In re Thames
Decision Date | 26 March 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 3326.,3326. |
Citation | 544 S.E.2d 854,344 S.C. 564 |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | In the Matter of Doris W. THAMES. Doris W. Verdery, Individually as an Interested party, and as Attorney-in-fact for Doris W. Thames, Appellant, v. Betty Jane Daniels and C. Covert Daniels, Respondents. |
A.F. Carter, III, of Carter Law Firm, of Orangeburg, for appellant.
Steven S. McKenzie, of Coffey, Chandler & Johnson, of Manning, for respondents.
Doris W. Verdery brought this action seeking to set aside a power of attorney and a revocation of an earlier power of attorney, both executed by her mother, Doris W. Thames. Verdery alleges that on December 16, 1996, the date both documents were executed, Thames lacked mental capacity. The probate court dismissed Verdery's action, holding Thames was mentally competent when she executed the power of attorney in favor of Betty Jane Daniels and revoked the former power of attorney which appointed Verdery her attorney in fact. The circuit court affirmed. Verdery appeals, and we affirm.
Thames, who was in her late eighties at the time of trial, has been married to Harry A. Thames (Mr. Thames) since 1969. Verdery and Daniels are her daughters from a previous marriage, and Daniels' husband, C. Covert Daniels, is her sonin-law.
Thames had been living with her husband, but in the latter part of 1995 she began living at Verdery's home in Orangeburg. During March of 1996, Verdery attempted to have a guardian and a conservator appointed for her mother, apparently on the ground that her mother suffered from dementia and was mentally incompetent. After reviewing the medical evidence, the probate court declined Verdery's request, concluding Thames was mentally competent.
In May of 1996, Thames, while still living with Verdery, executed a durable power of attorney in Verdery's favor. In the summer of that year, Mr. Thames brought a family court action seeking visitation with or custody of his wife. Under a consent order in that case, Thames remained in Verdery's home, but other family members, including her husband, were granted limited visitation. The order also prohibited family members from discussing or transacting business during these visits. The court later held Mr. Thames in contempt after he, Daniels, and Daniels' son, during a visit with Thames, took her to a bank where she withdrew money and refused to return her to Verdery's home. The family court's order included the following statements regarding Thames' competency:
Mr. Thames later brought an action in probate court to have a guardian appointed for Thames, alleging she was an "incapacitated person." The court appointed him guardian, noting that the parties' counsel stipulated that she was incapacitated. In its order, the probate court discussed in detail the difference between a guardian and a conservator. The court did not appoint a conservator.
Less than one month later, Thames executed the documents which are the subject of this lawsuit. In addition to asking that the documents be set aside, Verdery asked the court to recognize her as the attorney in fact for Thames, enjoin Daniels and her husband from interfering with Verdery's management of Thames' business affairs, order Daniels and her husband to make an accounting to Verdery regarding transfers of Thames' real and personal property, and award Verdery attorney's fees and costs.
While Verdery raises several grounds for appeal, her arguments essentially boil down to two main issues: (1) what is the applicable standard of review for an appellate court in an action to set aside a power of attorney and a revocation of a power of attorney for lack of mental capacity; and (2) based on the appropriate standard of review, did the circuit court err in affirming the probate court's finding that Thames was competent to execute the challenged documents on December 16, 1996?
Verdery first argues the circuit court erred in concluding this was an action at law and thus applied the wrong standard of review. We agree.
The standard of review applicable to cases originating in the probate court is controlled by whether the underlying cause of action is at law or in equity. Howard v. Mutz, 315 S.C. 356, 361-62, 434 S.E.2d 254, 257-58 (1993) ( ). The question of whether an action to set aside a power of attorney and a revocation of a power of attorney on the ground of mental incompetency is at law or in equity has not been previously addressed in South Carolina. Therefore, we must examine a power of attorney, and the capacity required to execute and revoke one, in light of other existing legal authority to determine the nature of Verdery's cause of action.
Both Verdery and Daniels compare the current lawsuit to actions to set aside other legal instruments or transactions on the basis of a lack of mental capacity. Verdery argues that her cause of action is akin to an action to set aside a deed or petition signature on the basis of mental incompetence, which is an action in equity. Vereen v. Bell, 256 S.C. 249, 251-52, 182 S.E.2d 296, 297 (1971) ( ); Ballenger v. City of Inman, 336 S.C. 126, 130, 518 S.E.2d 824, 827 (Ct.App.1999) ( ). Likewise, an action to rescind a contract is in equity. Gibbs v. G.K.H., Inc., 311 S.C. 103, 105, 427 S.E.2d 701, 702 (Ct.App.1993).
Daniels, on the other hand, equates the current action to a will contest, which is an action at law. Estate of Cumbee v. Cumbee, 333 S.C. 664, 670, 511 S.E.2d 390, 393 (Ct.App. 1999). This general principle applies even when the ground for setting aside the will is lack of mental capacity. Estate of Weeks v. Drawdy, 329 S.C. 251, 262, 495 S.E.2d 454, 460 (Ct.App.1997) ( ).
A durable power of attorney allows a person, the principal, to designate another as his or her attorney in fact to act on the principal's behalf as provided in the document even if the principal becomes mentally incompetent. S.C.Code Ann. § 62-5-501 (Supp.2000); see also 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 23 (1986) ( . With a durable power of attorney, a principal creates an agency in another that continues despite the principal's later physical disability or mental incompetency. See § 62-5-501; see also 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 28 (). Moreover, in order for the principal to create the agency relationship in the first instance, the principal must have the mental capacity to contract. 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 12 (). Therefore, in order to execute or revoke a valid power of attorney, the principal must possess contractual capacity.
South Carolina has defined contractual capacity as a person's ability to understand, at the time the contract is executed, the nature of the contract and its effect. In re: Nightingale's Estate, 182 S.C. 527, 542, 189 S.E. 890, 896 (1937) (); see also 53 Am.Jur.2d Mentally Impaired Persons § 156 (1996) .
Other jurisdictions addressing this issue have found contractual capacity is required to execute a power of attorney. Younggren v. Younggren, 556 N.W.2d 228, 232 (Minn.Ct.App. 1996) ( ); Testa v. Roberts, 44 Ohio App.3d 161, 542 N.E.2d 654, 658 (1988) (). Because a person must possess contractual capacity to execute or revoke a valid power of attorney, we believe a cause of action to set aside such a document is more closely akin to an action...
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