In re Tiffany. riginal
| Decision Date | 01 March 1920 |
| Docket Number | O,No. 26,26 |
| Parties | In re TIFFANY. riginal |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Mr. Merritt Lane, of Newark, N. J., for petitioner.
[Argument of Counsel from page 32-33 intentionally omitted] Mr. Samuel Heyman, of Jersey City, N. J., for respondent.
[Argument of Counsel from page 33-34 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an application of J. Raymond Tiffany as receiver, appointed by the Court of Chancery of New Jersey, of William Necker, Incorporated, for a writ of mandamus, or in the alternative a writ of prohibition, the object of which is to require the District Judge and the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey to order the assets of the corporation, in the hands of a federal receiver, to be turned over to applicant for administration by him as receiver appointed by the New Jersey Court of Chancery.
An order to show cause why the prayer of the petition should not be granted was issued, a return was made by the District Judge and the matter was argued and submitted. The pertinent facts are: On September 30, 1916, creditors and shareholders of William Necker, Incorporated, a corporation of the state of New Jersey, filed a bill in the United States District Court of New Jersey alleging the insolvency of the corporation, praying for the appointment of a receiver, and a distribution of the corporate assets among the creditors and shareholders. The bill alleged diversity of citizenship as a ground for jurisdiction. The defendant corporation appeared and answered, admitting the allegations of the bill, and joined in the prayer that its assets be sold and distributed according to law. Upon consent the District Court appointed a receiver. The estate is insolvent, and the assets in the hands of the federal receiver are insufficient to pay credtors, and shareholders will receive nothing. On April 1, 1919, 2 1/2 years after the appointment of the federal receiver, creditors of William Necker, Incorporated, filed a bill in the Court of Chancery of New Jersey alleging the corporation's insolvency, praying that it be decreed to be insolvent, that an injunction issue restraining it from exercising its franchises, and that a receiver be appointed to dispose of the property, and distribute it among creditors and shareholders. A decree was entered in said cause adjudging the corporation insolvent, and appointing the petitioner, J. Raymond Tiffany, receiver. Thereupon Tiffany made application to the United States District Court asking that its injunction enjoining the corporation and all of its officers and all other persons from interfering with the possession of the federal receiver be dissolved, that the federal receivership be vacated, and that the federal receiver turn over the assets of the company then in his hands, less administration expenses, to the chancery receiver for final distribution—the contention being that the appointment of the chancery receiver and the proceedings in the state court superseded the federal proceeding, and deprived the federal court of jurisdiction.
The federal receiver had made various reports and conducted the business of the corporation up until the time of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger
...had in the Supreme Court.' The statutory limitation of appeals to final decisions, i.e., judgments and decrees, Ex parte Tiffany, 252 U.S. 32, 36, 40 S.Ct. 239, 240, 64 L.Ed. 443, has called for determinations of the characteristics of finality. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6, 72 S.Ct. 1, 4,......
-
Clark v. Williard
...a chancery receiver appointed by a state court for the delivery of property in the possession of another court (Ex parte Tiffany, 252 U.S. 32, 36, 40 S.Ct. 239, 64 L.Ed. 443. Cf. Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U.S. 150, 155, 3 S.Ct. 136, 27 L.Ed. 888; Williams v. Morgan, 111 U.S. 684, 689, 4 S.Ct. ......
-
Austin v. United States
...case, whenever the application for the papers or other property is made by a stranger to the litigation, compare Ex parte Tiffany, 252 U.S. 32 40 S.Ct. 239, 64 L.Ed. 443; City of Savannah v. Jesup, 106 U.S. 563 1 S.Ct. 512, 27 L.Ed. 276; Gumbel v. Pitkin, 113 U.S. 545 58 S.Ct. 616, 28 L.Ed.......
-
Tutun v. United States Neuberger v. Same
...granting or denying a petition for naturalization is clearly a final decision within the meaning of that section. Ex parte Tiffany, 40 S. Ct. 239, 252 U. S. 32, 64 L. Ed. 443. This is true, although a certificate granted may be canceled under section 15 of the Naturalization Act (Comp. St. ......