In re W.R. Grace & Co., Civil Action No. 08-246 (Bankr.Del. 8/12/2008), Civil Action No. 08-246
| Decision Date | 12 August 2008 |
| Docket Number | Bankruptcy Case No. 01-1139,Civil Action No. 08-246,Adv. Proc. No. 01-771 |
| Parties | In re: W.R. GRACE & CO., et al., Debtors. W.R. GRACE & CO., et al., Appellants, v. LIBBY CLAIMANTS, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Delaware |
Presently before the Court are Appellants W.R. Grace & Co., et al.'s ("Grace" or "Debtors") Motion for Leave to Appeal Order Denying Injunction (Adv. Proc. Docket No. 495) and Appellees Libby Claimants' Opposition (Adv. Proc. Docket No. 505), as well as Appellant State of Montana's Brief on Appeal (Docket No. 10), Appellants Debtors' Brief on Appeal (Docket No. 12), and Appellees Libby Claimants' Brief on Appeal (Docket No. 14). For the reasons set forth below, Appellants Debtors' motion for leave to appeal is granted, and upon consideration of the appeal itself, the Court affirms the Bankruptcy Court's order denying expansion of the preliminary injunction.
On April 2, 2001, Debtors filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. On the same date, Debtors filed an adversary complaint seeking to stay asbestos-related litigation against various affiliates of Debtors and third parties whose purported asbestos liability was derivative of Debtors' liability. The Bankruptcy Court entered a preliminary injunction barring such actions on May 3, 2001.2 On January 22, 2002, the Bankruptcy Court modified the scope of the preliminary injunction to include certain additional affiliates and to reinstate the bar against the commencement of new actions against affiliates arising from alleged exposure to asbestos, whether indirectly or directly caused by Debtors.3
The Appellees in this matter, referred to as the "Libby Claimants," constitute individuals allegedly injured by exposure to asbestos from Debtors' mining operations in Lincoln County, Montana. On February 4, 2002, certain Libby Claimants sought to modify the preliminary injunction discussed above in order to pursue an alleged direct cause of action against Maryland Casualty Company ("MCC"), one of Debtors' insurers.4 The Bankruptcy Court denied the Libby Claimants' motion, a decision that was ultimately affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In re W.R. Grace & Co. (Gerard v. W. R. Grace & Co.), 115 Fed. Appx. 565 (3d Cir. 2004). The Libby Claimants thereafter attempted to pursue their asbestos personal injury claims arising out of Debtors' mining operations in Libby, Montana by commencing suit against Montana Vermiculite Company ("MVC"), the former owners of Debtors' mining operations. On February 25, 2005, the Bankruptcy Court amended the preliminary injunction to stay actions against MVC.5
Meanwhile, prior to and after the April 2, 2001 petition date, the Libby Claimants have pursued a number of actions in state court against the State of Montana (the "state court actions"), alleging negligence for failing to warn the Libby Claimants of the risks of asbestos at Debtors' work place and mine in Libby, Montana. On March 25, 2003, the State of Montana filed claims against Debtors in Bankruptcy Court, seeking contribution and indemnification in the pending state court actions.
On August 22, 2005, Debtors filed a motion in Bankruptcy Court seeking to expand the preliminary injunction ("injunction motion") to include the state court actions filed against the State of Montana.6 The Libby Claimants filed an opposition to Debtors' injunction motion,7 joined by the Official Committee of Asbestos Personal Injury Claimants ("PI Committee").8 The State of Montana filed a response in which it did not object to the injunction motion unless the relief affected certain of Montana's rights.9
The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on Debtors' injunction motion on December 19, 2005, after which the Bankruptcy Court imposed a temporary stay of the state court actions while the Court considered the matter. On April 16, 2007, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order denying Debtors' injunction motion, finding that "related-to subject matter jurisdiction [did] not exist for the purpose of expanding the injunction to include the state court actions."10 Debtors and the State of Montana subsequently filed motions for reconsideration,11 to which the Libby Claimants and the PI Committee filed objections.12 On May 21, 2007, the Bankruptcy Court held oral arguments and again temporarily stayed the state court actions pending reconsideration. On March 31, 2008, the Bankruptcy Court denied the motions for reconsideration, again finding that the Bankruptcy Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the state litigation.13
On April 11, 2008, Debtors filed a motion for leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court's Order denying Debtors' injunction motion, and the State of Montana joined in Grace's motion. The Libby Claimants filed an opposition to the motion. The parties have also filed briefs of the underlying appeal in anticipation of the Court's ruling. Specifically, Debtors and the State of Montana contend that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that related-to jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. §1334(b), to expand the injunction did not exist.
Debtors and the State of Montana seek leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court's Order denying expansion of the preliminary injunction to include the Libby Claimants' state court actions against the State of Montana. Section 158(a)(3) of Title 28 of the United States Code gives this court jurisdiction to hear appeals, with leave of court, from interlocutory orders and decrees. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). In deciding whether an interlocutory order is appealable in the bankruptcy context, courts have typically borrowed the standard found in 28 U.S.C. §1292(b), which governs whether an appeal of an interlocutory order of a district court to a court of appeals is warranted. In re Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., Civ. A. No. 96-177, 1996 WL 363806, at *3 (D. Del., June 27, 1996) (citing In re Delaware and Hudson Ry. Co., 96 B.R. 469, 472-73 (D. Del.), aff'd, 884 F.2d 1383 (3d Cir. 1989)). An appellant must establish that "exceptional circumstances justify a departure from the basic policy of postponing review until after the entry of final judgment." Delaware & Hudson, 96 B.R. at 473. In addition to the requirement of establishing exceptional circumstance, a court will grant an interlocutory appeal only if the order at issue: (1) involves a controlling question of law as to which there is (2) substantial ground for difference of opinion and (3) when an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Id.
Applying the facts and circumstances here, the Court finds an interlocutory appeal of the Bankruptcy Court's order denying expansion of the preliminary injunction to be warranted. In short, the parties' arguments of conflicting legal precedents, combined with the impact of the Bankruptcy Court's Order, satisfy the requirements necessary to justify an immediate appeal. Therefore, the Court grants Debtors' motion for leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court's Order denying the injunction motion, and will now address the appeal itself.
At issue is whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in denying expansion of the preliminary injunction to include the state court actions based on a finding that the court lacked related-to subject matter jurisdiction. This Court must accept the Bankruptcy Court's factual determinations unless those determinations are clearly erroneous. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013 (). The Court reviews the Bankruptcy Court's legal decisions de novo. In re O'Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 188 F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir. 1999).
In accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), a bankruptcy court may issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). Section 105(a), however, "does not provide an independent source of federal subject matter jurisdiction." In re Combustion Engineering, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 225 (3d Cir. 2004). Therefore, a bankruptcy court must establish subject matter jurisdiction before considering the merits of a § 105(a) injunction.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), "the district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). The district court may refer "any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11 . . . to the bankruptcy judges for the district." 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). Proceedings "related to" a title 11 case include "suits between third parties that conceivably may have an effect on the bankruptcy estate." Combustion Engineering, 391 F.3d at 226 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995)). A bankruptcy court's "related to" jurisdiction, however, is not without limit. Celotex, 514 U.S. at 308; Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984).
In Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984), the Third Circuit set forth the test for determining "related to" jurisdiction over third-party claims.
The usual articulation of the test for determining whether a civil proceeding is related to bankruptcy is whether the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy. . . . An action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate.
Id. at 994 (emphasis in...
To continue reading
Request your trial