In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litigation

• Decision Date: 20 December 1995
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1989-220.
• Citation: 909 F. Supp. 980
• Parties: In re TUTU WELLS CONTAMINATION LITIGATION. Rhoda J. HARTHMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TEXACO INC., et al, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands

909 F. Supp. 980

In re TUTU WELLS CONTAMINATION LITIGATION Rhoda J. HARTHMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TEXACO INC., et al, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1989-220.

District Court, Virgin Islands, D. St. Thomas and St. John.

December 20, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Richard R. Knoepfel, Briggs, Knoepfel & Ronca, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Jeffrey T. Eddy, Joseph B. Cox, Jr., James M. Hughes, Charles W. Patrick, Jr., Frederick J. Jekel, Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, Charleston, South Carolina, and Thomas Alkon, Gordon Rhea, Thomas H. Hart, III, Alkon, Rhea & Hart, Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands, for PID-Harthmans.

Robert T. Lehman, Debra Rosen, William J. O'Kane, Christopher Gibson, Archer & Greiner, Haddonfield, New Jersey, and Douglas L. Capdeville, Christiansted, St. Croix, VI, for Esso Standard Oil, S.A., Ltd., Esso Virgin Islands, Inc., and Esso Standard Oil, Co. (P.R.).

Richard E. Daley, Law Offices of Pattie & Daley, Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Kell S. Damsgaard, Terri Jacobsen, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Philadelphia, PA, and William Stack, Houston, Texas, for Exxon Corporation.

Francis E. Jackson, Jr., Jacqueline Drew, 8A & B Bjerge Gade, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, for Daniel Bayard.

John Newman, Diane Siana, Porzio, Bromberg & Newman, P.C., Morristown, New Jersey, and Kevin A. Rames, Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands, for Paul Lazare, Andreas Gal, The Duplan Corp., Laga Industries, Ltd., Panes Industries Inc. and Panex Co.

OPINION

BROTMAN, District Judge, Sitting by Designation.

Presently before this court is the Motion of Defendant Exxon ("Exxon") For Summary Judgment Based on the Statute of Limitations.¹ For the reasons set forth below, the court must deny this motion.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Most of the underlying facts of this litigation were set forth in an Opinion dated August 13, 1993, published at 846 F.Supp. 1243 (D.V.I.1993) and supplemented in the Opinion of August 11, 1994, published at 157 F.R.D. 367 (D.V.I.1994). Familiarity with the underlying facts is therefore presumed. In addition to this motion, the Esso Defendants² and Exxon filed several other motions for summary judgment³ each attacking a narrow issue of the Plaintiffs' case. Given the importance of each of the issues raised, the court notes for the convenience of the reader that it addresses each motion separately.

For the purposes of this motion, a brief procedural history of the Plaintiffs' filings is necessary. As previously determined by this court and discussed below, the Plaintiffs injury in this action accrued in July of 1987, when the DPNR and the United States Environmental Protection Agency began an investigation into alleged contamination of the Turpentine Run Aquifer. On July 6, 1989, the PID filed its original Complaint in this action, naming five defendants, including Esso Standard Oil S.A. Ltd., a subsidiary of Exxon. The Complaint included claims for negligence, trespass, nuisance and strict liability. Subsequent amendments to the Complaint added the Harthmans, Tutu Park, and Water Services as Plaintiffs. On March 2, 1992, the Plaintiffs filed their Fourth Amended Complaint which, for the first time, added Exxon as a defendant.

In response to Exxon's motion to dismiss based on the expiration of the statute of limitations, this court declines at that time to decide whether Plaintiffs' claims were time-barred. At the close of discovery in this matter, Exxon filed its instant motion requesting that the court enter summary judgment in its favor because the applicable statute of limitations expired prior to the time that it was joined as a defendant in this matter.

II. The Law

A. Summary Judgment Standard

The standard for granting summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is a stringent one. Summary judgment is appropriate only if all the probative materials of record "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Hersh v. Allen Prods. Co., 789 F.2d 230, 232 (3d Cir.1986); Lang v. New York Life Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 118, 119 (3d Cir.1983). In determining whether there remain any genuine issues of material fact, the court must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. Meyer v. Riegel Prods. Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 n. 2 (3d Cir.1983) cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 1091, 104 S.Ct. 2144, 79 L.Ed.2d 910 (1984); Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir.1972); Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1987). Significantly, "at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Under the standards announced by the Supreme Court's trilogy in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) and Matsushita, 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. at 2510 (emphasis in original). Indeed, where the moving party has made a properly supported motion for summary judgment, it is incumbent upon the nonmoving party to come forward with specific facts to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. Thus, once the moving party has carried its burden of establishing the absence of genuine issues of material fact, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon mere allegations or denials" of its pleadings, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), but must produce sufficient evidence that will reasonably support a jury verdict in its favor, id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; J.E. Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 618 (3d Cir.1987) (Becker, J., concurring), and not just "some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1355; see also, Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.1991), cert denied, 502 U.S. 940, 112 S.Ct. 376, 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991) (In opposing summary judgment, a non-movant may not "rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or ... vague statements."); Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990) ("unsupported allegations in a nonmovant's memorandum and pleadings are insufficient to repel summary judgment").

A dispute involving a material fact is "genuine" only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury would return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. Whether a fact is "material" is determined by the substantive law defining the claims. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; United States v. 225 Cartons, 871 F.2d 409, 419 (3d Cir.1989). The Supreme Court observed that "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude an entry of summary judgment." Id.; see also, Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir.1981) (role of district court is to determine whether genuine issue of material fact exists). Summary judgment must be granted if no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.

Moreover, "there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. "Consequently, the court must ask whether, on the summary judgment record, reasonable jurors could find facts that demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the nonmoving party is entitled to a verdict." In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 860 (3d Cir.1990) cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961, 111 S.Ct. 1584, 113 L.Ed.2d 649 (1991).

Although the summary judgment hurdle is a difficult one to meet, it is by no means insurmountable. "Where the evidence is so one-sided that it leaves no room for any reasonable differences of opinion as to any material fact" this Court will grant summary judgment. Tunis Bros. Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 763 F.2d 1482, 1489 (3d Cir.1985). Accordingly, in Celotex, the Supreme Court concluded that "one of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.

B. The Statute of Limitations

In a prior opinion, this court held that the applicable statute of limitations for the Plaintiffs' claims is the two year limitation set forth in § 31(5)(A) of Title 5 of the Virgin Islands Code. In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litigation, 846 F.Supp. 1243, 1253-54 (D.V.I.1993); 5 V.I.C. § 31(5)(A). In order to determine whether the Plaintiffs' claims against Exxon are time-barred by that statute, the court must determine when their claims began to accrue. Under the law of the Virgin Islands, the court must apply both the Discovery Rule and the Continuing Torts Doctrine in making this determination.⁴ Id. at 1254-55. Applying each of these rules individually, a plaintiff's claim begins to accrue at the latest time provided by either rule.

1. Environmental Discovery Rule

As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has established, the law of the Virgin Islands has in certain circumstances incorporated the Discovery Rule to delay the running of ...