In re Weisz

• Decision Date: 21 March 1918
• Citation: 250 F. 1008
• Parties: In re WEISZ.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

250 F. 1008

In re WEISZ.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia.

March 21, 1918

Applicant in pro. per.

Hooper Alexander, U.S. Atty., and J.W. Henley, Asst. U.S. Atty both of Atlanta, Ga.

NEWMAN District Judge.

The applicant for naturalization here was born in Hungary and is a native of that country. The United States declared war against Austria-Hungary, the proclamation being dated December 11, 1917. This man's application for naturalization was filed before that time, to wit, on December 4th. He and his witnesses have been examined thoroughly in open court, and I think he is entirely loyal to the United States in every way, and will do his full duty as a soldier for our government. He was for many years an enlisted man in the United States army and was recently appointed a lieutenant in the army.

The question which arises in his case, and the only question really, is whether or not, under section 2171 of the Revised Statutes, he is entitled to be naturalized, notwithstanding his nativity in a country with which the United States is now at war. The act of Congress embodied in that section (section 2171) is:

"No alien who is a native citizen or subject, or a denizen, of any country, state, or sovereignty with which the United States are at war, at the time of his application, shall be then admitted to become a citizen of the United States," etc.

The courts have differed about what is "the time of application" construing this law properly. Some United States courts have held what is to me the natural and proper construction of this language, "at the time of his application," as being the time he files his application for citizenship properly in the clerk's office of the court in the district of which he is at the time a resident. Some other courts have held that the "time of his application" is the time that he appears in open court to have his application passed upon. The cases which take the former view are In re Kreuter et al. (D.C.) 241 F. 985, decided by Judge Trippet, in California, and In re Nannanga (D.C.) 242 F. 737, decided by Judge Speer in the Southern district of Georgia.

The principal case, and the strongest case, for the reasons which will be named, is the case of United States v Meyer, 241 F. 305, 154 C.C.A. 185. That case was decided by at least two District Judges in the District Court, because in the opinion in the Circuit Court of Appeals, to which it went, the judgment of the District Court is referred to as being by the "judges," in the plural, indicating that more than one judge had passed upon it in the District Court; but I am...