In re the Parental Responsibilities of M.B.–m., 09CA2447.
Decision Date | 20 January 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 09CA2447.,09CA2447. |
Citation | 252 P.3d 506 |
Parties | In re the Parental Responsibilities of M.B.–M., a Child, and Rebecca Johanna McBlair, Appellee,andConcerning Marie Yvette Berndt, Appellant. |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Barbara L. Naas, LLC, Barbara L. Naas, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Appellee.G. William Beardslee, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Appellant.
Opinion by Judge TERRY.
Can a district court magistrate sua sponte reconsider his or her written and signed order for contempt and sanctions, other than to correct clerical errors? Based on our review of the Colorado Rules for Magistrates, combined with the applicable Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, we conclude the answer is no.
Marie Yvette Berndt appeals from two district court orders. Those orders adopted a magistrate's order that reversed the magistrate's previous finding of contempt and award of attorney fees against Rebecca Johanna McBlair. We reverse the district court's orders and remand for further proceedings.
After disagreements arose between Berndt and McBlair with regard to M. B.–M., a minor child whom they had jointly adopted, Berndt filed a petition for allocation of parental responsibilities, parenting time, and child support.
As part of temporary orders, the magistrate ordered joint decision-making and parenting time. The magistrate also required that the parties keep the child with his established daycare provider, and ordered that neither party “shall ... unilaterally enroll the child in any other [daycare] or preschool programs without agreement.”
Berndt later filed a motion for contempt against McBlair, alleging that McBlair had violated temporary orders by unilaterally enrolling the child with a new daycare provider and without listing Berndt as a parent or emergency contact person.
The magistrate held a hearing on the contempt motion in May 2009. At the end of the hearing, the magistrate made the following oral ruling: McBlair was in contempt; she could purge the contempt by giving the daycare provider a new admission form; and within sixty days she was to pay Berndt $1,500 to compensate for the latter's attorney fees. The oral ruling was never reduced to writing.
Two months later, the magistrate held a sentencing hearing. After the hearing, the magistrate issued a signed minute order, dated July 7, 2009, stating:
Court finds that contempt has been purged and court awards [attorney] fees to [Berndt] in the amount of $1500; judgment shall enter against [McBlair and] in favor of [Berndt] in the amount of $1500.
On July 13, 2009, six days after issuing the minute order, the magistrate issued a new written order, which she signed. The new order made what the magistrate referred to as “additional, different findings.” Based on the new findings, the magistrate ruled that Berndt had not met her burden to establish McBlair had violated a valid court order, and that McBlair had not been in contempt. The new order also vacated the attorney fees award.
Berndt filed a petition for review of the July 13 order, and sought to have the May oral contempt order and the July 7 minute order reinstated. In the first of two district court orders before us on appeal, the district court denied the petition for review, concluding that the July 13 order was “the only final order for those proceedings” before the magistrate. Berndt moved for reconsideration of the district court's order. In the second order before us on appeal, the district court denied the motion for reconsideration. The court acknowledged that it had previously overlooked the fact that the July 7 minute order was dated and signed by the magistrate. It nevertheless concluded:
[The minute] order [awarding] attorney fees [could] not stand alone [and was] dependent upon the [earlier oral] finding and order for contempt and inextricably connected to it. The magistrate in her order of July 13, 2009, did not find [McBlair] in contempt and specifically vacated the $1,500.00 in attorney's fees and ordered each party to pay [her] own fees. Until the order of July 13, 2009, was entered the issue before the court was not fully resolved. Based on that order no attorney's fees are due either party.
Berndt now appeals the two district court orders.
We agree with Berndt's contention that the district court erred in adopting the magistrate's July 13 order. This error resulted from a series of improper actions on the magistrate's part.
Because this appeal turns on the interpretation of the Colorado Rules for Magistrates and the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and their application to orders entered by the magistrate and the district court, our review is de novo. See People v. Zhuk, 239 P.3d 437, 438 (Colo.2010).
Initially, we note that a magistrate should not make a ruling deciding the issue of contempt and sanctions solely on an oral record, without also executing a written and signed order. C.R.C.P. 107(f) ( ); C.R.M. 7(a)(4) ( ). Contempt proceedings have serious consequences, and litigants should not be left in limbo, having the issue of finality of a contempt finding depend upon whether a magistrate has entered a written and signed order. Had the magistrate here entered a written and signed order directly after the May contempt hearing, this appeal would never have arisen.
Because of the circumstances presented here, we need not decide whether a contempt finding that is not reduced to writing and signed by a magistrate is nevertheless final and appealable. Here, the magistrate's July 7 written and signed minute order stands, however imperfectly, as a written contempt order.
Granted, the July 7 minute order does not explicitly state that McBlair was in contempt of court. Nevertheless, in stating that the parties were before the magistrate for a sentencing hearing, that the contempt had been purged, and that judgment was entered against McBlair for attorney fees, the minute order can only be understood as an adoption of the magistrate's earlier oral finding that McBlair had been in contempt. Moreover, the minute order imposed the same $1, 500 attorney fee award against McBlair that had been imposed in the previous oral ruling. The July 7 order “fully resolved an issue or claim,” and thus, was a final order. See C.R.M. 7(a)(3), (4).
Where a magistrate considers a motion for contempt under C.R.C.P. 107, consent of the parties to hear the matter is not required. C.R.M. 5(b). Thus, we limit our discussion here to situations where consent of the parties is not required, and do not consider the effect of a magistrate's ruling where the parties have given consent for a magistrate to hear and decide matters ordinarily decided by a district court.
We begin by contrasting the powers of a district court magistrate with those of a district court.
A magistrate has only those powers provided by statute or court rule. See § 13–5–201(3), C.R.S.2010 (); § 13–6–405, C.R.S.2010 ( ); §§ 13–6–501 to 13–6–504, C.R.S.2010 ( ); C.R.M. 1–11; see also In re R.G.B., 98 P.3d 958, 960 (Colo.App.2004) ( ).
District court magistrates are not judges, but rather are supervised by district court judges. C.R.M. 1 (); C.R.M. 3(a) ( ); cf. Wiegand v. County Court Magistrate, 937 P.2d 880 (Colo.App.1996) ( ).
District courts have a limited ability to reconsider their judgments under C.R.C.P. 59 and 60. Under C.R.C.P. 59(a), a party may, within fifteen days, file a post-trial motion requesting a district court to...
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In re Thorburn, Court of Appeals No. 21CA1006
...cannot rule on a motion to reconsider under C.R.C.P. 59 or for relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b). In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.B.-M. , 252 P.3d 506, 510 (Colo. App. 2011) ; see also C.R.M. 5(a) (magistrate may correct clerical errors under C.R.C.P. 60(a) but otherwise has no autho......
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Andrews v. Miller, Court of Appeals No. 18CA2143
...consent. ¶ 7 This appeal turns on interpretation of the magistrate rules, which we review de novo. In re Parental Responsibilities of M.B.-M. , 252 P.3d 506, 509 (Colo. App. 2011). We interpret all court rules, consistent with principles of statutory construction, looking first to the plain......
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