In re Trigg.

• Decision Date: 02 January 1942
• Docket Number: No. 4599.,4599.
• Citation: 121 P.2d 152,46 N.M. 96
• Parties: In re TRIGG.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

46 N.M. 96

121 P.2d 152

In re TRIGG.

No. 4599.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Jan. 2, 1942.

Appeal from District Court, San Miguel County; Irwin S. Moise, Judge.

In the matter of the taxes of Dan Trigg on property in San Miguel County for 1938. From a judgment denying the taxpayer relief on grounds of improper classification and consequent excessive assessment of such property, he appeals.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

In taxpayer's proceeding for relief on grounds of improper classification and consequent excessive assessment of his grazing lands, allegations of complaint that such lands should have been valued at $46,020.50, but that taxing officials valued them at $83,094, alleged such gross mistake as to shock conscience and amount to “constructive fraud”, so that complaint was not demurrable. Laws 1927, c. 127, § 3.

Luis E. Armijo, of Las Vegas, for appellant.

John W. Chapman, Sp. Tax Atty., and C. C. McCulloh, Asst. Sp. Tax Atty., both of Santa Fe, for appellee.

BICKLEY, Justice.

[1] This appeal presents the question whether the courts have jurisdiction to grant relief to a taxpayer because his grazing land has been improperly classified and consequently assessed at a valuation so excessive as to be constructively fraudulent. This question must be answered in the affirmative. See In re Blatt, 41 N.M. 269, 67 P.2d 293, 110 A.L.R. 656; Scholle v. State Tax Comm., 42 N.M. 371, 78 P.2d 1116.

These decisions introduce no new principles. In First National Bank of Raton v. McBride, 20 N.M. 381, 149 P. 353, 357, it was said: “There inheres in the nature of the subject of taxation a necessity oftentimes which would seem to authorize, if not require, equitable interference.”

[2] It is true there are decisions of our Court to the effect that mere excessive valuation does not constitute the “injustice” referred to in a certain statute which authorizes a taxpayer to petition the district attorney to apply to the court for relief in his behalf. We there held that the court had jurisdiction to grant relief under the statute, only where the injustice was of the kind the statute contemplated. See Bond-Dillon Co. v. Matson, 27 N.M. 85, 196 P. 323; First State Bank v. State, 27 N.M. 78, 196 P. 743.

Those decisions are not in conflict with and their force is not impaired by the later decisions in the Blatt and Scholle cases cited supra.

As we have seen in the Blatt and the Scholle cases, the power of a court of equity here invoked is not limited to the relief provided by statute.

As said in the Blatt case [41 N.M. 269, 67 P.2d 303, 110 A.L.R. 656]: “A court of equity may review upon facts specifically set forth showing the assessment to be so excessive as to be constructively fraudulent”. (Emphasis supplied.) See, also, 61 C.J. “Taxation” § 1128.

The next question presented, not more difficult, but requiring more extended discussion is, has the plaintiff set forth facts specifically which bring him within the principle last quoted.

Chapter 127, Laws 1927 provides: “At the session herein provided to be held on the third Monday of November annually the State Tax Commission shall determine and fix the actual valuations of the different classes of livestock and of the different classes of grazing lands for the ensuing year.” Section 3. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is the prevailing understanding in the office of the State Tax Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) and elsewhere that under this statute the valuations of grazing land are not subject to alteration by the county assessors or other county taxing officials.

It is alleged in the complaint that the Commission, pursuant to law, determined for the year 1938, the assessable valuations of grazing lands of the state, using a formula based on a section of 640 acres and its approximate carrying capacity in number of head of cows per section so that all grazing lands of the state are thus classified and valued:

Class Carrying Capacity Valuation C 20 head $2.00 per acre D 17 head 1.75 per acre E 15 head 1.50 per acre F 12 head 1.25 per acre G 10 head 1.00 per acre H 7 head .75 per acre

It is further alleged that the assessment against the real estate of the plaintiff as it appears upon the tax rolls of San Miguel County for the year 1938 is as follows:

No. Acres Val. per acre Valuation Total Val Grazing Land-Class “C” 12,400 $2.00 $24,800 ‘ ‘ “D” 3,000 1.75 5,250 ‘ ‘ “E” 13,000 1.50 19,500 ‘ ‘ “F” 9,000 1.25 11,250 ‘ ‘ “G” 22,294 1.00 23,294 Total Acres 59,694 $83,09

Plaintiff protested against the assessment so fixed by the county assessor and appealed to County Board of Equalization, which sustained the action of the county assessor as to the classification and value of said lands.

Plaintiff appealed from such action of the County Board of Equalization to the Commission, with the result that it was ordered that the assessment, classification and valuation should remain undisturbed.

It is further alleged that the real estate aforesaid is situated in School District No. 43 and that the same consist of grazing lands and “are adaptable only for grazing purposes,” and, that the classification of said lands by the taxing officials “Was and is discriminatory and not uniform and is not in just relationship to the value of the real estate of the tax-payers in School District No. 43 *** and is excessive.”

Not long ago, (1938) in Scholle v. State Tax Commission, 42 N.M. 371, 78 P.2d 1116, 1118, we said:

“In South Spring Ranch & Cattle Co. v. [State] Board of Equalization, 18 N.M. 531, at page 572, 139 P. 159, 174, we said: ‘So long as the taxpayer is not assessed more than the law provides, and in the absence of some well-defined and established scheme of discrimination, or some fraudulent action, he has no cause of complaint, and the courts have no power to review the action of the various taxing agencies established by law.’

“We have no desire to depart from the rule so long established in this state that the court will not afford relief to a taxpayer whose property is not assessed more than the law provides.”

In Abreu v. State Tax Commission, 29 N.M. 554, 224 P. 479, we distinctly recognized discrimination as a ground for equitable relief to the taxpayer.

In First State Bank v. State, 27 N.M. 78, 196 P. 743, 744, we quoted with approval certain general principles of taxation stated by Cooley in his work on Taxation, among which are the following: “In the exercise of the power to tax, the purpose always is that a common burden shall be sustained by common contributions, regulated by some fixed general rule and apportioned by the law according to some uniform ratio of equality. So the power is not arbitrary, but fixed, and rests upon fixed principles of justice, which have for their object the protection of the taxpayer against exceptional and invidious exactions, and which are to have effect through established rules operating impartially.”

In Bond-Dillon Co. v. Matson, 27 N.M. 85, 196 P. 323, 325, the court denying relief to the taxpayer, distinguished and explained other decisions reaching a contrary result and pointed out that in one case [Ute Creek Ranch Co. v. McBride, 20 N. M. 377, 150 P. 52] discrimination against the taxpayer had been “admitted by the pleadings”, and in another case [State v. Superior Lumber & Mill Co., 23 N.M. 606, 170 P. 58], “overvaluation of the taxpayer's property is admitted by the pleadings”.

So it is in the case at bar, that it is important to keep in mind that the taxing officials are not here asserting that they have exercised an honest judgment which they are ready to back up with proof. They admit that the taxpayer is discriminated against in that his property is not valued in just relationship to the value of the real estate of the taxpayers in the taxing district in which the land of plaintiff is situated; they admit that they have placed the taxpayer's property in classes unknown to the law, which will result in the ultimate valuation of his property at double what “the law provides” and yet they assert that a court of equity has no jurisdiction to consider the case.

It is well to remember that there is a difference between a mere mistake in judgment of the assessing officers as to value and the intentional adoption by such officers of a manifestly erroneous method of arriving at value.

[3] The complaint further alleges: “11. That the said assessments and classifications so made by the Assessor of the County of San Miguel, State of New Mexico, and by the Board of County Commissioners of the County of San Miguel, sitting as a County Board of Equalization, are erroneous, in that petitioner herein has no land which should have been classified as ‘Class C’, and no land which should have been classified as ‘Class D’, has no land which should have been classified as ‘Class E’, has no land which should have been classified as ‘Class F’, and has not to exceed five thousand acres which should be classified as ‘Class G’, and that the balance of 54694 acres should have been classified as ‘Class H’.”

It had been urged that this portion of the complaint is defective because it does not state why the classification of plaintiff's grazing land is erroneous. It has been suggested that the plaintiff would have had a better complaint if he had alleged that he: “has no land which should have been classified as Class ‘C’, because he has no grazing land with a carrying capacity of 20 head per section.”

Viewing the complaint within its four corners, it is manifest that the pleader could mean nothing else. He set out in his complaint that the legal classification of Class “C” grazing land is land that will carry 20 head of cows per section. He then says that he has no land that should be classified as Class “C” grazing land. The necessary implication is that he has no land that will carry 20 head per section. The only way he could support this allegation would be with proof that he has no grazing land with a...