In re Twt Acquisition, LLC
Decision Date | 24 February 2022 |
Docket Number | M2020-01100-COA-R3-CV |
Parties | In re TWT ACQUISITION, LLC. PROPERTY ID: 003 009.04 TAX YEARS 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 |
Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
March 3, 2021 Session
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Houston County No. 2018-CV-694 David D. Wolfe, Judge
Two counties assessed the same property for multiple tax years. The taxpayer appealed the double assessments to the State Board of Equalization. The administrative law judge determined that Houston County had assessed the taxpayer's real and personal property for more than five years before Stewart County assessed the same property. Based on Tennessee Code Annotated § 5-2-115(d), the judge voided the later assessment. The Assessment Appeals Commission reversed in part. The Commission ruled that the state statute only applied to real property. And because the personal property was located in Stewart County, Stewart County was the proper taxing authority for that property. The trial court affirmed the agency decision. On appeal, we conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated § 5-2-115(d) only applies to real property. Because the agency's decision is also supported by substantial and material evidence in the record, we affirm.
Tenn R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
Markley Preston Runyon, Erin, Tennessee, for the appellant Houston County, Tennessee. Charles R. Parks Jr., Dover Tennessee, for the appellee, Stewart County, Tennessee.
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter, Andrée S. Blumstein, Solicitor General, Charles L. Lewis, Deputy Attorney General, James P. Urban, Deputy Attorney General, and Joseph R. Longenecker, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee State Board of Equalization.
W. Neal McBrayer, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Frank G. Clement, Jr., P.J., M.S., and Thomas R. Frierson II, J., joined.
TWT Acquisition, Inc. owns and operates a manufacturing facility in the Stewart-Houston Industrial Park. Stewart County and Houston County jointly operate the industrial park, which is located on or near their shared border.
TWT's real property is partially located in both counties. Houston County has assessed TWT's real and personal property since 1997-the year in which the manufacturing facility was built. Stewart County began assessing the real property in 2014 and the personal property in 2016. Upon discovering the double assessment, TWT sought relief from the State Board of Equalization.
TWT contended that Stewart County was the proper taxing authority for its personal property based on the location of the property. Houston County responded that Tennessee Code Annotated § 5-2-115(d) made location irrelevant. Because Houston County had been taxing the personal property for more than five years, the State Board had no authority to rule that the property was located in another county. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-2-115(d) (2015). So the Board's only option was to void the later assessment. Id. The administrative law judge agreed with Houston County.
Stewart County appealed to the Assessment Appeals Commission. By State Board rule, for personal property that is rarely moved, "physical location is of prime importance in determining the taxable situs." See Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0600-05-.09(2) (2017). Relying on that rule, Stewart County claimed that the personal property was located in Stewart County. Houston County reiterated its statutory argument. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-2-115(d).
The Commission concluded that Tennessee Code Annotated § 5-2-115(d) only applied to real property and that the State Board rule governed the assessment of the personal property. So based on the tax history, Houston County was the proper taxing authority for TWT's real property. But because it found TWT's personal property was located in Stewart County, the Commission concluded that Stewart County was the proper taxing authority for the personal property.
Houston County sought judicial review. The trial court affirmed the agency decision. It agreed that the statute was not applicable to personal property. And, based on the evidence in the record, the court determined that the location of the personal property appeared undisputed.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h) (2021).
Relying on Tennessee Code Annotated § 5-2-115(d), Houston County maintains that the State Board's decision violated state law. See id. § 4-5-322(h)(1). Both the State Board and the trial court ruled that the cited statute did not apply to personal property. Statutory construction is a question of law, which we review de novo. See Pickard v. Tenn. Water Quality Control Bd., 424 S.W.3d 511, 523 (Tenn. 2013); Jones v. Bureau of TennCare, 94 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).
When interpreting a statute, our goal is to "ascertain and effectuate the legislature's intent." Kite v. Kite, 22 S.W.3d 803, 805 (Tenn. 1997). We always begin with the words in the statute. Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 526 (Tenn. 2010). We give those words their "natural and ordinary meaning." Id. Dictionary definitions can be helpful tools in this endeavor. See State v. Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 859 (Tenn. 2010). But the "meaning of individual words in a statute does not equal the meaning of the statute itself." Waldschmidt v. Reassure Am. Life Ins. Co., 271 S.W.3d 173, 176 n.2 (Tenn. 2008). Context and purpose are also important. See Lee Med., Inc., 312 S.W.3d at 527 ().
Houston County contends that subsection (d) applies to both real and personal property. In general, the term "property" refers to the collective "rights in a valued resource such as land, chattel, or an intangible." Property, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 827 (Tenn. 1996) (). And while it can include both real and personal property, the intended meaning depends on the context. See Property, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("may have different meanings, under different circumstances, according to the manner in which it is used" (citation omitted)). that property The context of this statute compels us to conclude that the Legislature intended for "property" to mean real property.
The statute as a whole suggests only real property concerns. See State v. Turner, 913 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1995) (). Peppered throughout the statute are references to boundaries and acres-both real...
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