In re TR
| Decision Date | 30 December 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 38480.,38480. |
| Citation | 119 Nev. 646,80 P.3d 1276 |
| Parties | In the Matter of T.R., a Minor. T.R., Appellant, v. The State of Nevada, Division of Child and Family Services, Department of Human Resources, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Marcus D. Cooper, Public Defender, and Susan K. Roske and Abel M. Yanez, Deputy Public Defenders, Clark County, for Appellant.
David J. Roger, District Attorney, Clark A. Peterson, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and Jonathan VanBoskerck, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.
Before the Court En Banc.
This appeal challenges, as unduly vague, the application of Nevada's adult sex offender registration and notification provisions to an adjudicated juvenile sex offender upon reaching his twenty-first birthday pursuant to NRS 62.590. Because the statute fails to give sufficient notice of what conduct is prohibited and authorizes or encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, the statute is void for vagueness. We therefore reverse the portion of the district court's judgment that requires appellant to submit to a hearing under NRS 62.590. We affirm the portion of the district court's judgment that adjudicated appellant a delinquent.
The district attorney filed a petition for delinquency against appellant T.R., a fourteen-year-old boy, alleging three counts of sexual assault against a victim under the age of fourteen. Count I alleged that T.R. sodomized the four-year-old victim, Count II alleged that T.R. forced the victim to orally copulate him, and Count III alleged that T.R. orally copulated the victim.
An evidentiary hearing was conducted before a district court hearing master. The master heard conflicting testimony from the victim, T.R., and their respective family members. Additionally, the victim's grandmother testified to TR's revelation to her that he had been sexually assaulted. Following closing argument, the master concluded that the State had proved Counts I and II by clear and convincing evidence and that Count III should be dismissed. The district court then entered an order that adopted the master's findings and recommendations.
T.R. timely moved for rehearing of the district court's order. He asserted that the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed the alleged sexual assaults, and that the master inappropriately considered unreliable hearsay statements in reaching its decision. The State opposed the motion, and the matter was scheduled for a hearing.
In the interim, the Juvenile Probation Department prepared a dispositional report following its evaluation of T.R. The Department recommended that T.R. complete a correctional program, submit to community notification under NRS 62.500 through 62.600 and, upon reaching his twenty-first birthday, be subject to a hearing under NRS 62.590 to determine if he should be required to comply with the adult sex offender registration and notification statutes beyond his twenty-first birthday.
Before the hearing was conducted on T.R.'s rehearing motion, he moved to strike the Probation Department's recommendation that he comply with the community notification statutes. The State opposed his motion, and the Attorney General's Office also filed an opposition. After a hearing, the court upheld the master's decision as to Count I (sodomy), but concluded that the State had failed to prove Count II (oral copulation of T.R.) beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court adopted the Probation Department's recommendations, adjudicated T.R. a delinquent child, and ordered him committed to correctional placement. Subsequently, the district court entered a written order that denied T.R.'s motion to strike the dispositional requirements for community notification. T.R. timely appealed.
On appeal, T.R. challenges his delinquency adjudication for sexual assault as not supported by sufficient evidence. T.R. also contends that NRS 62.590, which imposes adult sex offender registration and notification requirements on juvenile sex offenders, is unconstitutionally vague and therefore cannot be applied to him.
When a juvenile challenges his delinquency adjudication for an offense that was established beyond a reasonable doubt, this court will affirm a judgment that is supported by sufficient evidence.1 Thus, we will consider whether, when viewing all of the evidence in the State's favor, a rational fact finder could have found the offense's essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.2 Additionally, evaluating the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony is within the fact finder's province.3 Finally, a sexual assault victim's uncorroborated testimony is sufficient evidence to support an adjudication.4
Under NRS 200.366(1), "[a] person who subjects another person to sexual penetration... is guilty of sexual assault." T.R. contends that insufficient evidence was adduced at the adjudication proceeding to prove that he committed sexual assault because the victim's testimony was unreliable, the victim's grandmother's hearsay testimony was improperly admitted, and no corroborating evidence was offered to establish sexual abuse. Based on evidence presented during the adjudication hearing, the district court found that sufficient evidence existed in the record to support the hearing master's findings and recommendations as to Count I, sodomy. The district court also concluded that the master properly considered the grandmother's admissible hearsay testimony concerning what the victim had told her about the sexual assault.5 Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that T.R. committed the offense of sexual assault. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's delinquency adjudication.
After a child has been adjudicated a delinquent for a sexual offense, he or she is subject to community notification unless relieved of that duty by the district court.6 If the child has not been relieved of the duty to comply with community notification requirements by the time he or she is twenty-one, the district court must "determine whether the child should be deemed an adult sex offender for the purposes of registration and community notification."7 More specifically, NRS 62.590 provides in relevant part:
The State contends that T.R. lacks standing to challenge the application of NRS 62.590. Since T.R. has not yet been subject to a hearing regarding his possible duty to register as an adult sex offender, the State insists that T.R. has not suffered any injury and that the issues concerning NRS 62.590's future application are not ripe for this court's review.
Although the question of ripeness closely resembles the question of standing, ripeness focuses on the timing of the action rather than on the party bringing the action.8 In the present case, T.R. seeks pre-enforcement review of NRS 62.590; thus, ripeness, rather than standing, is our focus.9 The factors to be weighed in deciding whether a case is ripe for judicial review include: (1) the hardship to the parties of withholding judicial review, and (2) the suitability of the issues for review.10 T.R. argues that NRS 62.590 contains vague and arbitrary language and therefore violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The district court's delinquency order requires T.R. to submit to a hearing under NRS 62.590 when he reaches twenty-one. Thus, application of NRS 62.590 is certain.11 Moreover, delay will harm T.R., as he is unsure how the statute applies to his current and future life choices; those choices could well influence the district court's decision in any hearing under NRS 62.590. Nothing is gained from deferring review until T.R. is twenty-one. As for the issues' suitability for review, the record is sufficiently developed to allow us to consider the legal questions before us. Applying these factors, we conclude that this case is ripe for our review.
With respect to T.R.'s facial challenge to NRS 62.590, he contends that under the Due Process Clause, the statute's sex offender registration and notification requirement is impermissibly vague on its face.12 He asserts that NRS 62.590 provides no guidance or standards for determining when a juvenile sex offender is rehabilitated, or a threat to the community, and that the statute encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Substantive due process demands definitive laws and includes the void-for-vagueness doctrine.13 The vagueness doctrine is based upon the principle that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and...
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