In re Thomas J.
Citation | 811 A.2d 310,372 Md. 50 |
Decision Date | 19 November 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 67,67 |
Parties | In re THOMAS J. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Maryland |
Mary Ann Ince, Assistant Attorney General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, on brief), for petitioner.
Geraldine K. Sweeney, Assistant Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), for respondent. Argued before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ.
The issue this case presents is whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial applies to juvenile proceedings, where, in this case, there was a delay of three years and four months between the detention of the juvenile and the subsequent adjudicatory hearing. The Circuit Court for Prince George's County, sitting as a juvenile court, found that there was no denial of the right to a speedy trial and, therefore, denied the motion to dismiss filed by Thomas J., the respondent. The Court of Special Appeals, following an independent constitutional appraisal of the undisputed facts, reversed, determining that Thomas J. had been denied his right to a speedy trial. We shall affirm.
Evidence gathered during a police investigation of an attempted robbery led to the arrest of Thomas J. on January 18, 1996. Later that day, Thomas J. was released into the custody of his mother ("Mrs. J.") pending further proceedings. Subsequently, a delinquency petition was filed on May 2, 1996, but because Mrs. J. and Thomas J. had moved, they did not receive the summonses issued on May 8, 1996. The summonses were reissued on two occasions, May 28, 1996 and May 30, 1996. As a result of the failed attempts at service by the State, the petitioner, a writ of attachment was issued on June 24, 1996. This writ was reviewed annually for three years, and finally returned on April 22, 1999—three years and four months after the arrest. At the adjudicatory hearing on May 20, 1999, Thomas J. filed a preliminary Motion to Dismiss, "based upon denial of a speedy trial."
The State argues that neither the Fourteenth, nor the Sixth Amendment is applicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings, in light of the Maryland Juvenile Causes Act ("MJCA"), infra, which already has in place rigid time limitations for the commencement of juvenile proceedings. Moreover, the State argues, Mrs. J. signed a form release requiring her to "immediately notify the Clerk of the Juvenile Court at the Court House, Upper Marlboro, Maryland of any new address for [her] or the child." She failed to do so and, thus, the State submits, the delay should be attributed to Thomas J.:
Thomas J., of course, sees it much differently. Noting that the form release was not admitted into evidence, he disputes that Mrs. J. was notified of an affirmative duty to notify the clerk of the juvenile court of any change of address. Rather, Mrs. J. did what she reasonably could have by giving the detective in the case her phone number at work, notifying that same detective of her change of address, and also in notifying the post office of her change of address. Moreover, even after the move, Thomas J. remained a student in the Prince George's County Public School System. Arguing that both the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution should be applicable to juvenile proceedings, and that the delay should be attributed to the State, defense counsel stated:
Subsequently, Thomas J.'s Motion to Dismiss was denied. Consequently, Thomas J. noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The intermediate appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court. In re Thomas J., 132 Md.App. 396, 752 A.2d 699 (2000). Balancing the four factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2191, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 116 (1972) ( ), that court, In re Thomas J., at 404-12, 752 A.2d at 703-07, opined:
We then granted the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, In re Thomas J., 360 Md. 485, 759 A.2d 230 (2000), to address this case of first impression.
We have previously noted that while "juvenile proceedings are civil and not criminal in nature, this does not mean that a juvenile gives up all rights that a person would be entitled to in a criminal proceeding." In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 69, 763 A.2d 136, 146 (2000). The respondent adopts this premise and asserts (i) a speedy trial claim based on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights; and (ii) a speedy trial claim based on the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution contains protections specifically granted to a criminal defendant in a criminal prosecution. Therefore, those rights are properly asserted by an accused in a criminal prosecution. The Supreme Court has been reluctant to transfer wholesale all the rights specifically granted to the criminal defendant to the juvenile offender. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1986, 29 L.Ed.2d 647, 661 (1971)
(); See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1445, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 548 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1057, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 97 (1966) (). Consequently, any federal constitutional relief Thomas J. is afforded must stem from a violation of his due process rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
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