In re Western Pennsylvania Nat. Bank

• Decision Date: 04 January 1967
• Citation: 424 Pa. 161,225 A.2d 676
• Parties: In re First and Final Account of WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA NATIONAL BANK, Successor by merger to Beaver County Trust Company, Executor of the Estate of Mary E. Moltrup, Deceased, as Life Tenant under the Last Will and Testament of Walter J. Moltrup, Deceased. Appeal of Louise Guthrie WADDINGTON.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

225 A.2d 676

424 Pa. 161

In re First and Final Account of WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA NATIONAL BANK, Successor by merger to Beaver County Trust Company, Executor of the Estate of Mary E. Moltrup, Deceased, as Life Tenant under the Last Will and Testament of Walter J. Moltrup, Deceased. Appeal of Louise Guthrie WADDINGTON.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 4, 1967.

John D. Ray, Ray & Good, Beaver, for appellant.

James M. Houston, Hilary G. Lynch, Houston, Cooper, Speer & German Pittsburgh, for Viola M. Moltrup.

Samuel C. Holland, Charles A. Woods, Jr., Deputy Attys. Gen., Edward Friedman, Atty. Gen., Harrisburg, for the Commonwealth.

Wilson & Salmon, J. Quint Salmon, Beaver, for Western Pa. Nat Bank.

Before BELL C.J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BELL, Chief Justice.

The questions involved in this appeal are many and the record is confusing. However, the two principal questions may be thus stated: (1) Did the Unconsumed property which originally was part of the residuary estate of Walter J. Moltrup husband of Mary E. Moltrup, together with the accretions thereof, belong to their son Merle as remainderman under the will of his father, or did such property belong to appellants and others, all of whom were appointees under Mrs. Moltrup's will; and (2) is Merle's executor estopped from asserting Merle's claim thereto by a prior accounting of the executrix of Mr. Moltrup's estate?

Walter J. Moltrup died November 1, 1940 leaving a will dated March 16, 1935. He was survived by his wife Mary E. Moltrup who died August 21, 1958, and their son Merle who survived both his father and mother and died on September 1, 1962. Merle was survived by his wife Viola, but left no issue.

Several appointees of Mrs. Moltrup's will appeal from a Decree of the Orphans' Court which sur an executors' account in Mr. Moltrup's estate directed distribution to Merle's executor of Mr. Moltrup's unconsumed residuary estate, including all the accretions thereof. Under Mr. Moltrup's will, his wife was the life tenant and donee of a power of consumption, with the further powers hereinafter referred to. The Orphans' Court further decided that under Mr. Moltrup's will, his wife Mary had no absolute or unconditional power of appointment and, we repeat, that Mr. Moltrup's unconsumed residuary estate with all its accretions was distributable Under his will to his son Merle, subject to certain limitations hereinafter set forth.

The facts are so unusual and complicated that it is necessary to quote at length from Walter J. Moltrup's will.

IV.

'All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, of whatsoever character, and wheresoever situate, now owned, or hereafter acquired, by me, I give, devise, and bequeath to my wife, Mary E. Moltrup, for and during the term of her natural life, with full power of consumption of both principal and income, and with the right of sale of real estate of which I may die possessed, I further direct that my wife shall not be required to give any bond, or bonds, or to give any account of, or concerning, her consumption and use of the estate herein given her.

V.

'Upon the death of my wife, Mary E. Moltrup, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate not consumed by her in her lifetime, as well as the stock hereinbefore bequeathed in paragraph II ^[1] hereof, to my son, Merle A. Moltrup, subject, however, to any trust or trusts that my said wife may appoint or make concerning the same in her Last Will and Testament, and, in the absence thereof, To him absolutely. ^[2]

VI.

'It is my wish, will and intention that my wife, Mary E. Moltrup, shall have the right, if, in her judgment, it is advisable, in and by her Last Will and Testament, to create and make any and all trusts she may wish in favor of my son, Merle A. Moltrup, of any interest or estate passing to him by virtue of this will.

VII.

'If my son, Merle A. Moltrup, shall predecease my wife, then the stock bequeathed in paragraph II hereof to my wife, Mary E. Moltrup, in trust for my son, Merle A. Moltrup, I give, devise and bequeath to my wife, for and during the term of her natural life with full power of consumption of both the principal and income thereof.

VIII.

'If my son, Merle A. Moltrup, shall predecease my wife, leaving lawful heirs to survive him, then any part of my estate remaining unconsumed by my wife at the time of her death, I give, devise and bequeath To the lawful heirs of my son, Merle A. Moltrup.

IX.

'If, at the time of the death of my wife, Mary E. Moltrup, my son, Merle A. Moltrup, shall have died, leaving no lawful heirs, then I direct any part of my estate remaining unconsumed by my wife shall be disposed of by her will to whom and in such amounts, and under such conditions as she sees fit.

X.

'* * *.

XI.

'In the event of the death of my son, Merle A. Moltrup, without lawful heirs, prior to the death of my wife, Mary E. Moltrup, and in the further event that my wife shall make no disposition of any part of my estate remaining unconsumed at the time of her death, then I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate so remaining unconsumed to my heirs at law, according to the Intestate Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in effect at the time of my decease.'

It has long been the well established law in Pennsylvania that a testator's intent is the polestar in interpreting a will.

In Hoover Estate, 417 Pa. 263, pp. 266--267, 207 A.2d 840, p. 842, the Court said:

'In Houston Estate, 414 Pa. 579, pages 586--587, 201 A.2d 592, page 595, the Court, quoting from prior decisions, said: '* * * "It is now hornbook law (1) that the testator's intent is the polestar and must prevail; and (2) that his intent must be gathered from a consideration of (a) all the language contained in the four corners of his will and (b) his scheme of distribution and (c) the circumstances surrounding him at the time he made his will and (d) the existing facts; and (3) that technical rules or canons of construction should be resorted to only if the language of the will is ambiguous or conflicting, or the testator's intent is for any reason uncertain: Dinkey's Estate, 403 Pa. 179, 168 A.2d 337; Pruner's Estate, 400 Pa. 629, 162 A.2d 626; Wanamaker's Estate, 399 Pa. 274, 159 A.2d 201; Hope's Estate, 398 Pa. 470, 159 A.2d 197."

"* * * "it is not what the Court thinks he might or would or should have said in the existing circumstances, or even what the Court thinks he meant to say, but what is the meaning of his words. Kelsey's Estate, 393 Pa. 513, 143 A.2d 42; Britt's Estate, 369 Pa. 450, 87 A.2d 243; Sowers' Estate, 383 Pa. 566, 119 A.2d 60; Cannistra's Estate, 384 Pa. 605, 121 A.2d 157.' Saunders Estate, 393 Pa. 527, 529, 143 A.2d 367, 368. See to the same effect Althouse Estate, 404 Pa. 412, 172 A.2d 146. * * * '. Woodward Estate, 407 Pa. 638, 640, 182 A.2d 732, 733."

In Woelpper's Appeal, 126 Pa. 562, at page 572, 17 A. 870, at page 872 (1889), the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Mitchell, said:

'In the construction of wills the great general and controlling rule is that the intent of the testator shall prevail. And by his intent is meant his actual intent. It is often said, as in the language of Weidman's Appeal, 42 Leg.Int. 338, quoted by our brother Green in Hancock's Appeal, 112 Pa. (532), 541, (5 A. 56) and cited by appellant, 'The question in expounding a will is not what the testator meant, but what is the meaning of his words?' But by this it was never intended to say that the testator's meaning, when apparent, can be disregarded, but that it cannot be got at aliunde by what he might have meant, or even what under the circumstances perhaps he would have meant, but only by what he said. The search is confined to his language, but its object is still his meaning.

'With the desire to reduce to a minimum the perplexity and uncertainty inseparable from the subject, courts have established certain more or less artificial and arbitrary canons of construction, by which certain forms of expression are presumed to have certain meanings, and in doubtful cases, these presumptions are held to be decisive. But all of these canons are subservient to the great rule as to intent, and are made to aid, not to override it. As in all such cases, care is required that tools shall not become fetters, and the real end shall not be sacrificed to what was intended only as the means of reaching it.' Accord: Reck's Appeal, 78 Pa. 432 (1875); Baker and Wheeler's Appeal, 115 Pa. 590, 593, 8 A. 630.

It is difficult to see how a testator could more clearly express his intention:

(1) That his wife Mary should have only a life estate in his residuary estate with a power of consumption of both principal and income; ^[3] and

(2) That all his residuary estate which was Unconsumed by his wife Mary should go (a) to his son Merle if he survived Mary (subject to Mary's right to create a trust of this property for Merle for his life), or (b) if Merle predeceased testator's wife Mary, then to Merle's surviving lawful heirs.

In the clearest language testator expressed his intent that this unconsumed residuary estate should go (after the death of his wife Mary) to his son Merle or Merle's surviving lawful heirs; in other words, to the testator's son or his surviving lawful heirs and not to Mary or her heirs or relatives or her testamentary appointees, unless Merle predeceased Mary without leaving lawful heirs. It is equally clear that testator did not give Mary a fee or even a general power of appointment (unless Merle predeceased his mother Mary without leaving any surviving lawful heirs) and the testator made no provision for...