In re Tobler Transfer, Inc.
Decision Date | 29 May 1987 |
Docket Number | Adv. No. 86-8184.,Bankruptcy No. 185-00596 |
Citation | 74 BR 373 |
Parties | In re TOBLER TRANSFER, INC., Debtor. William H. CHRISTISON, Trustee for the Estate of Tobler Transfer, Inc., Plaintiff, v. CATERPILLAR INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Central District of Illinois |
Louis J. Wade, Kansas City, Mo., Andrew Covey, Peoria, Ill., for plaintiff.
F. Louis Behrends, Steven C. Hoffman, Peoria, Ill., William J. Augello, Huntington, N.Y., for defendant.
DECISION
The matters under consideration in this Chapter 7 adversary proceeding are: (1) the motion of the defendant, CATERPILLAR INC., for a determination that this is not a core proceeding; (2) CATERPILLAR'S motion for transfer and reference of issues to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC); (3) CATERPILLAR'S motion for leave to file a jury demand; and (4) the motion of the plaintiff, WILLIAM H. CHRISTISON, Trustee (Trustee), to strike the counterclaim.
The facts in this matter are generally uncontroverted. Tobler Transfer, Inc. (TOBLER) filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in this Court on March 20, 1985. William H. Christison was appointed Trustee. Prior to its bankruptcy, TOBLER was in the business of freight hauling and was subject to regulation by the ICC. From 1979 to 1985, TOBLER provided transportation services to CATERPILLAR and CATERPILLAR paid TOBLER the amounts billed by TOBLER.
On May 5, 1986, the Trustee for the estate of TOBLER TRANSFER brought this action to collect $184,057.41 in freight undercharges. CATERPILLAR answered the complaint and asserted a counterclaim against TOBLER. On October 8, 1986, CATERPILLAR filed a motion for a determination that this is not a core proceeding along with a motion for transfer and reference of the issues to the ICC. The Trustee filed a motion to strike CATERPILLAR's counterclaim. A hearing on all three motions was held on January 21, 1987, and the matters were taken under advisement. CATERPILLAR filed a motion for leave to file a jury demand on February 2, 1987, and a hearing was held on April 13, 1987. That issue was also taken under advisement by the Court.
The first issue to be addressed is whether this adversary action is a core proceeding. The Trustee has cast his complaint as one for turnover of property of the estate. Because such a proceeding is included in the statutory illustrations of "core" proceedings under 28 U.S.C. Section 157(b)(2), the Trustee contends that its action to collect freight undercharges is a core proceeding. The Trustee likens this action as one to collect an account receivable. CATERPILLAR maintains that this is not an action to collect an account receivable but is akin to the action in Marathon1 and should be determined to be a non-core proceeding.
Under the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, the bankruptcy court may hear and render a final decision in core proceedings, while in non-core or related proceedings the Court may only submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the District Court. However, if the parties consent, a bankruptcy judge may enter a final order or judgment in a non-core proceeding which is subject to appeal to the District Court. 28 U.S.C. Section 157(c)(2). The statute itself lists numerous proceedings which are classified as core proceedings, but the list is merely illustrative and not exclusive. Included therein are "matters concerning the administration of the estate," as well as "orders to turn over property of the estate." "Core" proceedings are generally described as those proceedings which would not exist absent the bankruptcy proceeding. In re Yagow, 53 B.R. 737 (Bkrtcy.D.N.D.1985). Merely labeling the proceeding as one to turn over property of the estate is not, however, dispositive of whether the matter is a core proceeding. As one commentator notes:
1 Collier on Bankruptcy, para. 3.012biii.
Many courts have considered actions to collect accounts receivable to be core proceedings. In re Nat. Equipment & Mold Corp., 60 B.R. 133 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio 1986); In re Franklin Computer Corp., 50 B.R. 620 (E.D.Pa.1985). Other courts have held that a debtor's action to collect an account receivable is not a core proceeding. In re Arnold Print Works, Inc., 54 B.R. 562 (Bkrtcy.D.Mass.1985); In re Atlas Automation, Inc., 42 B.R. 246 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Mi. 1984). These latter courts have perceived that such an action is similar to that involved in Marathon. Even those courts which hold that such actions are core proceedings are confronted with "garden variety" accounts receivable where the issues are simple and the amount due is not in dispute. See In re Windsor Communications Group, 67 B.R. 692 (E.D.Pa.1986). That is hardly the case here.
The Trustee, relying on the filed rate doctrine, seeks to collect unbilled freight charges. CATERPILLAR fully disputes its liability, alleging that the Trustee's attempts to recover the undercharges constitutes an unreasonable practice under the Interstate Commerce Act. To this Court, resolution of the issue is not unduly complex. But for the Debtor's bankruptcy, would TOBLER's cause of action against CATERPILLAR exist? Clearly the answer is yes. The matter is not a core proceeding.
This Court determines, however, that this case is a "proceeding that is otherwise related to a case under title 11," for if the Trustee's action is successful, the funds will become part of the bankruptcy estate. Accordingly, this Court will submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the District Court.
The second issue to be determined is whether the issues raised in this case should be transferred to the ICC under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The Court in Bradford Sch. Bus Transit v. Chicago Tr. Auth., 537 F.2d 943, 949 (7th Cir.1976), discussed the doctrine's application:
Section 10701 of the Interstate Commerce Act provides that a rate related to transportation or service provided by a carrier subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC must be "reasonable." 49 U.S.C. Section 10701. Courts have, in the past, consistently held that a shipper must pay the tariff rate, regardless of any negotiated rate. Most recently, however, the ICC has indicated that the filed rate doctrine will no longer necessarily bar equitable defenses, such as those raised by CATERPILLAR here. The Commission explains:
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