In re Tpt Transp.
| Decision Date | 13 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 95-215-B-M2. |
| Citation | 191 F.Supp.2d 717 |
| Parties | In re TPT TRANSPORTATION. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
Hyde Dunbar Healy, Ashton, R. O'Dwyer, Jr., Lemle & Kelleher, Pan American Life Center, New Orleans, LA, for debtor.
Craig Frank Palmintier & Holthaus, John W. Degravelles, Michael Carter Palmintier, deGravelles, Palmintier & Holthaus, Scott Thomas Gegenheimer, Julie Malone Brown, Sweeney & Miller, LLC, Charles R. Moore, Moore, Walters, Shoenfelt & Thompson, Daniel Albert Claitor, Claitor & Loupe, John P. Wolff, III, Nancy B. Gilbert, Keogh, Cox & Wilson, Ltd., Vincent J. Desalvo, DeSalvo & Harris, Baton Rouge, LA, for claimants.
RULING
This matter is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment filed by TPT Transportation Company ("TPT") and HBM River Plant, Inc. ("HBM"), a subsidiary of Hall-Buck Marine, Inc. ("Hall-Buck"). On September 29, 2001,1 the Court, for reasons to be assigned in this opinion, granted HBM's motion for summary judgment2 and denied TPT's motion for summary judgment.3 The Court found that TPT was not entitled to recover attorney fees or payments made to settle the personal injury cases from HBM or Hall-Buck.4 The Court now assigns reasons for its opinion.
During the summer of 1994, TPT engaged the services of HBM to remove the residue of toluene cargo from a barge owned by TPT and to clean and gas-free the barge so that it could pass inspection by the United States Coast Guard and receive new cargo. On August 15, 1994, while the work was being performed by HBM's cleaning crew, an explosion occurred when a spark ignited the explosive vapors of the toluene cargo. The parties agree that the cause of the spark was most likely the crew's use of an ungrounded hose which was not designed for the removal of flammable cargo.
The explosion injured four of HBM's employees and also caused substantial damage to a barge owned by TPT. Subsequently, TPT filed this action seeking limitation of its liability to the injured workers. Thereafter, all four workers filed claims against TPT in the proceeding. TPT also filed a third party complaint against HBM and Hall-Buck Marine seeking indemnity and contribution for the claims asserted by the workers and for its own damages occasioned by the loss of the barge. This case was administratively closed pending the resolution of the personal injury claims in state court.5 The state court personal injury claims were settled before a judicial determination of the status of the claimants as seamen or longshoremen. TPT and HBM also settled the barge damage claim. The issues presently before the Court are TPT's indemnity claim for attorneys' fees incurred in defending the personal injury claims filed against it and those fees incurred in prosecuting its own barge damage claim. TPT also seeks indemnity for the sum it paid in settlement to the injured workers.6
Summary judgment should be granted if the record, taken as a whole, "together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."7 The Supreme Court has interpreted the plain language of Rule 56(c) to mandate "the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."8 A party moving for summary judgment "must `demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,' but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case."9 If the moving party "fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response."10
If the moving party meets this burden, Rule 56(c) requires the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and show by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, or other admissible evidence that specific facts exist over which there is a genuine issue for trial.11 The nonmovant's burden may not be satisfied by conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, metaphysical doubt as to the facts, or a scintilla of evidence.12 Factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, "but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts."13 The Court will not, "in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts."14 Unless there is sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict in the nonmovant's favor, there is no genuine issue for trial.15
In order to determine whether or not summary judgment should be granted, an examination of the substantive law is essential. Substantive law will identify which facts are material in that "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment."16
In assessing TPT's claim for indemnity, including attorneys' fees incurred in conjunction with the personal injury claims, both parties present arguments regarding the applicability of Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.17 HBM argues that the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act18 ("LHWCA") supercedes Ryan and precludes TPT's claim for indemnification. TPT asserts that the claimants are not covered under the LHWCA and, in the alternative, even if they are, Ryan still has some limited applicability.
In 1927, Congress adopted LHWCA, which was designed to be the exclusive remedy for a longshoreman bringing suit against his employer.19 Despite the exclusivity provision in the LHWCA, the Supreme Court, in Seas Shipping Co., Inc. v. Sieracki,20 allowed a longshoreman to recover from a shipowner, who was not his employer, under the theory that the vessel was unseaworthy.21 Later, in Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.,22 the Supreme Court extended the loophole in the LHWCA by allowing a shipowner who was liable to a longshoreman under Sieracki to recover from the longshoreman's employer by asserting an indemnity action.23 The combined effect of the Sieracki and Ryan decisions diluted the LHWCA's exclusivity provision. A longshoreman seeking to recover damages could indirectly recover from his employer by suing the shipowner who, in turn, sought indemnity from the employer.
As a result of the Sieracki and Ryan decisions, Congress amended the LHWCA in 1972.24 The 1972 amendments to the LHWCA added subsection (b) which states, in pertinent part:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title, and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void.25
The amendment to section 905 of the LHWCA still allows a longshoreman to bring an action against a shipowner for negligence, but effectively overrules Sieracki and Ryan by eliminating the unseaworthiness doctrine which allowed an action against shipowners even in the absence of negligence.26
The amendments to the LHWCA requires the Court to determine what applicability, if any, Ryan continues to have for several reasons.27 First, Ryan recognized the warranty of workmanlike performance ("WWLP") owed to the shipowner by stevedores and independent contractors and ruled that the breach of this warranty could constitute fault.28 Second, Ryan held that a suit by the shipowner for breach of the implied WWLP was not barred by section 905.29 Finally, Ryan allowed an indemnity action based on breach of the WWLP where a shipowner was found to be liable without fault in an unseaworthiness action.30 In the aftermath of the 1972 amendments, courts continue to recognize the WWLP doctrine and hold that its breach can constitute fault. In addition, section 905(a) does not abolish the Sieracki and Ryan remedies for certain workers who are not covered under the LHWCA.31
Because Ryan and Sieracki may still have some viability in the Fifth Circuit in certain cases where the LHWCA is rendered inapplicable,32 a number of cases have held that the determination of whether or not a claimant is classified as a longshoreman or a seaman can be a material fact which would preclude entry of summary judgment.33 Such is not the case under the facts of this case.
In order for TPT to be indemnified, it must show that: 1) the settlement was reasonable under the circumstances; 2) HBM breached the warranty of workmanlike performance and 3) because of the breach by HBM, TPT was exposed to potential liability.34 The reasonableness of TPT's settlement with the claimants and their potential exposure to liability does not depend on the classification of the claimants as seamen or longshoremen. It is immaterial whether the claimants are longshoremen or seamen because TPT owed no duty of seaworthiness under the facts of this case. Thus, TPT was not exposed to liability without fault.
Even if the Court finds that the claimants should be classified as longshoremen, Fifth Circuit jurisprudence has denied recovery by a longshoreman against a vessel owner under analogous facts.35 TPT has alleged that the barge was under the exclusive control of HBM at the time of the explosion. Accordingly, section 905(b) provides for ...
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