In re UPS, Inc., 03-22-00526-CV

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Writing for the Court: Thomas J. Baker, Justice.
• Parties: In re UPS, Inc. and Antoine Scott Crenshaw
• Docket Number: 03-22-00526-CV
• Decision Date: 21 October 2022

In re UPS, Inc. and Antoine Scott Crenshaw

No. 03-22-00526-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Third District, Austin

October 21, 2022

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM WILLIAMSON COUNTY.

Before Goodwin, Baker, and Kelly, Justices.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Thomas J. Baker, Justice.

Relators UPS, Inc. (UPS), and Antoine Scott Crenshaw (Crenshaw) have filed a petition for writ of mandamus and motion for stay complaining of the trial court's discovery order in a personal injury suit by Real Party in Interest Andrew Dunne (Dunne) et ux. Dunne seeks damages for injuries sustained when a package truck operated by UPS employee Crenshaw allegedly failed to yield right of way from a stop sign and struck Dunne, who was riding his bicycle at the time. Dunne sued both Crenshaw and UPS, asserting claims of both vicarious and direct liability against UPS, the latter based on theories of negligent training and supervision. Against Relators' objection, the trial court granted discovery requiring UPS to produce a list of all accident claims and suits relating to any UPS vehicle allegedly failing to yield the right of way at a traffic-control device in Texas for the five years preceding the lawsuit. In their petition, Relators seek mandamus relief from the discovery order on the ground that it is both overbroad and unduly burdensome. Having reviewed the petition and the record provided, we now deny the petition for writ of mandamus. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).

1

To be entitled to a writ of mandamus in a civil suit in Texas, the party seeking such relief must establish (1) that the ruling of the trial court constitutes a clear abuse of discretion and (2) that there is no adequate remedy at law. In re Frank Kent Motor Co., 361 S.W.3d 628, 630 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding). An abuse of discretion is an exercise of discretion that is "arbitrary, unreasonable, and without reference to [any] guiding [rules and] principles", Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex. 1996) (citing Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. 1985), or that is "so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law." In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tex. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Relators reason that similar-incident discovery necessarily seeks facts not relevant to the subject incident and therefore constitutes an impermissible "fishing expedition." For his part, Dunne points out that evidence of other, similar incidents is probative of the foreseeability of the subject occurrence and is therefore relevant to his negligent supervision claim.

Relators cite two recent Supreme Court cases in support of their argument that similar-incident discovery of the type at issue here is overbroad. The first of these two cases, In re Contract...