lack authority to assume control of the entire school district to rectify performance deficiencies at 1 of the district's 280 schools and to address concerns about open-government compliance and discord among HISD's publicly elected board of trustees.Among the actions HISD challenges are Commissioner Morath's decision to (1) install Dr. Delaney as a district-level conservator, (2) replace HISD's elected trustees with an appointed board of managers, and (3) lower HISD's accreditation status.HISD contends these actions would be ultra vires and, on that basis, seeks injunctive relief barring their implementation.

After a hearing, the trial court temporarily enjoined the proposed actions, finding (1) HISD established a probable right to recovery on its claim that the challenged actions are without legal authority and ultra vires, (2) HISD made a sufficient showing that the alleged ultra vires actions would irreparably harm HISD, and (3) injunctive relief is necessary to maintain the status quo pending a final judgment.The trial court set a prompt trial date on HISD's request for permanent injunctive relief and denied supersedeas on interlocutory appeal.In allowing HISD to counter-supersede the interlocutory order if the Relators appealed, the court stated that unless the temporary injunction remained in force on appeal, Commissioner Morath would be free to engage in ultra vires conduct that, once undertaken, would constitute final, unappealable administrative action.⁵

After perfecting an interlocutory appeal, Relators filed a motion to vacatethe trial court's counter-supersedeas order, citing Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.2(a)(3).⁶Relators argued that their notice of appeal automatically superseded the trial court's temporary injunction and, under Rule 24.2(a)(3), trial courts have no discretion to deny supersedeas to a state agency or the head of a state agency.HISD opposed Relators' motion to vacate the counter-supersedeas order and, in the alternative, filed a cross-motion urging the court of appeals to exercise its authority under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.3 to "make any temporary orders necessary to preserve the parties' rights until disposition of the appeal."⁷HISD argued that temporary relief was necessary to protect the parties' rights during the appeals process and to prevent Commissioner Morath from taking a final and unappealable administrative act that would divest the court of jurisdiction to reach the merits.

The court of appeals granted Relators' motion and vacated the portion of the trial court's order granting HISD's counter-supersedeas request.The court agreed with Relators that the trial court's denial of supersedeas violated Rule 24.2(a)(3).⁸However, to preserve the status quo, to prevent HISD from suffering irreparable harm, and to protect its jurisdiction to decide the appeal on the merits, the court also granted HISD's cross-motion and ordered that the trial court's temporary injunction would remain in effect pending disposition of the interlocutory appeal.⁹The court explained that,

under the particular circumstances presented here, where the appellee alleges irreparable harm from ultra vires action that it seeks to preclude from becoming final, to effectively perform our judicial function and to preserve the separation of powers, we must exercise our inherent authority and use Rule 29.3 to make orders "to prevent irreparable harm to parties that have properly invoked [our] jurisdiction in an interlocutory appeal."¹⁰

The court emphasized, "We are not allowing the trial court to counter-supersede the temporary injunction; we are exercising our power to issue temporary orders."¹¹

The court of appeals has since ruled on the merits of the temporary injunction, affirming the trial court in a split decision.¹²But prior to disposition of the interlocutory appeal, Relators filed this original proceeding seeking to vacate the appellate court's order temporarily continuing the injunction.The validity of the court of appeals' temporary order remains live and mandamus relief remains effective because the court has not lifted its temporary order.

II.Discussion

This original proceeding presents our first opportunity to consider the meaning and reach of Section 22.004(i) of the Government Code, which prohibits this Court from adopting procedural rules authorizing counter-supersedeas of orders and judgments against certain governmental defendants except as to a narrow class of administrative cases.¹³Relators contend Section 22.004(i) creates a right to supersedeas that is substantive, absolute, and unavoidable.HISD argues to the contrary, finding support for interim appellate relief in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.3, Texas Government Code provisions authorizing courts to protect their jurisdiction, and the judiciary's inherent authority.HISD further urges that the statutory scheme and the rules of appellate procedure cannot be construed as neutering judicial power in the way Relators suggest without violating the separation-of-powers doctrine established in Article II, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution.

We hold that the court of appeals' temporary order does not conflict with Section 22.004(i)'s limitation on procedural rules authorizing counter-supersedeas.The temporary order is not counter-supersedeas relief within the meaning of the statute even though the order may have the same effect."Supersedeas" is a trial-court process for suspending enforcement of the judgment.Under the rules of appellate procedure, supersedeas is subject to review by the appellate courts, but the supersedeas process occurs in the trial court.¹⁴Section 22.004(i) does not purport to limit the power of appellate courts, including this Court, to issue temporary orders under other authority, like the Rule 29.3order issued here.

It is not uncommon for procedurally different processes to produce the same substantive effect.That is the case here where an injunctive effect may be achieved in multiple ways, but Section 22.004(i) uses precise and technical language to prohibit only one of those procedural mechanisms.We cannot presume the Legislature intended Section 22.004(i) to carry broader preclusive force than the enacted language describes.Rather, "[w]e must take the Legislature at its word, respect its policy choices, and resist revising a statute under the guise of interpreting it."¹⁵Judicial restraint in this regard is all the more important if expanding a statute's reach has the potential to impermissibly encroach on the judiciary's constitutionally separate domain.

A.

The purpose of supersedeas is "to preserve the status quo by staying the execution or enforcement of the judgment or order appealed from pending the appeal."¹⁶Supersedeas not only prevents a judgment creditor from levying execution on a judgment while an appeal is pending¹⁷ but also prevents a judgment, injunction, or other order from being enforced by contempt.¹⁸When superseded, compliance with an injunction is not required until all appeals have been exhausted and the mandate has issued.¹⁹

Merely appealing an interlocutory order does not suspend enforcement "unless ... the appellant is entitled to supersede the order without security by filing a notice of appeal."²⁰TEA and Commissioner Morath fall within the stated...