In re the Commitment of Edwin C. West:State
| Citation | 2011 WI 83,800 N.W.2d 929 |
| Decision Date | 26 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 2009AP1579.,2009AP1579. |
| Parties | In re the COMMITMENT OF Edwin C. WEST:State of Wisconsin, Petitioner–Respondent,v.Edwin Clarence West, Respondent–Appellant–Petitioner. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs and oral argument by Ellen Henak, assistant state public defender.For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.DAVID T. PROSSER, J.
¶ 1 This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals 1 affirming an order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court denying Edwin Clarence West's (West) petition for supervised release.
¶ 2 In 1997 a jury found that West was a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, and he was thereafter committed under that chapter. Under § 980.08(1), persons committed under ch. 980 may petition for supervised release into the community after at least 12 months have passed since the person was committed or his last petition for supervised release was rejected. The Wisconsin Legislature amended this statute in 2005, removing language that specifically allocated the burden of proof to the State in a hearing on the petition.
¶ 3 In 2008 West filed a motion with the circuit court to interpret whether amended § 980.08(4)(cg) continues to allocate the burden to the State. One month after filing this petition, he also filed a petition seeking supervised release. The circuit court denied his motion, finding that the amendments to § 980.08(4)(cg) unambiguously placed the burden of proof with the committed individual. The circuit court also denied his petition for supervised release.
¶ 4 West appealed, and argued to the court of appeals that the burden of proof does not rest with the committed person, and if it did, such allocation would violate the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions. The court of appeals disagreed, and in a per curiam opinion affirmed the circuit court.
¶ 5 West asks us to interpret the supervised release provision, Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4)(cg), to place the burden of proof with the State. He argues that, although the statute is ambiguous, the language, history, and scope of the statute support his position. He also asserts that the burden must remain with the State to prevent § 980.08(4)(cg) from violating the due process and equal protection clauses of the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions. 2
¶ 6 We conclude that amended Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4)(cg) unambiguously places the burden of proof with the committed individual, and that the appropriate burden of persuasion is clear and convincing evidence. We further hold that this allocation does not violate the guarantees of due process and equal protection in the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions.
¶ 7 In 1993 West was convicted of second degree sexual assault in violation of § 940.225(2)(a). Prior to West's release, the State petitioned to have him committed as a sexually violent person, pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes ch. 980. West was committed under ch. 980 in July 1997.
¶ 8 In preparation for the commitment hearing to establish probable cause to commit West, the State offered various medical examinations, including a report by Dr. Kenneth Diamond (Dr. Diamond), a senior staff psychologist for the Milwaukee Clinical Services Unit of the Department of Corrections. Dr. Diamond's evaluation of West compiled the results of various records and other, in-person, clinical evaluations. It was Dr. Diamond's opinion that West suffered from cocaine and alcohol abuse (both in remission) and from antisocial personality disorder, a mental disorder warranting commitment. Based on West's history of sexual assaults and his performance on various behavioral tests, Diamond stated:
Psychological testing indicates that he is an aggressive individual with possible sexual problems. On the PCL–R [Psychopathy Checklist Revised], his total score is diagnostic of psychopathy. Additionally, he scores on several actuarial risk factors which are strongly indicative of violent recidivism and these include: a high degree of psychopathy, pre-treatment deviant sexual arousal, non-sexual criminality, denial or minimization of previous offense, and use of force and/or threat of force during crime. It is my opinion to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that the antisocial personality disorder, cocaine abuse and alcohol abuse exhibited by Edwin C. West ... are congenital or acquired conditions ... that predispose Edwin C. West to engage in acts of sexual violence. It is also my opinion that these mental disorders exhibited by Edwin C. West create a substantial probability that he will engage in acts of sexual violence.
¶ 9 Dr. Diamond's summary of West's history of sexual assaults included:
(a) In 1982, at age 17, sexual contact with his then–15–year–old girlfriend, whom he impregnated;
(b) In 1988, at age 23, a conviction for choking and raping a female acquaintance, for which West received probation;
(c) In 1991, a probation violation for picking up a 16–year–old girl and threatening to rape her if she refused to kiss him, and then attempting to have intercourse with her; 3
(d) In 1991, an accusation that West forced a woman into her bedroom where he pushed her down and ejaculated on her; and,
(e) Also in 1991, an accusation that West terrorized and stalked a woman on the highway, although the woman did not press charges.
¶ 10 Finally, reports also indicated that in at least four states, West had adult criminal convictions including disorderly conduct and sexual assault, burglary and robbery, and auto theft.
¶ 11 Based on these factors, as well as his personal observations, Dr. Diamond recommended West be committed under ch. 980. Dr. Diamond testified at trial, and his report was admitted into evidence. In May 1997 a jury found West to be a sexually violent person under ch. 980. He was initially admitted to the Wisconsin Resource Center for treatment, and transferred in 2001 to Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center.
¶ 12 Between January 1998 and April 2009, during re-examination and review of West's classification as a sexually violent person, Department of Health and Family Services (DHFS) evaluators consistently found that West continued to be a sexually violent person, and consistently recommended against either supervised release or discharge.4 Only one re-examination, conducted by Hollida Wakefield in May 2008, indicated that West had made progress. While the report acknowledged that West still required treatment, it took the position that treatment could occur in the community.
¶ 13 In West's most recent examination in April 2009, however, the examiner diagnosed West with four mental disorders: paraphilia, alcohol dependence, polysubstance dependence, and antisocial personality disorder. The examiner found West to continue to be a sexually violent person and recommended against supervised release or discharge.
¶ 14 During his commitment, West requested supervised release in October 2000, July 2001, April 2002, and April 2008. He withdrew the 2000 and 2002 petitions without judgment. West also petitioned for discharge in April 2007 but withdrew that petition after his April re-examination results. He also petitioned for discharge in May 2009.
¶ 15 In March 2008 West filed a motion with the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Martin J. Donald, Judge, to interpret Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4)(cg) as allocating the burden of proof to the State in a hearing on supervised release. Prior to the statute's amendment,5 the presumption in supervised release cases was to grant a petition for supervised release unless the State met the burden of proving that release was not warranted. Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4)(b) (2003–04). The prior version of the statute required a circuit court to:
grant the petition unless the state proves by clear and convincing evidence ... that it is still likely that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence if the person is not continued in institutional care ... [or] ... [t]hat the person has not demonstrated significant progress in his or her treatment or that the person has refused treatment.Id.
¶ 16 However, effective June 2006, the statute was revised to read that “[t]he court may not authorize supervised release unless ... the court finds that all of the following criteria are met.” Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4)(cg). The amended statute does not mention any burden of proof.
¶ 17 On August 1, 2008, the circuit court denied West's motion. In its oral decision, the court determined that § 980.08(4)(cg) unambiguously places the burden of proof on the civilly-committed individual. Additionally, the court held that placement of such burden on the individual offends neither the due process nor equal protection clauses of the Constitution. On the same day, the circuit court held evidentiary hearings on West's petition for supervised release, followed by further hearings on October 10, 2008. The circuit court ultimately denied the petition for supervised release.
¶ 18 West appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court. In its decision, the court relied on State v. Rachel ( Rachel II ), 2010 WI App 60, 324 Wis.2d 465, 782 N.W.2d 443, in which the court of appeals rejected arguments identical to those raised by West. State v. West, No. 2009AP1579, unpublished slip op., ¶ 4, 329 Wis.2d 710, 2010 WL 3119776 (Wis.Ct.App. Aug. 10, 2010).
¶ 19 The court of appeals concluded that the statute was unambiguous, and that the plain language indicates the burden is to be placed on the petitioning committed individual. Id., ¶ 5. The court reasoned that by beginning the provision with language to deny supervised release unless certain criteria are met, the legislature intended to create a presumption of institutionalization that must be overcome by...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Waupaca Cnty. v. K.E.K. (In re K.E.K.)
...constitutionality must show that ‘the state unconstitutionally treats members of similarly situated classes differently.’ " State v. West, 2011 WI 83, ¶90, 336 Wis. 2d 578, 800 N.W.2d 929 (quoting Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 318, 541 N.W.2d 115 ). However, "[t]he right to equal protection does not......
-
State v. Hager (In re Commitment of Hager)
...the committed person to prove he is no longer a sexually violent person. See Arends, 325 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶ 40–41, 784 N.W.2d 513 ; cf State v. West, 2011 WI 83, ¶ 81, 336 Wis. 2d 578, 800 N.W.2d 929 (construing supervised release statute to place burden of persuasion on the committed person bec......
-
Michels v. Lyons (In re Visitation of A. A. L.)
...prosecutions of civil ordinance violations, and civil commitment. See Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d at 102, 325 N.W.2d 687 ; see also State v. West, 2011 WI 83, ¶¶76-77, 336 Wis. 2d 578, 800 N.W.2d 929.¶35 A number of courts require clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that a fi......
-
Winnebago Cnty. v. Christopher S. (In re Christopher S.)
...160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005) ( "This is because certain privileges and rights must necessarily be limited in the prison context."); In re Commitment of West, 2011 WI 83, ¶ 85, 336 Wis.2d 578, 800 N.W.2d 929 (holding that a liberty interest in freedom from confinement is not absolute). "Such a con......