In re Webb

• Decision Date: 05 February 1895
• Citation: 89 Wis. 354,62 N.W. 177
• Parties: IN RE WEBB.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

89 Wis. 354

62 N.W. 177

IN RE WEBB.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Feb. 5, 1895.

Leslie Webb, convicted of adultery, sues out a writ of habeas corpus, and to the sheriff's return thereto demurs. Demurrer sustained, and prisoner discharged.T. L. Cleary, for petitioner.

E. M. Lowry and L. K. Luse, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

PINNEY, J.

The petitioner was convicted of the crime of adultery in the circuit court for Grant county, and on the 16th day of March, 1894, at the request of the attorneys for the state and for the defendant, he was sentenced to pay a fine of $200, and to pay the costs of the prosecution, taxed at $400, and stand committed to the common jail of the county until such fine and costs were paid, the period of imprisonment to be limited to six months; and, in case said costs were paid that day, the court directed “that the sentence of imprisonment be suspended until the further order of the court.” The defendant paid the costs accordingly. At a succeeding term, October 12, 1894, the defendant being present in court with his counsel, the court made an order reciting the sentence; that the fine had not been paid; and “that there is good reason why further leniency should not be extended to the defendant, but that he should be required to fully comply with said sentence, or be committed to the common jail until said fine is paid”; ordering and adjudging that the defendant “do forthwith pay said fine of $200, and that he stand committed to the common jail of the county until said fine is paid, the period of imprisonment being limited in accordance with said sentence to the period of six months.” A commitment was issued accordingly, under which the defendant was confined in the county jail. These facts appearing by the return of the sheriff to the writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner demurred to the return.

No legal reason appears to have existed to warrant the court in suspending its sentence, in whole or in part, after it had been pronounced, if it be conceded the court had such power. The action of the court seems to have been founded on the joint request of the prosecution and of the defendant, and to have been granted as a matter of leniency to the defendant. While it may be said that the defendant is in no position to complain or take advantage of the clemency of the court, the question at issue is one of power, involving serious considerations of public policy respecting the administration of criminal justice. After the defendant had been convicted, and the sentence of the law in legal and proper form had been pronounced against him, it is difficult to understand upon what principle the court could further interfere in the premises. The right of the court, for cause, within the exercise of a reasonable discretion, to postpone sentence or suspend sentence, as it is said, seems to be clear; but we think, both upon principle and...