In Re The Interest Of J.R.

• Decision Date: 11 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. 27858-1-III.,27858-1-III.
• Citation: 156 Wash.App. 9,230 P.3d 1087
• Parties: In re the Interest of J.R.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

156 Wash.App. 9

230 P.3d 1087

In re the Interest of J.R.

No. 27858-1-III.

Court of Appeals of Washington Division 3.

May 11, 2010.

Eric J. Nielsen, Casey Grannis, Nielsen Broman & Koch PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.

Kimberly A. Loranz, Office of the Attorney General, Yakima, WA, Thomas W. Mcgirk, Attorney General's Office, Spokane, WA, for Respondent.

KULIK, C.J.

¶ 1 J.R. appeals a Yakima County Juvenile Court order denying his petition for reinstatement of his mother's parental rights under RCW 13.34.215.He contends the court misinterpreted this statute when it concluded that J.R. failed to meet the statutory criteria for filing a reinstatement petition because he had achieved a permanent placement within three years of the parent's termination order.In the alternative, J.R. contends that if this court agrees with the juvenile court's interpretation, the statute violates his rights to substantive due process and equal protection.We conclude RCW 13.34.215 is unambiguous and does not allow J.R. to petition for reinstatement of parental rights.We also reject J.R.'s claim that the statute violates his substantive due process and equal protection rights.Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2 J.R. was born on February 28, 1993.Two and one-half months after his mother's voluntary relinquishment of parental rights in 1998, the court ordered a guardianship for J.R.The guardianship placed J.R. with his grandmother and another relative.The guardianship was in place for 10 years.The juvenile court terminated the guardianship upon request of the guardians.

¶ 3 On December 2, 2008, the then 15-year-old J.R. filed a petition for reinstatement of his mother's parental rights.Pursuant to RCW 13.34.215, ¹ J.R. alleged that he had previously been found to be dependent, that he was at least 12 years of age, that his permanency plan of guardianship had not been achieved, and that more than 3 years had passed since entry of the juvenile court order terminating his parental rights.According to J.R.'s petition, his mother was rehabilitated and wanted the court to place J.R. in her home.

¶ 4 At the threshold hearing on the matter, the State argued that J.R. did not meet the statutory criteria for filing a reinstatement petition.Specifically, it contended that RCW 13.34.215 barred J.R.'s petition because he achieved permanency when he was placed in a dependency guardianship within three years of the order terminating parental rights.J.R. argued that he had not achieved permanency because the guardianship ultimately failed.

¶ 5The juvenile court recognized that reinstatement might be in J.R.'s best interest, but found that J.R. had “not met the criteria to file a petition under RCW 13.34.215(1)(c) as [the] child did achieve a permanent plan of guardianship from 1998-2008 and the plain meaning of the statute is clear & unambiguous.”Clerk's Papersat 19(emphasis added).

ANALYSIS

¶ 6 The issue before us is whether RCW 13.34.215(1)(c) applies only to dependent children whose permanency plans were not achieved within three years of a final order of termination.

¶ 7RCW 13.34.215 was enacted in 2007 as Engrossed Substitute House Bill 1624.The statute provides a process for a child to petition the juvenile court to reinstate his or her parent's parental rights if certain conditions are met.RCW 13.34.215(1).The process involves three steps: (1) an initial threshold hearing (RCW 13.34.215(4)²); (2) if specific threshold criteria are met, the juvenile court addresses the merits of the petition ( RCW 13.34.215(6)³); and (3) if specific criteria on the merits are proven, then the child is placed in the home and custody of the parent for a specific period of time with monitoring ( RCW 13.34.215(8)(a)⁴).The ultimate goal is reinstating the parent-child relationship and dismissal of the dependency.RCW 13.34.215(8).

¶ 8 The subsection at issue here provides that a child may petition for reinstatement of parental rights if “[t]he child has not achieved his or her permanency plan within three years of a final order of termination.”RCW 13.34.215(1)(c).

¶ 9 J.R. contends the statute allows a dependent child to petition for reinstatement of parental rights if the child loses a permanent placement three years after the termination of parental rights.He argues that the trial court's interpretation overlooks his legislatively recognized right to a permanent home.He also contends that he did not achieve a permanency plan because the guardianship ultimately failed.

¶ 10The State counters that RCW 13.34.215(1)(c) is unambiguous and therefore it is unnecessary to look beyond the statute's plain language to determine the legislature's intent.It argues, “The statute is facially clear; either a permanency plan has been achieved within three years of a final order of termination or it has not been.”Br. of Resp'tat 6.The State points out that J.R.'s permanency plan was achieved within three months of the final order of termination and therefore J.R. does not fall within the narrow category of dependent children who may file for reinstatement of parental rights.

¶ 11 This is a case of first impression with no Washington authority on point.We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo.Cerrillo v. Esparza,158 Wash.2d 194, 199, 142 P.3d 155(2006).When a statute is unambiguous, we derive the legislature's intent from the plain language alone.State v. Watson,146 Wash.2d 947, 955, 51 P.3d 66(2002);State v. Thorne,129 Wash.2d 736, 762-63, 921 P.2d 514(1996).A statute is ambiguous if it can be interpreted in more than one way.Vashon Island Comm. For Self-Gov't v. Wash. State Boundary Review Bd.,127 Wash.2d 759, 771, 903 P.2d 953(1995).

¶ 12 Here, the statute's language is facially clear and not subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.By its plain language it applies to the class of children who have failed to achieve permanency plans within three years of a termination order.When a statute is clear on its face, courts must give effect to its plain meaning and should assume the legislature means exactly what it says.“The court may not add language to a clear statute, even if it believes the Legislature intended something else but failed to express it adequately.”State v. Chester,133 Wash.2d 15, 21, 940 P.2d 1374(1997).

¶ 13 Because the statute is clear we need not turn to legislative history to assist us with its interpretation.Nevertheless, the legislative history of the enactment supports our interpretation of the statute.This history indicates that the intent of the new legislation was to provide a process for reinstatement of parental rights for children who lacked a permanent home within three years of the termination of parental rights.

¶ 14 For example, the Senate Bill Report states: “There's no reason to keep kids lingering in foster care, if they can go home and be safe there.In addition, kids should be able to petition for reunification with their birth families if their permanency plans have not been achieved within three years.”Senate Comm. on Human Servs. & Corr. and Comm. on Ways & Means, S.B. Rep.. on Engrossed SubstituteH.B. 1624, at 5, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess.(Wash.2007).

¶ 15 Additionally, the House Bill Report states:

There have been some circumstances in which children have been placed in care and have not thrived.We have seen children who have no permanency and no hope for adoption....Children who want to go to a parent who wants them home, and can take care of them, should have a legal process to allow that to happen.The bill provides another avenue in select cases for the approximately 250 children who are legally free and age out of the foster care system each year.

House Comm. on Early Learning & Children's Servs., H.B. Rep. on H.B. 1624, at 4-5, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007).

¶ 16 In view of the plain language of the statute and the legislative history, J.R. does not fit within the class of children to which the statute applies.His permanency plan was entered within two and one-half months of the termination of his mother's parental rights.He did not lingering in foster care.Instead, he lived with his grandmother and another relative in a stable and permanent environment for over 10 years.Because J.R. achieved a permanency plan well within three years of the termination of parental rights, he does not meet the statutory criteria for filing a reinstatement petition.

¶ 17 Further, contrary to J.R.'s argument, he achieved a permanency plan.Under RCW 13.34.136(2)(a) a “permanency plan of care” includes guardianships.Additionally, the Final Bill Report provides: “The permanency plan will contain the desired goal for the child which may include a plan to return the child home, adoption, long-term placement, or guardianship, including dependency guardianship.”Final B. Rep. on Engrossed SubstituteH.B. 1624, at 1, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess.(Wash.2007).

¶ 18RCW 13.34.215(7) provides guidance in determining whether a permanency plan has been achieved.It states that in determining whether a child has achieved a permanency plan “the court shall review ... information related to any efforts to achieve the permanency plan including efforts to achieve adoption or a permanent guardianship.”J.R. asserts that under this section“[p]ermanent means permanent.”Br. of Appellantat 16.The State counters that permanent is not meant to mean “forever” but simply means “intended to last.”Br. of Resp'tat 10.

¶ 19 Federal law supports the State's position.42 U.S.C. § 675(7) states that “[t]he term ‘legal guardianship’ means a judicially created relationship between child and caretaker which is intended to be permanent.”(Emphasis added.)Additionally, we may resort to a dictionary definition to determine the common meaning of a term if it is not defined in a statute.Watson,146 Wash.2d at 956, 51 P.3d 66.Webster's dictionary defines “permanent” as “fixed or intended to be...