In re the Marriage of Scott L. Hart

• Decision Date: 12 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. DA 10–0192.,DA 10–0192.
• Citation: 258 P.3d 389,360 Mont. 308,2011 MT 102
• Parties: In re the MARRIAGE OF Scott L. HART, Petitioner, Appellee and Cross–Appellant,andMargot Luckman Hart, Respondent and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

360 Mont. 308

258 P.3d 389

2011 MT 102

In re the MARRIAGE OF Scott L. HART, Petitioner, Appellee and Cross–Appellant,andMargot Luckman Hart, Respondent and Appellant.

No. DA 10–0192.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs March 23, 2011.Decided May 12, 2011.

For Appellant: Thorin A. Geist, P. Mars Scott Law Offices, Missoula, Montana.For Appellee: Kenneth R. Dyrud, Dyrud Law Offices, P.C., Missoula, Montana.Justice PATRICIA O. COTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

[360 Mont. 309] ¶ 1 Margot Luckman Hart (Margot) appeals the June 2009 order of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, denying her motion for determination of back child support and imposing sanctions for inconsistent pleadings. Margot also appeals the March 2010 order of the District Court concluding that her ex-spouse, Scott L. Hart (Scott), did not owe her for back child support. Scott cross-appeals the District Court's 2010 order arguing it failed to award his attorney fees pursuant to the terms of the Marital and Property Settlement Agreement. Both Margot and Scott pray for attorney fees on appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

ISSUES

¶ 2 A restatement of Margot's issues on appeal is:

1. Did the District Court err when it concluded Margot's statements filed with the court indicating that Scott was current on his child support obligations as of September 2001 constitute judicial admissions and thus preclude an award of back child support?

2. Did the District Court err when it determined that Margot had filed inconsistent pleadings and imposed sanctions against her?

3. Did the District Court err when it held that Scott did not owe Margot for back child support?

¶ 3 Scott raises the following issue on cross-appeal: did the District Court err by failing to award Scott his attorney fees pursuant to a “prevailing party” contractual provision, when the sanctions imposed on Margot covered only a portion of Scott's attorney fees?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Scott and Margot divorced in May 1993 and entered into a Marital and Property Settlement Agreement (hereinafter “Settlement Agreement”) before the District Court. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Margot and Scott's two children would live primarily with Margot and Scott would pay Margot child support payments of $150 (later $200) per month plus half the cost of the children's uninsured medical expenses.

¶ 5 In October 2000, Scott filed a Motion to Amend the Parenting Plan to reflect changes in the children's residency arrangements. In her response brief to Scott's motion, Margot set forth the statutory criteria to determine the best interests of the child and, in doing so, made the statement that “[t]here is no issue of Scott's having failed to pay child support.” Following a contested hearing, each party submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Margot again made the statement in Proposed Finding No. 40 that Scott was current with his child support obligations, but the court did not ultimately adopt this finding. In December 2001, the District Court granted Scott's motion as to the residency arrangement of the children; it did not modify child or medical support obligations.

¶ 6 In March 2003, Scott suffered a catastrophic injury for which he received social security disability benefits. In February 2008, as a result of Scott's injury, Margot received a lump-sum social security payment of $8,097 for each child, and she began receiving dependent's benefits of $274 per month for each child.

¶ 7 On June 9, 2008, Margot filed a Motion for Determination of Back Child and Medical Support Amount Due, in which she requested a determination of the child and medical support amounts due to her from Scott. Margot claimed Scott owed her over $34,000 in back child and medical support dating back to 1993. On July 31, 2008, Scott filed his response, disputing Margot's claims and arguing that Margot's statements regarding back child support were contradictory to earlier statements made under oath and otherwise. On October 1, 2009, the court held a hearing in which it received testimony from Margot and Nicholas L. Bordeau, an expert in child support determination hired by Scott. Mr. Bordeau opined that Margot was overpaid by at least $3,230.12 for the child support, accrued interest, and medical expenses obligations of Scott for the period of September 25, 2001, to March 26, 2003, regardless of whether the payments were applied first to principal and then to interest, or vice versa. The parties agreed that the lump-sum payment should be applied to Scott's outstanding child and medical support obligations; however, the parties disagreed as to whether the lump-sum should be applied first to principal or to interest. At that hearing, the court ordered that the lump-sum social security payment be applied first to principal and then to interest.

¶ 8 Ultimately, the District Court found that Scott was current on child support obligations through September 25, 2001, because Margot admitted as much in what the District Court concluded were judicial admissions. Further, the court found that the lump-sum social security payment was an overpayment, regardless of whether it was applied first to principal or to interest, and therefore concluded that Scott was not in arrearage for past due child or medical support. Finally, the court awarded Scott attorney fees and costs as a sanction, because it concluded Margot's pleadings were inconsistent.

¶ 9 Margot timely appeals these orders and prays for attorney fees. Scott cross-appeals the District Court's March 23, 2010 order and prays for attorney fees. Additional facts are included below as necessary.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 10 We review a district court's findings of fact to determine whether they are clearly erroneous. In re Szafryk, 2010 MT 90, ¶ 18, 356 Mont. 141, 232 P.3d 361 (internal citations omitted). A finding is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence, if the trial court has misapprehends the evidence, or if a review of the record leaves us with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. We review a district court's conclusions of law for correctness. Id.

¶ 11 We review a district court's grant or denial of attorney fees for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Gorton, 2008 MT 123, ¶ 45, 342 Mont. 537, 182 P.3d 746 (citing In re Marriage of Mease, 2004 MT 59, ¶ 57, 320 Mont. 229, 92 P.3d 1148).

DISCUSSION

¶ 12 Issue One: Did the District Court err when it concluded Margot's statements filed with the court indicating that Scott was current on his child support obligations as of September 2001 constitute judicial admissions and thus preclude an award of back child support?

¶ 13 Margot acknowledges that she stated “[t]here is no issue of Scott's having failed to pay child support” in her November 2000 response to Scott's Motion to Amend Parenting Plan, and again asserted that “Scott is current with his child support obligations” in her September 2001 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed with the District Court. She argues, however, that these statements do not constitute judicial admissions for two reasons. First, she asserts the statements are not judicial admissions because the issue of the children's residential arrangements, not child and medical support, were before the court when she made these statements. Second, she argues that her proposed finding cannot be a judicial admission because it was not ultimately adopted by the District Court in its December 21, 2001 order. However, Margot does not dispute either that she made these statements during the litigation surrounding interpretation of the Settlement Agreement or that they are statements of fact.

¶ 14 A judicial admission is “an express waiver made in court by a party or its counsel conceding the truth of an alleged fact,” Bitterroot Intl. Sys. v. Western Star Trucks, Inc., 2007 MT 48, ¶ 41, 336 Mont. 145, 153 P.3d 627. “A judicial admission has a conclusive effect upon the party who makes it, and prevents that party from introducing further evidence to prove, disprove, or contradict the admitted fact.” Id. (internal citation omitted). To be binding, a judicial admission must be “an unequivocal statement of fact.” Denke v. Shoemaker, 2008 MT 418, ¶ 84, 347 Mont. 322, 198 P.3d 284 (internal citation omitted). A judicial admission “may occur at any point in the litigation process.” Kohne v. Yost, 250 Mont. 109, 112, 818 P.2d 360, 362 (1991).

¶ 15 Margot asserts that our review of judicial admissions must be guided by the five-part test set forth in Conagra, Inc. v. Nierenberg, 2000 MT 213, ¶ 45, 301 Mont. 55, 7 P.3d 369. However, Conagra is inapposite because the plain language of the five-part test and our analysis in that case clearly applies to testimonial declarations, not to pleadings and other documents filed with the court. See Conagra, ¶¶ 44–45. Here, we are not concerned with testimonial declarations, but instead with the two separate occasions on which Margot filed written statements with the district court unequivocally stating that Scott was current with his child support obligations through at least September 2001. We have not extended—and do not extend today—the five-part test set forth in Conagra to pleadings and documents filed with the district court. The policy concerns surrounding testimonial declarations—that declarants may be easily swayed by aggressive cross-examination—simply do not exist when statements are written.

¶ 16 A written document, filed with a district court and signed by either the party or the party's attorney, is assumed to be, “to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry ... well-grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of...