In re Wade
| Decision Date | 21 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20-589 |
| Citation | 326 So.3d 306 |
| Parties | SUCCESSION OF Cladie J. WADE |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
C. Sherburne Sentell, Jr., 111 North Monroe Street, Post Office Box 875, Minden, Louisiana 71058-0875, (318) 377-0123, COUNSEL FOR: Alma Rea Wade
Lewis O. Lauve, Jr., Bussey & Lauve, LLC, 3112 Jackson Street, Alexandria, Louisiana 71301, (318) 449-1937, COUNSEL FOR: Carl Wade, individually and as Administrator for the Estate of Cladie J. Wade
Court composed of John D. Saunders, John E. Conery, D. Kent Savoie, Candyce G. Perret, and Jonathan W. Perry, Judges.
This appeal weighs a statutory will's conditional legacies. The trial court ruled the conditional legacies were valid and enforceable. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse, finding the conditional legacies violate public policy.
Cladie J. Wade (Cladie) died testate on May 8, 2011, while domiciled in Rapides Parish, Louisiana. She effectuated a statutory will on August 13, 2007, dividing most1 of her belongings between her only children, Alma Rea Wade (Alma) and Carl Wade (Carl).2 The primary issue before this court concerns the following conditional legacies contained in Cladie's will:
Alma and Carl both sought judicial determinations via motions for summary judgment on the legality of Cladie's conditional legacies. Alma chiefly argued the condition on her legacy was contrary to the laws or to morals in violation of Article 1519 of the Louisiana Civil Code.3 Additionally, she requested $4,771.09 for expenses she allegedly paid maintaining rental properties owned by Cladie's estate.
Carl argued the conditional legacies are valid and clearly indicated Cladie's intent—sell the California property and receive your portion of my estate or keep the California property and receive nothing from my estate.4 He contended such an optional bequest is not repugnant to the law or to good morals, and to not acknowledge and enforce the conditional legacies is to give no effect to Cladie's intended and rightful disposition of her estate. See La.Civ.Code art. 1612.
Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Carl, upholding the conditional legacies contained in Cladie's will. In spite of this, Alma was allowed forty-five days to decide whether she would keep the California property or sell it and split the proceeds with Carl. If Alma satisfied the condition, she would receive her legacies from Cladie; if not, Carl would receive Cladie's estate. Additionally, the trial court awarded Alma the reimbursement she requested from Cladie's estate.
On appeal, both Alma and Carl argue the trial court erred. Alma contends the trial court legally erred in upholding conditional legacies she asserts violate public policy by allowing, in effect, Cladie to bequeath property she did not own. Carl, in his capacity as administrator of Cladie's estate, suspensively appeals the trial court's reimbursement award in favor of Alma.
On appeal, summary judgments are reviewed de novo . Magnon v. Collins , 98-2822 (La. 7/7/99), 739 So.2d 191. Thus, the appellate court asks the same questions the trial court asks in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, i.e., whether any genuine issue of material fact exists, and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id . ; La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(3). Moreover, "[t]he summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action[.]" La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(2).
"Succession is the transmission of the estate of the deceased to his successors." La.Civ.Code art. 871. "The estate of a deceased means the property ... a person leaves after his death[.]" La.Civ.Code art. 872.
"A testator cannot bequeath that which is not owned, and any such legacy is void to that extent." Succession of Wagner , 431 So.2d 10, 12 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1983) ; La.Civ.Code art. 1519. A donation inter vivos can have as its object only present property of the donor. La.Civ.Code art. 1529.
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1519 provides: "In all dispositions inter vivos and mortis causa , impossible conditions, those which are contrary to the laws or to morals, are reputed not written." Louisiana Civil Code Article 1612 directs us to interpret a testament in a way that furthers, rather than frustrates, the testator's lawful intent.
Concerning Cladie's conditional legacies, neither party asserts there are disputed facts. The issue before us is purely a legal one—namely, whether the conditional legacies herein are valid and enforceable.
Foremost of Alma's arguments against the legality of the conditional legacies is that conditions exist which are contrary to the laws or to good morals. La.Civ.Code art. 1519. Alma argues Cladie's conditional legacies sought to transmit property which did not belong to her estate; thus, the conditions should be deemed not written. Id .; Wagner , 431 So.2d 10.
Alma alleges Cladie resented Alma being the sole legatee of Theodore Harris, from whom Alma inherited the California property, evidenced by Cladie's directive that Alma sell the California property and divide the sale proceeds three ways between Alma, Carl, and Cladie. Alma urges this court to disallow conditional legacies which seek to settle grievances with relatives or unfavorable wills by requiring legatees to alienate their own property.
Carl concedes Cladie did not own the California property; however, he argues whether or not Cladie had an ownership interest is inconsequential. Carl denies Cladie was bequeathing property she did not own; instead, he insists Cladie was simply giving Alma an option to comply with her request. He also admits Cladie had no legal basis to force Alma to sell the California property or to force Alma to divide the sale proceeds. Yet, in brief he states, Carl argues no effect would be given to Cladie's intended and rightful disposition of her estate if her conditional legacies were ruled invalid.
Carl additionally submits that the conditional legacies herein are analogous to one assailed in Succession of Wagner , 431 So.2d 10, wherein the testator only owned half of the lot in question because it was community property; the other half was owned by his children, forced heirs. The conditional provision in Wagner , 431 So.2d at 11, stated: "In the event that any of my children should object to the above and foregoing disposition of that particular lot to Marie Amick, then I will and bequeath to the said Marie Amick the disposable portion of my entire estate." The forced heirs argued the conditional provision should be considered a penalty clause and was contra bonos mores , citing La.Civ.Code art. 1519 and Succession of Kern , 252 So.2d 507 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ denied , 259 La. 1050, 254 So.2d 462 (1971). The fourth circuit viewed the conditional disposition of the disposable portion to be a conditional donation, conditioned on the heirs not complying with the testator's implied wishes that they convey their half interest in the lot to Marie Amick in order to receive the balance of the disposable portion. The court reasoned the testator's children alone had the capacity to comply with their father's request, should they fail to comply, the conditional disposition would be effective.
Carl insists Cladie, exactly like the testator in Wagner , 431 So.2d 10, "sought to indirectly achieve a result that could not be achieved directly." We disagree, and we observe a significant difference Carl deems inconsequential. The particular lot in question which was made the subject to the option the legatees could either accept or reject was owned, albeit partly, by the testator in Wagner . In this case, the California property did not belong to Cladie.
Noting the strong public policy of sustaining the validity of wills and giving effect to the testator's wishes when possible ( Succession of La Barre , 179 La. 45, 153 So. 15 (1934) ), the fourth circuit in Wagner , 431 So.2d at 12-13 (footnote omitted), explained:
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