In re Watkins

• Decision Date: 24 November 1959
• Docket Number: No. 17391.,17391.
• Parties: In re Tom R. WATKINS, Praying for a Writ of Mandamus.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

271 F.2d 771 (1959)

In re Tom R. WATKINS, Praying for a Writ of Mandamus.

No. 17391.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

November 24, 1959.

Thomas D. Bourdeaux, Meridian, Miss., for petitioner.

John H. Holloman, Columbus, Miss., J. C. Wilbourn, Meridian, Miss., for respondent.

Before RIVES, Chief Judge, and BROWN and WISDOM, Circuit Judges.

JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge.

This is an application for writ of mandamus to require the District Judge in a suit on promissory notes and an open account to vacate an order referring the whole cause to a Master to "hear and determine all of the facts and law involved from which the Court may then determine whether it should call to its aid a jury in disposing of the case." The reference was to enable the Master "to report his findings of the facts and conclusions of law upon which the rights of the parties can be fairly determined" since the Court considered that "the complications and conflicts are such that it would be exceedingly difficult for a jury of laymen as an original proposition, to understand and reach a correct conclusion, without expert analysis."

Initially this Court suggested, Ex parte Watkins, 5 Cir., 1958, 260 F.2d 548, that by appropriate supplemental proceedings below, the parties and the District Judge explore the availablity of an interlocutory appeal under the recent amendments, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b). The Judge's Certificate¹ was inadequate in substance to show a probable dispositive question. It is important, though, in giving corroboration to Petitioner's apprehensions that the reference is preliminary to a denial by the District Court either of a trial by jury at all or an effective trial by jury of his defenses and counterclaims for money damages.

We are fully mindful that the writ of mandamus is truly an extraordinary one to be used under the most guarded circumstances² lest it become a substitute for appeal or interlocutory appeal and a likely frustrating interruption of trials. However, "supervisory control of the District Courts * * * is necessary to proper judicial administration" and the "All Writs Act confers on the Courts of Appeals the discretionary power to issue writs of mandamus * * *." La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 1956, 352 U.S. 249, 259-260, 77 S.Ct. 309, 315, 1 L.Ed.2d 290, 299.

A reference to a Master, of course, is to be judged by F.R.Civ.P. 53 (b), 28 U.S.C.A., and the principles embodied in that declaration. "A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it." Mere error, however, in the application of these standards would not justify the intervention of mandamus. For the "All Writs Act is meant to be used only in the exceptional case where there is clear abuse of discretion or `usurpation of judicial power'" and "* * * should be resorted to only in extreme cases" where the reference to a Master is "so palpably improper" that "the rules have been practically nullified." La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 1956, 352 U.S. 249, 256-258, 77 S.Ct. 309, 314, 1 L.Ed.2d 290, 297, 298.

In assaying an application for mandamus, we must first determine whether there was an error and if so, whether in context it had those qualities the law characterizes as an abuse of discretion. The starting point is then the rule allowing reference in jury trials "only when the issues are complicated."

Watkins is a cotton ginner who had frequent business dealings with Wesson Oil & Snowdrift Company who operated a cotton seed oil mill. Wesson Oil bought almost all of the cotton seed of Watkins' gin and advanced money to Watkins for ginning operations and other purposes. This litigation was initiated by Wesson Oil against Watkins on three basic claims.

(1) A promissory note, dated July 1, 1955, face amount $15,264.11, plus interest and attorneys fees. Watkins denied liability on the note on the ground that he signed it on the representations of Wesson Oil's agent (Travis) that the company would loan Watkins that amount to finance operations for the 1955 ginning season which loan Watkins says was never made. Wesson Oil denied this.

(2) An open account, unpaid balance of $2,401.74. Watkins admits liability on the account except for a consignment of poison in the amount of $2,204 which Watkins denies ever receiving.

(3) A promissory note, dated August 31, 1954, face amount $41,938.93, with an unpaid balance of $5,000 plus interest and attorneys fees. Watkins asserts that he signed the note in blank on the representation of Travis (Wesson Oil's agent) that the note would be filled in with the correct amount of Watkins' open account indebtedness. Wesson Oil denied this. The correct amount of the indebtedness is in dispute with Watkins claiming that he should have received a credit of $73,989.22 rather than $48,449.20 for 1952 cotton seed sales. Watkins counterclaimed for the difference in the two amounts.

In addition, Watkins counterclaimed for an amount unconnected with any of the plaintiff's claims. The counterclaim was for improper conversion of insurance proceeds totaling $14,437.50 received by Wesson Oil as a result of fire destruction of the Brooksville cotton gin. Watkins claims he purchased this gin from John J. Cochran subject to an "open-end" mortgage held by Wesson Oil the balance of which was represented by plaintiff's agent (Travis) to be $25,000 but which was in fact approximately $108,000. Watkins claims he is entitled to all insurance proceeds received by Wesson Oil in excess of $25,000 because of the misrepresentation by Travis that the indebtedness was $25,000.

Watkins made a timely demand for a jury trial.

The reference to a Master came about this way. Wesson Oil, on the ground that the allegations of fraud by its agent Travis had converted the case to one in equity, sought an order for trial by the Court instead of to a jury. Alternative to that was the motion for a reference to a Master. The hearing brought out, as the record here reflects, that extensive pretrial discovery had taken place. It is only fair to Wesson Oil to state that with respect to the matter of the correct amount of the 1952 cotton seed sales (Item (3) above) there was much confusion and uncertainty. Detailed examination of Wesson Oil's books and oral testimony of its employees having knowledge, reflected...