In re Vetas' Estate
Decision Date | 13 June 1946 |
Docket Number | 6818 |
Citation | 170 P.2d 183,110 Utah 187 |
Parties | In re VETAS' ESTATE. v. VETAS VETAS |
Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Second District, Weber County Charles G. Cowley, Judge.
Proceeding in the matter of the estate of George Vetas, deceased wherein Nettie Vetas filed a petition for letters of administration, claiming to be the wife of the deceased, and wherein Sam Vetas, a brother of the deceased, challenged the competency of Nettie Vetas to apply for appointment as administratrix. From a judgment of the district court holding that Nettie Vetas was not the wife of the deceased, and denying the petition for letters of administration, and appointing the Commercial Security Bank of Ogden to act as administrator, she appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
George S. Barker and Thatcher & Young, all of Ogden, for appellant.
Ira A Huggins and Howell, Stine & Olmstead, all of Ogden, for respondent.
Pratt, J., not participating.
OPINION
The district court held that appellant was not the wife of decedent George Vetas, denied her petition for letters of administration, and appointed the Commercial Security Bank of Ogden to act as administrator, and she appeals. Only questions of law are presented for our determination.
Appellant asserts that the court erred in finding that she was not the lawful wife of decedent.
Section 102-4-1, U. C. A. 1943, provides that letters of administration shall be issued upon application, according to the following order of preference, to: (1) Surviving husband or wife; (2) children; (3) father or mother; (4) brothers or sisters; (5) grandchildren; and (6) next of kin. Section 102-4-3 provides that if persons entitled to letters of administration fail to appear within 3 months, letters of administration must be granted to any interested applicant. Appellant, claiming to be the surviving wife of decedent, filed her petition within the 3 months' period following death of decedent, so the right of appellant to have letters of administration issued to her in the event of a contest, would necessarily depend upon whether she was in fact a member of the preferred class.
A brother of decedent challenged the competency of appellant to apply for appointment as administratrix during said period by filing an answer to her petition in which answer he denied that she was ever married to the decedent.
It contends that under this section, appointment of the bank to act as the administrator, must be upheld. However, it is clear from the findings of fact and conclusions of law that the lower court did not act alone under the quoted portion of Sec. 104-4-2, but proceeded to determine whether appellant was legally the wife of decedent. The answer to the petition and the reply to such answer, raised an issue as to whether appellant was married to decedent. The issue of marriage was therefore a proper one to be determined by the court prior to the appointment of an administrator.
By reply of appellant she alleged that she became the wife of George Vetas on February 14, 1932, by a common-law marriage contracted in the state of Idaho. She made no claim that either she or said George Vetas ever had a domicile in Idaho. In fact, her testimony clearly shows that both were residents of Utah during the entire time in question, and that the parties went to Idaho for the sole purpose of marriage and with the intention of returning to this state almost immediately thereafter. The facts as set forth in the findings, in substance, are as follows:
For some time prior to February 14, 1932, appellant and decedent kept company with each other. They were both residents of Ogden, Utah. On February 13, 1932, they decided to go to Salmon City, Idaho, where appellant's sister resided, to be married. On the morning of the 14th they drove to Salmon City. They there went to the courthouse to find a justice of the peace and to procure a marriage license. As it was Sunday, they were unable to locate either a justice of the peace or the marriage license clerk at the courthouse. George Vetas then said to appellant,
Appellant replied, "That's okay by me."
They then went to the home of her sister and represented themselves as being married, and received congratulations from her relatives and friends. They occupied the same bed that night at the home of appellant's sister and returned to Ogden the following day. En route to Ogden they stopped for a short time at Pocatello, Idaho, where they announced to a friend residing there that they were married and received the friend's congratulations. Thereafter, they held themselves out as husband and wife, and continued to live together at Ogden where decedent was engaged in business, until his death on June 7, 1944.
We have heretofore held that a common-law marriage cannot be consummated in this state; that marriage in this state must be solemnized as required by our statutes. Schurler v. Ind. Comm., 86 Utah 284, 43 P. 2d 696, 100 A. L. R. 1085; and Sanders v. Ind. Comm., 64 Utah 372, 230 P. 1026. The lower court concluded, as indicated hereinabove, that appellant had not entered into a valid marriage with decedent. In a memo opinion filed by such court this conclusion was reached by the court assuming that though the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that as between residents of Idaho a "common law" marriage would have been contracted; nevertheless by virtue of Sec. 40-1-2, U. C. A. 1943, such purported marriage was void.
Said section reads:
Section 40-1-5 provides:
The trial court in its opinion refers to Sec. 132 of the Restatement of the Law: Conflict of Laws, page 197, reading:
The court points to paragraph (d) of the rules quoted from the Restatement; and construing paragraph (3) of Sec. 40-1-2 as declaring void a marriage not "solemnized by an authorized person," holds that a common law marriage entered into in a state which recognizes such marriage will not be recognized in Utah as to persons here domiciled at the time such purported marriage is contracted in such sister state.
We address ourselves to this proposition. The marriages covered by paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sec. 132 of the Restatement were invalid at common law and would be so declared regardless of statute. 1 Schuler, Marriage, Divorce, etc. Sec. 16, p. 21 and Sec. 21, p. 31; 35 Am. Juris., Marriage, Secs. 140, 141 and 148; 1 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation, Chaps. XXIV and XXV; 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 132.1 and Sec. 132.2. As to inter-racial marriages, the question would be decided upon determination of whether such unions are regarded as odious at the domicile. Paragraph (d) does not declare void a marriage of a domiciliary contracted in a foreign state in compliance with its laws by mere force of a statute which would make the union invalid if entered into in the domiciliary state. Rather, it states that such marriage will be invalid everywhere if the statute of the domicile makes it void "even though celebrated in another state." (Emphasis supplied.) If such statute expressly or by necessary implication declares a foreign marriage, entered into by one domiciled in such state, void, then it will be held void wherever it is called into question. But, if not expressly so declared, or if the necessary implication of a statute is not that its prohibitions extend to marriages entered into...
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