In re Thompson
| Decision Date | 17 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 19-062 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Richard B. Thompson An Attorney at Law |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Disciplinary Review Board
Decision
Eugene A. Racz appeared on behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics.
Robert E. Ramsey appeared on behalf of respondent.
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
This matter was before us on a motion for final discipline filed by the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE), pursuant to R. 1:20-13(c)(2), following respondent's guilty plea in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Monmouth County, to one count of fourth-degree falsifying records, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4(a).
For the reasons set forth below, we determined to grant the motion for final discipline and to recommend respondent's disbarment and a permanent bar from serving in the judicial branch of government in the State of New Jersey.
Respondent earned admission to the New Jersey bar in 1982 and to the New York and District of Columbia bars in 1991. He has no history of discipline in New Jersey.
On February 2, 2018, before the Honorable David F. Bauman, P.J.Cr., Monmouth County, respondent pleaded guilty to one count of fourth-degree falsifying records, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4(a). Respondent's guilty plea was pursuant to an accusation, whereby he voluntarily waived his right to an indictment by a grand jury.
During his guilty plea allocution, respondent admitted that, from January 2010 through October 2015, while serving in public office as a municipal court judge in nine jurisdictions, he had systematically falsified official court records in motor vehicle cases. Specifically, respondent admitted that he routinely suspended mandatory motor vehicle fines in cases and, instead, substituted phony, baseless contempt of court charges in their place, knowing that his criminal scheme would steer one hundred percent of the contempt proceeds to the towns over which he presided. In contrast, mandatory motorvehicle fines were required to be divided between the respective towns and Monmouth County. Respondent further admitted that, if challenged by a defendant, he often would revert contempt charges to mandatory fines, but, on one occasion, threatened jail time for a defendant who had raised such a challenge. Moreover, respondent admitted that he would improperly apply defendants' bail money toward the phony contempt charges, without notice or due process for those defendants.
Respondent further admitted that the purpose of his criminal scheme was to use his authority, in his public office, to direct maximum revenue to the towns where he presided as a municipal court judge, and that, to conceal his wrongdoing, he typically falsified the contempt charges outside of the presence of the defendants and their counsel. Respondent admitted that his scheme was successful and, thus, deprived Monmouth County of its fair share of motor vehicle fine revenue. Finally, respondent admitted that he continued his scheme, even after a March 7, 2014 meeting with his superiors to discuss his contempt of court practices. Although he began assessing smaller phony contempt fines, he continued to steer funds to his preferred jurisdictions, until his suspension from the bench, on October 23, 2015.
According to the prosecution, a two-year investigation by the Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office, Financial Crimes and Public Corruption Unit,revealed that respondent's scheme had affected approximately 4,000 cases between 2010 and 2015, and $1.2 million in motor vehicle fine revenue, $600,000 of which was diverted to respondent's towns from Monmouth County.
On February 2, 2018, as part of respondent's plea agreement, Judge Bauman executed a forfeiture of public office, ordering that respondent "be forever disqualified from serving as a municipal court judge and from holding any other office or position of honor, trust, or profit under this State or any of its administrative or political subdivisions," pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(d). On March 22, 2018, respondent was granted entry into the Pretrial Intervention Program (PTI).
To address the possibility that, upon his successful completion of PTI, the forfeiture of public office that he executed would be nullified, respondent consented to entry of a Court Order permanently disqualifying him from "holding or securing future judicial office in the State of New Jersey."
Following a review of the record, we determine to grant the OAE's motion for final discipline. Final discipline proceedings in New Jersey are governed by R. 1:20-13(c). Under that Rule, a criminal conviction is conclusive evidence of guilt in a disciplinary proceeding. R. 1:20-13(c)(1); In re Magid, 139 N.J. 449, 451 (1995); In re Principato, 139 N.J. 456, 460 (1995).Respondent's guilty plea to, and conviction of, fourth-degree falsifying records, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4(a), establishes a violation of RPC 8.4(b). Pursuant to that Rule, it is professional misconduct for an attorney to "commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer." Respondent's conduct also violated RPC 8.4(c) () and RPC 8.4(d) (). Hence, the sole issue is the extent of discipline to be imposed. R. 1:20-13(c)(2); In re Magid, 139 N.J. at 451-52; and In re Principato, 139 N.J. at 460.
In determining the appropriate measure of discipline, we must consider the interests of the public, the bar, and the respondent. "The primary purpose of discipline is not to punish the attorney but to preserve the confidence of the public in the bar." Ibid. (citations omitted). Fashioning the appropriate penalty involves a consideration of many factors, including the "nature and severity of the crime, whether the crime is related to the practice of law, and any mitigating factors such as respondent's reputation, his prior trustworthy conduct, and general good conduct." In re Lunetta, 118 N.J. 443, 445-46 (1989).
In sum, respondent violated RPC 8.4(b), RPC 8.4(c), and RPC 8.4(d). The OAE urges respondent's disbarment. Respondent requests discipline short of disbarment.
The discipline imposed in cases involving similar misconduct in connection with municipal court proceedings has ranged from a reprimand to disbarment, depending on the facts of the offense, the presence of other unethical conduct, and the analysis of aggravating and mitigating factors.
In In re DeLucia and In re Terkowitz, 76 N.J. 329 (1978), each attorney received a one-year suspension. At the time of their misconduct, they were municipal court judges in Rutherford, New Jersey. Id. at 330. Barbara Spencer, Terkowitz's secretary, received a ticket for improperly passing a school bus on her way to work. Id. at 331. Later that day, she informed Terkowitz that she had not seen the school bus because of other traffic. Id. at 331-32. Terkowitz telephoned DeLucia and explained that Spencer had been experiencing physical problems due to her pregnancy, and that, because her view had been obstructed, she had not seen the school bus before passing it. Id. at 332. DeLucia then contacted the ticketing officer, explained the circumstances, and asked whether he would object if they "took care of it." Ibid. The officer responded that he did not object. Ibid.
While in chambers, without anyone appearing before him, DeLucia "personally noted a not guilty plea on the court copy of [Spencer's] summons and entered a judgment of not guilty." Ibid. In the portion of the summons for the witness' testimony, in the absence of a court hearing or any testimony, DeLucia wrote "testimony that . . . defendant states view was obstructed by trees . . . ." Ibid. Spencer's acquittal was based solely on the information that DeLucia had received from Terkowitz. Ibid.
When the prosecutor's office investigated the Spencer summons, DeLucia arranged for Spencer to prepare an affidavit reciting what had occurred, and to back-date it to the date of the summons, which was also the date that she had conveyed the information to Terkowitz. Id. at 332-33. DeLucia testified before the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct that, as to Spencer's affidavit, he had known that he was "arranging for the filing of a false document." Id. at 335.
The Court noted that it had previously denounced ticket-fixing, Id. at 336.
Although DeLucia resigned his position as municipal court judge, suffered great mental anguish, and did not personally profit from the misconduct, the Court imposed a one-year suspension, stating:
As to Terkowitz, the Court found that he knowingly participated in the improper dismissal of the traffic summons and attempted to conceal the wrongdoing by permitting the preparation of an affidavit with a back-dated acknowledgement and by executing a false jurat. Id. at 338.
In In re Hardt, 72 N.J. 160 (1977) (municipal court judge) and In re Weishoff, 75 N.J. 326 (1978) (municipal prosecutor), the municipal court judge was removed from his position and reprimanded, and the prosecutor was suspended for one year, for participating in fixing a speeding ticket.
In Hardt, after Muriel Mansmann received a speeding ticket, the return date of the summons was rescheduled at the request of her attorney. Id. at 162. The officer who issued the ticket discovered that his...
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