In re Toland

• Citation: 258 Mass. 470,155 N.E. 602
• Parties: TOLAND'S CASE.
• Decision Date: 03 March 1927
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

258 Mass. 470

155 N.E. 602

TOLAND'S CASE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

March 3, 1927.

Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Weed, Judge.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Daniel Toland, claimant, against the Rendle-Kenney Dredging & Construction Company, employer, and the London Guarantee & Accident Company, Limited, insurer. From decree for claimant, the insurer appeals. Affirmed.J. R. Fuller and John J. Sullivan, both of Boston, for appellant.

W. G. Thompson and S. B. Horovitz, both of Boston, for appellee.

RUGG, C. J.

[1][2] The injury arose out of and in the course of the employment while the employee was at work ‘as a stationary engineer on a dredge of the subscriber which was engaged in digging into the land side of the harbor to enlarge the capacity of a dock in Boston Harbor.’ The employee was required by G. L. c. 146, § 46, to have a license as a stationary engineer from this commonwealth, but was not required by the laws of the United States to have a marine engineer's license. The evidence shows that the dredge was without motive power and could not move itself. It had been towed to its place, was afloat, and was either anchored or secured to the wharf by a line while the dock was being dredged. The employee was engaged on the engine by which the steam shovel for digging out the dock was operated. The employer had voluntarily accepted the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act by insuring under it and becoming a subscriber. It has been found that ‘there is full insurance coverage under the provisions of the statute.’ The employee has given no notice to retain his common law rights. The employer and employee have both elected, so far as permissible under the law as to exclusive admiralty jurisdiction, to be bound by the Workmen's Compensation Act. G. L. c. 152, §§ 1, 21, 22, 24, 26. That act is not compulsory but elective, both with respect to employers and employees. Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 349, 106 N. E. 1.

The single question for decision is whether in these circumstances the case comes within the Workmen's Compensation Act, or whether it is exclusively within admiralty jurisdiction. The principles by which this court must be guided were stated in Gillard's Case, 244 Mass. 47, 51, 52, 138 N. E. 384, 385, 386, in these words:

‘The words of the Workmen's Compensation Act, now G. L. c. 152, formerly St. 1911, c. 751, are broad enough in their scope, to include maritime torts except and so far as jurisdiction of the General Court of Massachusetts in that particular is excluded by the grant of power to the United States in ‘all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.’ U. S. Const. art. 3, § 2; art. 1, § 8. In several instances jurisdiction under the Workmen's Compensation Act over an injury which might have been argued to be maritime in its nature was taken without the point being raised, discussed or thought of. Gillen's Case, 215 Mass. 96 [102 N. E. 346, L. R. A. 1916A, 371]; Brightman's Case, 220 Mass. 17 [107 N. E. 527, L. R. A. 1916A, 321];McManaman's Case, 224 Mass. 554 . The only significant point in this connection is that by a verbal interpretation of our Workmen's Compensation Act, apart from constitutional considerations, maritime torts are included. Dorman's Case, 236 Mass. 583, 584 . Although these words are broad enough, as mere matter of grammatical construction, to include strictly maritime torts exclusively within admiralty jurisdiction, yet it is familiar law (to quote the words of Chief Justice Knowlton) that ‘a statute which would be unconstitutional as applied to a certain class of cases, and is constitutional as applied to another class, may be held to have been intended to apply only to the latter class, if this seems in harmony with the general purpose of the Legislature.’ Attorney General v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 188 Mass. 239, 241 [74 N. E. 467,3 Ann. Cas. 631];Manchester v. Popkin, 237 Mass. 434, 440 ;United States v. Standard Brewery, Inc., 251 U. S. 210, 220 [40 S. Ct. 139, 64 L. Ed. 229]. The Workmen's Compensation Act, therefore, must be and is interpreted as intended only to operate upon the classes of employment and injury within the jurisdiction of the General Court. On the other hand the words of the act and its chief aim render the conclusion irresistible that the General Court intended to make the act applicable to all classes of injuries therein described which are within its jurisdiction. ‘The statute is as broad as the jurisdiction of the commonwealth.’ Kinney v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 207 Mass. 368, 369 [93 N. E. 586, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 784, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 902]. In none of the cases which have come before us since the decision of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 [37 S. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900], have we undertaken to delimit the jurisdiction of the commonwealth under the Workmen's Compensation Act further than to apply to specific cases the principles of that decision as we understood them. Duart v. Simmons, 231 Mass. 313 ; [Id.], S. C., 236 Mass. 225 ;Sterling's Case, 233 Mass. 485 ;Proctor v. Dillen, 235 Mass. 538, 544, 545 ;Sterling v. Frederick Leyland & Co., Ltd., 242 Mass. 8 . The language of that act, in view of its beneficient purpose, ought not to be narrowed any further than jurisdictional bounds demand. So far as our own decisions are concerned, we are quite at liberty to extend the Workmen's Compensation Act to any case to which it is applicable under adjudications of the Supreme Court of the United States, and it is our...