In Re The Marriage Of Daniel A. Nord

• Decision Date: 28 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. 4-09-0726.,4-09-0726.
• Parties: In re the MARRIAGE OF Daniel A. NORD, Petitioner-Appellant, and Kathleen A. Nord, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

402 Ill.App.3d 288

932 N.E.2d 543

342 Ill.Dec. 416

In re the MARRIAGE OF Daniel A. NORD, Petitioner-Appellant, and Kathleen A. Nord, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 4-09-0726.

Appellate Court of Illinois,Fourth District.

June 28, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Melissa M. McGrath (argued), of Thomson & Weintraub, of Bloomington, for appellant.

James A. Martinkus (argued), and Carrie B. Boyd, both of Erwin, Martinkus & Cole, Ltd., of Champaign, for appellee.

Justice POPE delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal concerns an award of maintenance entered during marriage dissolution proceedings between petitioner, Daniel A. Nord, and respondent, Kathleen A. Nord. All other issues have been resolved and are not part of this appeal.

On appeal, Daniel argues the trial court (1) abused its discretion when it awarded Kathleen permanent maintenance of $17,000 per month and (2) made significant factual errors which warrant reversal of the maintenance award. We disagree and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The parties married in December 1972. They had two children who are now adults. Daniel, age 57 at the time of the February 2009 hearing, is a physician practicing in the field of obstetrics and gynecology. Kathleen, age 58, is a high school graduate. Kathleen worked as a teacher's aide, in a real estate office filing paperwork, and for a patent attorney while Daniel was in medical school. However, Kathleen ceased working in 1980 to stay home and care for the parties' two children. As a result, Kathleen has not worked outside the home in approximately 30 years.

The parties purchased the marital residence for approximately $485,000, and during the marriage they made approximately $1 million worth of improvements to the home. Their 12,000-square-foot, three-floor home contained nine bathrooms, four bedrooms, a six-car garage, an indoor half-court gymnasium, and an in-ground pool. The parties' other properties included eight timeshares in Cancun, a timeshare in Missouri, and a second home in Guadalajara, Mexico, valued at $545,000. The parties, during their marriage, not only traveled extensively to Mexico, but also traveled to Australia, New Zealand, and to Europe on several occasions. Kathleen and her daughter also traveled to Africa and Japan during the marriage.

According to the trial testimony, the parties separated sometime between late July and early August 2006. Prior thereto, they sold their home for approximately $1,600,000 and moved into a $5,600-per-month rental home. The revenue from the sale of the home, furnishings, and artwork (the parties received $700,000 for furnishings and artwork) amounted to approximately $2,300,000.

In November 2006, Daniel filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. Prior to the hearing on Daniel's petition, the parties reached agreement on the distribution of the marital and nonmarital property. While the parties agreed with respect to who was to receive the various properties, they did not agree on the values to be assigned to some of the properties. Nor did the parties agree with respect to the amount and duration of maintenance for Kathleen. The parties' “Property Settlement Agreement” included four exhibits that itemized the agreed distribution of the marital and nonmarital property and debt to each party and set forth each party's assigned values to each item of property. Significant discrepancies existed in the values assigned to two items of property. The parties agreed Daniel's 10% interest in Nord Farms, Inc. (Nord Farms), was his nonmarital property. Daniel valued his interest in Nord Farms at $152,280, while Kathleen valued it at $705,125. The second significant discrepancy arose with respect to the value of a marital asset, a 50% interest in Daniel's obstetrics practice, Nord, Wellman Obstetrics & Gynecology, SC. While the parties agreed this marital asset should be assigned to Daniel, Kathleen valued it at $700,000 and Daniel valued it at $135,000.

In February 2009, over the course of 2 1/2 days, the trial court heard evidence concerning these property values and the parties' arguments regarding maintenance. The parties agreed Kathleen was entitled to maintenance but disagreed as to the amount and duration. To be able to establish an appropriate amount of maintenance, the court needed to determine the value of these properties, in addition to determining the prospective incomes of the parties. Daniel argued he could not pay more than $5,000 per month for 60 months. Kathleen, on the other hand, initially sought permanent maintenance of $31,000 monthly, a figure her counsel modified to $21,000 during closing argument. At the end of the hearing, the court took the matter under advisement.

In a June 2009 written order, the trial court found that “to meet Kathleen's reasonable needs in light of the standard of living established during the marriage and in light of Daniel's ability to pay, Daniel should pay Kathleen [permanent] maintenance in the amount of $17,000 per month.”

On July 13, 2009, the trial court entered a final judgment for dissolution of marriage.

On July 21, 2009, and July 23, 2009, Daniel filed motions to reconsider and to correct factual errors. Following a September 2009 hearing, the trial court denied both motions.

This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Daniel argues the trial court's permanent-maintenance award of $17,000 per month was an abuse of discretion where the trial court made significant factual errors. Specifically, Daniel contends (1) his resources are insufficient to pay the maintenance award, (2) $17,000 per month was not necessary for Kathleen's reasonable expenses, (3) his actual expenses were not considered, (4) Kathleen received the bulk of the marital assets, and (5) $5,000 per month for 60 months would adequately support Kathleen.

Kathleen argues the trial court's award was not an abuse of discretion. Specifically, she contends (1) Daniel has the ability to pay the maintenance awarded and his argument to the contrary is not supported by the evidence presented at trial, (2) Daniel's income is able to provide for her reasonable expenses while also providing a comfortable lifestyle for himself, and (3) given her age, educational level, and 30-year absence from the workforce as well as the duration of the marriage (37 years), permanent maintenance is justified and necessary.

A. Standard of Review

“As a general rule, ‘a trial court's determination as to the awarding of maintenance is presumed to be correct.’ ” In re Marriage of Heroy, 385 Ill.App.3d 640, 650, 324 Ill.Dec. 310, 895 N.E.2d 1025, 1037 (2008), quoting In re Marriage of Donovan, 361 Ill.App.3d 1059, 1063, 297 Ill.Dec. 823, 838 N.E.2d 310, 314 (2005).

The amount of a maintenance award lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this court must not reverse that decision unless it was an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Schneider, 214 Ill.2d 152, 173, 291 Ill.Dec. 601, 824 N.E.2d 177, 189 (2005). An abuse of discretion occurs where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Schneider, 214 Ill.2d at 173, 291 Ill.Dec. 601, 824 N.E.2d at 189. The party seeking reversal of a maintenance award bears the burden of showing the trial court abused its discretion. Schneider, 214 Ill.2d at 173, 291 Ill.Dec. 601, 824 N.E.2d at 189.

B. The Statutory Factors

Section 504(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) sets forth the following 12 factors for a trial court to consider in deciding whether to grant a maintenance award:

“(1) the income and property of each party, including marital property apportioned and non[ ]marital property assigned to the party seeking maintenance;

(2) the needs of each party;

(3) the present and future earning capacity of each party;

(4) any impairment of the present and future earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance due to that party devoting time to domestic duties or having forgone or delayed education, training, employment, or career opportunities due to the marriage;

(5) the time necessary to enable the party seeking maintenance to acquire appropriate education, training, and employment, and whether that party is able to support himself or herself through appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child making it appropriate that the custodian not seek employment;

(6) the standard of living established during the marriage;

(7) the duration of the marriage;

(8) the age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties;

(9) the tax consequences of the property division upon the respective economic circumstances of the parties;

(10) contributions and services by the party seeking maintenance to the education, training, career or career potential, or license of the other spouse;

(11) any valid agreement of the parties; and

(12) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be just and equitable.” 750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2008).

In considering these factors, the trial court is not required to give them equal weight “so long as the balance struck by the court is reasonable under the circumstances.” In re Marriage of Miller, 231 Ill.App.3d 480, 485, 172 Ill.Dec. 679, 595 N.E.2d 1349, 1353 (1992). “Although the trial court must consider all the relevant statutory factors, it need not make specific findings as to the reasons for its decisions.” In re Marriage of Reynard, 378 Ill.App.3d 997, 1004, 318 Ill.Dec. 304, 883 N.E.2d 535, 541 (2008). “The benchmark for determining the amount of maintenance is the recipient's reasonable needs in light of the standard of living established during the marriage.” In re Marriage of Culp, 341 Ill.App.3d 390, 398, 275 Ill.Dec. 221, 792 N.E.2d 452, 459 (2003)

C. Alleged Factual Errors

Daniel argues Kathleen's maintenance award was erroneous in light of the significant factual errors the trial court made in determining the award.

When a party challenges a trial court's factual...