In re Vermont Real Estate Inv. Trust

Decision Date01 November 1982
Docket NumberBankruptcy No. 82-00033,Adv. No. 82-0118.
Citation25 BR 809
CourtU.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Vermont
PartiesIn re VERMONT REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST, Debtor. CODY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff, v. VERMONT REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST, Defendant,

Wyman Smith, as trustee for debtor.

Ronald A. Fox, Montpelier, Vt., for Charles Crowell and Crowell England and Co.

David Putter, Montpelier, Vt., for Elizabeth Gentile.

James F. O'Neill, for Howard Bank, Administrator for the Sawyer Estate.

Douglas J. Wolinsky, Burlington, Vt., for Committee of Unsecured Creditors.

William B. Gray, Rutland, Vt., for Margaret Baird.

Julian Goodrich, Gibson, Noble & Goodrich, Montpelier, Vt., for debtor.

E. Bruce Weber, Brattleboro, Vt., for Dr. Felix Sommer.

Matthew Katz, Burlington, Vt., for Merchants Bank.

William Mikell, Burlington, Vt., William A. Fead, Montpelier, Vt., for Shareholders' Committee.

Hiram Hunn, Plainfield, Vt., for Cody Management Ass'n, Inc.

John Primmer, St. Johnsbury, Vt., for Judy Walke, et. al. as former trustees of debtor.

T.G. Hedges, pro se.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON THE PETITION OF CODY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, INC., FOR RELIEF FROM STAY TO PERMIT TERMINATION OF LEASE OR SECURITY AGAINST LOSS

CHARLES J. MARRO, Bankruptcy Judge.

Cody Management Association, Inc., now petitions this Court for relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362. Cody Management Association, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as "Cody"), seeks this relief in order to terminate the lease of March 30, 1981, between itself and the Debtor of the leasehold property commonly known as the "Cody Block" property. Cody further seeks, in the alternative, that the Debtor provide adequate assurances, by providing additional security for payment of the sums now due to Cody by the Debtor, and for those to become due under the terms of the lease.

At hearings on October 14, 1982 and October 15, 1982, both Cody and the Debtor made presentations concerning the defaults in the lease; the date for the assumption or rejection of the lease; and the Debtor's plans for the leasehold if the lease is assumed. It is also noted by the Court that while Cody sought judgment on the face of the pleadings; the Debtor's answer was allowed to be timely filed, instanter; and that the affidavit of W. Wyman Smith was not considered as an evidentiary pleading in this adversary proceeding.

I. DEFAULTS IN THE LEASE

The parties do not dispute the nature or extent of the defaults of the lease, with only minor exceptions. As established by the pleadings, the Debtor is in default on the "Cody Block" lease by virtue of its failure to pay the rent due April 1, 1982; its failure to pay an $8,500.00 lien in favor of the City of Montpelier; and its failure to pay real estate taxes. Since the issue of the lien of the City of Montpelier has been more extensively considered in Cody's Application directing payment and satisfaction of the lien, the remaining issues regarding the rent and the real estate taxes will be considered herein.

A. RENT

On April 1, 1982, the Debtor was required to remit $72,000.00 to Cody, pursuant to the provisions of the lease of March 30, 1981, regarding the "Cody Block" property. The Debtor failed to do so, and thereby defaulted on the lease. Counsel for the Shareholders' Committee has objected to the amount of the default, noting that the Debtor's petition for reorganization was filed on February 16, 1982, and as such, the Debtor is only liable for the "reasonable value" of the use and occupancy of the premises. In support of its position, the Shareholders' Committee directed the Court's attention to 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 365.032, where it is stated:

. . . It is a settled rule that until assumption or rejection of the debtor\'s lease, the estate is liable only for the reasonable value of the use and occupancy of the premises. Such value may be but is not necessarily, fixed at the rent reserved in the lease.

The Court acknowledges this settled rule. However, there has been no evidence produced by the instant parties to indicate that the "reasonable value" is anything other than that as fixed in the lease. And as was further stated by the Court in In the Matter of Fred Sanders, 22 B.R. 902, 9 B.C.D. 677 (Bkrtcy.1982) 9 B.C.D. at 680:

In the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, the payment fixed by the lease is presumptively reasonable. Green v. Finnegan Realty Co., 70 F.2d 465 (5th Cir.1934); Matter of Chase Commissary Corp. 11 F.Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y.1935), supra; Matter of Datamation 1 B.C.D. 1698 (1975), supra. Fruehauf\'s claim, therefore, is to be computed by reference to the payments stipulated in the lease, unless the debtor establishes that these payments are not reasonable.

In view of the law as stated above, and the lack of contrary evidence, the Court finds the default and reasonable value for the use and occupancy of the premises to be that as set forth in the lease i.e., the annual rent of $72,000.00.

B. UNPAID TAXES

Cody has alleged defaults in the lease by the Debtor's failure to pay real estate taxes and sewer taxes when due. The Debtor concedes its non-payment of real estate taxes in its answer. However, Counsel for the Shareholders' Committee objected to the inclusion of the appropriated tax refund for the period of December 30, 1980 through March 31, 1981, as being a pre-petition tax.

The Court agrees with the objection of the Shareholders' Committee and notes that a pre-petition tax will not be treated as an administrative expense. In re Melino Cigar & Candy Co. Inc., 22 B.R. 703, 9 B.C.D. 665 (Bkrtcy.1982). Hence, the defaults against the Debt-in-Possession are limited to the following taxes and other expenses, as paid by the lessor, Cody:

                  Real Estate Taxes
                    February 16, 1982 installment          $1891.85
                    May 12, 1982 installment               $2241.55
                    August 15, 1982 installment            $2299.24
                  Sewer Tax Payment
                    September 13, 1982                     $ 196.10
                  Liability Insurance Premium
                    July 1982                              $ 145.00
                

II. DATE FOR ASSUMPTION OR REJECTION OF THE LEASE

Questions have arisen regarding the date upon which the Debtor was to assume or reject the unexpired lease with Cody. Counsel for Cody advocates that a period of 60 days was set by the Court at a hearing on August 5, 1982. Counsel for the Shareholders' Committee asserts and stresses that the 60 day period was sought to run from the time of a subsequent hearing on August 31, 1982. In either event, the Court now requires that the Debtor either assume or reject the lease by November 10, 1982.

In the event that the Debtor should assume the lease, it should be prepared to comply with 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A). As stated in Section 365(b)(1)(A):

(b)(1) If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless, at the time of assumption of such contract or lease, the trustee
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly cure, such default;

This section is made applicable to the instant Debtor-in-Possession by reason of 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a).

The Court further notes that there is an additional response to the argument of Counsel for the Shareholders' Committee, as to "reasonable value" under section 365. See In the Matter of Midtown Skating Corp., 3 B.R. 194 (Bkrtcy.1980) at page 198:

"The fact that the debtor has asked this court to fix use and occupancy does not mean
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