In re Watts Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings
| Decision Date | 17 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | Master Docket Case No. 19 C 1717 |
| Parties | In re: WATTS COORDINATED PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
ORDER
Plaintiffs in some 73 pending cases have alleged that current and former Chicago Police Department officers - led by former Sergeant Ronald Watts and, in a majority of cases, former Officer Kallat Mohammed - fabricated drug or gun charges against Plaintiffs, leading to their false arrests and wrongful convictions. The cases have been consolidated for coordinated pretrial proceedings. Currently before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion For A Protective Order To Prohibit Defendants From Asking Plaintiffs About Uncharged Alleged Criminal Activity [124] pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(c) and 30(d).1 In the motion, Plaintiffs assert there is good cause for a protective order barring Defendants from asking certain questions at their depositions, primarily about uncharged criminal conduct occurring after 2008. For reasons discussed below, the motion is denied.
The arrests giving rise to the 73 pending cases largely took place at the now-defunct Ida B. Wells Housing Complex (the "IBW Complex"), and in the timeframe from 2002 through 2008. Plaintiffs allege that while Defendant officers were assigned to patrol the IBW Complex, they fabricated drug and gun charges, prepared false police reports, or testified falsely in criminal proceedings, resulting in the Plaintiffs being wrongfully convicted of one or more crimes. In 2012, Defendants Watts and Mohammed were charged with one count of theft of government funds after stealing drug proceeds from an FBI cooperating witness, to which both pleaded guilty. (Doc. 153, 8/10/2020 Order, at 2) (citing Information [27], 12 CR 86, at 1; Mohammed Plea Agreement [43] ¶¶ 1-5; July 19, 2019 Order [73]). Mohammed's plea agreement stipulated that he, along with Watts, demanded money from drug dealers working in the Ida B. Wells Housing Complex in exchange for not arresting them. (Id.) (citing Mohammed Plea Agreement [43] ¶ 7).
Additional scrutiny of Watts and Mohammed's tactics resulted in the Cook County State's Attorney's Office, through its Conviction Integrity Unit, reviewing criminal convictions in which these officers had been involved. Over time, the State's Attorney's Office has moved to vacate some 94 cases. (See Cook County State's Attorney's Office press release dated 2/11/2020, https://www.cookcountystatesattorney.org/news/state-s-attorney-kimberly-foxx-moves-vacate-additional-tainted-convictions-tied-former-chicago, last visited December 17, 2020). Plaintiffs are among those who have had their convictions vacated.
In their civil rights lawsuits that followed, Plaintiffs assert numerous claims against the Defendant officers, including: (1) violation of due process rights, malicious prosecution, violation of First Amendment rights, failure to intervene, and conspiracy, allpursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) state law claims for malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, and loss of consortium. Plaintiffs also contend that the City of Chicago is liable for the officers' federal violations under Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and liable for the officers' state law violations under principles of respondeat superior and state-law indemnification. While the specific allegations vary by case, Plaintiff Phillip Thomas ("Thomas") has alleged by way of example that he lived nearby the IBW Complex. On May 14, 2007, he was arrested by certain Defendants, and later convicted "for a crime that never happened; it was completely fabricated by Chicago police officers." (18 C 5132, Doc. 1, at 2). The arrest occurred after those Defendants demanded information about drugs and Thomas said he had none to provide. (Id. at 7). After striking him on the face and body several times, the Defendants transported Thomas to the police station and then "worked together to create false and fabricated police reports about [his] alleged possession of controlled substances." (Id.).
The parties are proceeding with coordinated discovery in all pending cases. During the deposition of Plaintiff Phillip Thomas, a dispute arose concerning the proper scope of questioning on the topic of his criminal history. Through the meet and confer process, the parties have resolved the dispute as to Thomas. (Doc. 124, at 4). Unable to reach an agreement with Defendants to declare certain questions about Plaintiffs' criminal history off limits at future depositions, Plaintiffs seek a protective order to prohibit these questions.
While Plaintiffs have altered their position somewhat in their reply memorandum (that modification is discussed later), the motion seeks to bar all questions about uncharged criminal conduct occurring after 2008. In addition, as to charged criminal conduct after 2008 (i.e., conduct for which Plaintiffs were arrested or convicted), the motion seeks to preclude questions about the identity of other participants who were never charged and are not mentioned in police reports.2 Plaintiffs selected 2008 as the cutoff year because the underlying arrests by Defendants at issue in these lawsuits occurred in the time period 2002 through 2008, and the IBW Complex (where most were arrested) reportedly closed in 2008. (Doc. 124, at 3).3
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d) provides that "a party may move to terminate or limit [a deposition] on the ground that it is being conducted in ... a manner that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses the deponent or party." FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(3). If a motion is filed, "[t]he court may order that the deposition be terminated or may limit its scope and manner as provided in Rule 26(c)." Id. Rule 26(c), in turn, provides that "[t]he court may for good cause issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). The party seeking the protective order "bears the burden of demonstrating why the order should be entered." Stanek v. St. Charles Comm. Unit Sch. Dist. #303, No. 13 C 3106, 2020 WL 1304828, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2020). Notably, to show good cause, the movant must submit "a particular and specific demonstration of fact." Flores v. Bd. of Trustees of Comm. College Dist. No. 508, No. 14 C 7905, 2015 WL 7293510, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2015) (quoting Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n.16 (1981)). "Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning are insufficient." Id.
Given these requirements, Plaintiffs face an uphill battle in demonstrating good cause, for they bring their motion on behalf of approximately 55 different Plaintiffs, each of whom has filed a separate lawsuit. But "[w]hether a discovery request imposes undue embarrassment or humiliation is a case- and fact-specific question." Flores, 2015 WL 7293510, at *3. Here the eight-page motion understandably omits the specificcircumstances of any individual Plaintiff and an explanation of why the need to answer the questions at issue would cause undue embarrassment or oppression. Of course, the circumstances (including the criminal history) of the individual Plaintiffs are not identical, so one cannot assume they all would experience the same harms and to the same degree if required to answer questions about uncharged criminal activity. Notably, Plaintiffs do not seek to bar questioning about charged and uncharged criminal conduct before 2008, or about charged conduct after 2008 (except as to the identity of other participants not identified in police reports). This raises the question as to why additional questions - focused on uncharged criminal conduct after 2008 - would lead to undue embarrassment, annoyance or oppression sufficient to justify a protective order.
Under the law, the approximately 55 Plaintiffs cannot be lumped together and a finding made on behalf of all - based on broad allegations of harm unsubstantiated by specific examples - that good cause exists to deviate from the normal discovery rules and shield them from the deposition questions at issue. On the sparse record here, the Court has no basis to find that all Plaintiffs necessarily would suffer undue embarrassment, annoyance, or oppression if required to answer questions about uncharged criminal conduct after 2008. See Flores, 2015 WL 7293510, at *3 (). Courts have recognized that "extensive intrusion into the affairs of both litigants and third parties is permissible and common in modern discovery, especially in a case . . . involving claims of emotional trauma." Id. And as noted, "[g]eneralized claimsof embarrassment do not establish good cause." Hollinger Int'l Inc. v. Hollinger Inc., No. 04 C 698, 2005 WL 3177880, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2005).4
As part of their motion for a protective order based on the harms they would suffer from answering the deposition questions at issue, Plaintiffs also argue that those questions seek irrelevant information. Defendants disagree, and articulate why they believe the questions seek information relevant to multiple issues in the case, including Plaintiffs' damages, ability to recall details of their arrests, and connections between Plaintiffs and Rule 404(b) witnesses that would establish bias.
Before examining these relevancy arguments more closely, it is helpful to review the scope of discovery and the definition of relevant evidence, for a constant refrain in Plaintiffs' motion is that Defendants are attempting to improperly "fish" for irrelevant information that...
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