In re Tug Allie-B, Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 September 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 8:98-CV-2671-T-23B.,8:98-CV-2671-T-23B. |
| Citation | 114 F.Supp.2d 1301 |
| Parties | In the Matter of: In re: TUG ALLIE-B, INC., a corporation, as owner of the tug ALLIE B, a commercial tug boat, official document number 524008 and Dann Ocean Towing, Inc., as operator of said vessel, in a cause of action for exoneration from or limitation of liability, |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Robert B. Parrish, Phillip Arthur Buhler, Moseley, Warren, Prichard & Parrish, Jacksonville, FL, for Tug Allie-B, Inc., and Dann Ocean Towing, plaintiffs.
Michelle T. Delemarre, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Torts Branch, Civil Division, Robert A. Kaplan, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Environmental Enforcement Section, Environment and Natural, Resource Division, Washington, DC, for U.S., claimant.
David W. McCreadie, Lau, Lane, Pieper, Conley & McCreadie, P.A., Tampa, FL, Eugene J. O'Connor, Jr., Freehill, Hogan & Mahar, LLP, New York, NY, for United States of America, Allied Towing Corp., claimant.
This action arises from the July 19, 1998, grounding of the tug ALLIE-B and her tow, barge ATC 350, which occurred near Ledbury Reef in Biscayne National Park (the "Park"). The Park extends approximately twenty-six miles, north to south, from the tip of Key Biscayne to Key Largo, Florida, and is home to a rare combination of terrestrial, marine, and amphibious life. The ALLIE-B mishap resulted in severe damage (estimated in excess of $3 million) to certain of the Park's natural resources.1
Following the grounding of the ALLIE-B, her owners and operators (collectively, the "vessel owners") filed this action pursuant to the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act of 1851 ("Limitation Act"), 46 U.S.C.App. § 181, et seq.,2 seeking exoneration from liability or, alternatively, a determination by the Court that any liability attributable to the petitioners is properly limited to the post-accident value of the ALLIE-B and her freight.3 In their complaint the vessel owners ask the Court to enjoin all potential claimants from filing claims outside this limitation action for damages arising from the ALLIE-B grounding incident. In essence, the United States asks that the Court decline to enjoin the United States (which injunction is typically a perfunctory consequence of a limitation action) from filing against the vessel owners a separate action based on the Park System Resource Protection Act (PSRPA), to which, the United States argues, the Limitation Act is subordinate.4 Whether the Limitation Act insulates a vessel owner against liability otherwise arising under the PSRPA is apparently an issue of first impression.5
Congress enacted the Limitation Act in 1851, in an effort to promote America's fledgling shipping industry. More specifically, Congress sought to secure equivalency for the United States with Great Britain by limiting American vessel owners' economic exposure with respect to maritime accidents that occurred without the owners' "privity or knowledge." See University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston v. United States, 557 F.2d 438, 454 (5th Cir.1977) (citing 23 Cong.Globe, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 714 (Remarks of Sen. Davis, Feb. 26, 1851)). Pursuant to the Limitation Act, the liability of a vessel owner "for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture" is limited to the post-accident value of the vessel and pending freight.6
About one hundred forty years after passing the Limitation Act, Congress enacted the PSRPA, 16 U.S.C. § 19jj, et seq. As stated in Senate Report No. 1010-328, June 8, 1990, the PSRPA's purpose is (1) to enable the United States to initiate legal action against individuals who damage or destroy marine resources within the National Park System and (2) to allow the United States to preserve and dedicate all funds recovered under the PSRPA to the prompt restoration and replacement of the resources without the requirement of an annual congressional appropriation.7
The PSRPA provides both for in personam and in rem liability and authorizes the award of "response costs"8 and "damages"9 against any person or instrumentality that "destroys, causes the loss of, or injures any park system resource."10 See 16 U.S.C. § 19jj-1 (a) and (b). The Act's otherwise pervasive liability is expressly limited only by the following section, entitled "Defenses":
A person is not liable under this section if such person can establish that —
(1) the destruction, loss of, or injury to the park system resource was caused solely by an act of God or an act of war;
(2) such person acted with due care, and the destruction, loss of, or injury to the park system resource was caused solely by an act or omission of a third party, other than an employee or agent of such person; or
(3) the destruction, loss, or injury to the park system resource was caused by an activity authorized by Federal or State law.
16 U.S.C. § 19jj-1(c). The United States contends that these defenses are exclusive and that the statute permits no defenses, including a defense arising from the Limitation Act, other than those statutorily specified.
While the text of the PSRPA includes no specific defense premised on the Limitation Act, neither does the statute expressly and affirmatively mention or textually preclude application of the Limitation Act. Similar in purpose to the PSRPA, both the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), 33 U.S.C. § 2719, and the Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA), 16 U.S.C. § 1443, provide the United States a means for monetary redress when a protected natural resource is destroyed or harmed due to some human act. However, unlike the PSRPA, both OPA 90 and the MPRSA textually preclude application of the Limitation Act, allowing for an assessment of liability based solely upon damages and without regard to the value of the vessel (and its freight) that caused the harm. See 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (OPA 90); 16 U.S.C. § 1443(a)(4)(MPRSA).
The vessel owners place great significance upon Congress's silence regarding the Limitation Act's applicability to the PSRPA. They argue that, viewed in comparison to OPA 90 and the MPRSA, both of which express clear congressional intent to preclude the Limitation Act's application, Congress's silence in the PSRPA with respect to the Limitation Act evidences an intent to limit any award under the PSRPA to the post-accident value of the vessel and its freight, in accord with the Limitation Act.
However, as the United States argues, Congress's silence is susceptible to other interpretations. As stated in Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1085 (5th Cir.1980), "[s]ilence may indicate that the question never occurred to Congress at all, or it may reflect mere oversight in failing to deal with a matter intended to be covered, or it may demonstrate deliberate obscurity to avoid controversy that might defeat the passage of legislation...." Significantly, Congress's silence in the context of resource preservation has not resulted generally in deference to the objectives of the Limitation Act.
In 1899, Congress enacted the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA) to allow for compensation to the United States for damages to government maritime works. 33 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. Collective portions of the RHA known as the "Wreck Act" (, Sections 15, 16, 19, and 20; 33 U.S.C. §§ 409, 411, 412, 414, and 415) provide for the removal of obstructions, including sunken vessels, from the United States' navigable waterways. The text of the RHA is silent concerning application of the Limitation Act.
In University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, 557 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.1977), the court addressed whether the potential liability of a negligent party for the cost of wreck removal under the Wreck Act of the RHA is subject to the Limitation Act. Finding that the policies of the later-enacted RHA were incongruous with those of the Limitation Act, the Fifth Circuit held that damages awarded under the Wreck Act were not subject to limitation:
To accord full effect to the Limitation Act by limiting the United States to an in rem recovery is merely to pour an old wine into a new bottle.... This is not to say that the Limitation Act no longer has any vitality. It is rather to say that its force succumbs to that of a later statutory enactment which, when still later construed by the Supreme Court in a manner that wars with the policies of the Limitation Act, must prevail over the earlier Act.11 University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, 557 F.2d at 455; see accord Hines, Inc. v. United States, 551 F.2d 717 (6th Cir.1977).
As a second example of the courts' reluctance to extend the Limitation Act despite the absence of a specific statutory exception to the Limitation Act, the United States cites In re Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577 (9th Cir.1991), which addresses the application of the Limitation Act to the later-enacted Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA) of 1973, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655.12 Glacier Bay affirms the district court's ruling that in enacting the TAPAA Congress implicitly repealed the Limitation Act with regard to vessels transporting trans-Alaska pipeline oil.
Simply stated, the Limitation Act is contrary to every goal of the TAPAA. It allows vessel owners virtually to eliminate liability for catastrophic damages. Application of the Limitation Act to any aspect of TAPAA would frustrate completely TAPAA's comprehensive remedial nature.
In declining to extend application of the Limitation Act, both the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits acknowledge a sharp conflict between the Limitation Act and more recent remedial statutes. However, in this case, the vessel owners argue that the PSRPA and the Limitation Act do not conflict and, therefore, that the holdings of University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston and Glacier Bay are inapplicable.13 Upon reviewing both statutes,...
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