In re Whetstone, 25641.
Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
Citation | 354 S.C. 213,580 S.E.2d 447 |
Decision Date | 28 April 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 25641.,25641. |
Parties | Ex parte Charles W. WHETSTONE, Jr., Appellant, In re Thomas IVEY, Applicant/Respondent, v. William D. CATOE, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent. |
354 S.C. 213
580 S.E.2d 447
In re Thomas IVEY, Applicant/Respondent,
v.
William D. CATOE, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent
No. 25641.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Heard March 5, 2003.
Decided April 28, 2003.
Rehearing Denied May 29, 2003.
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, of Columbia, for Respondent William D. Catoe, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections.
H. Wayne Floyd, of West Columbia, and Melissa Jane Reed Kimbrough, of Columbia, for Respondent Thomas Ivey.
Justice BURNETT:
Charles W. Whetstone, Jr., ("Whetstone"), a former circuit court judge, brings this action in our original jurisdiction through a common law writ of certiorari to quash a subpoena requiring him to testify in a Post Conviction Relief ("PCR") hearing for Thomas Ivey ("Ivey"). We reverse.
FACTS
Ivey filed a PCR petition alleging, inter alia, his trial counsel, Michael Culler ("Culler"), provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Ivey alleges Culler had a conflict of interest because of his friendship with Officer Thomas Harrison ("Officer Harrison"), a man for whose murder Ivey was convicted in an earlier trial.1
The PCR judge denied Whetstone's Motion to Quash the Subpoena. The PCR judge's order allowed Ivey to question Whetstone on two grounds: 1) whether he ever had a conversation with Culler discussing his association with Officer Harrison; and 2) whether he ever saw the Perkins' letter in which Culler asked to be relieved as counsel in the related case. The order specifically precluded Ivey's asking Whetstone what he might have done had he known of a potential conflict of interest.
ISSUE
Did the PCR court err in allowing the questioning of a former circuit court judge who presided over the applicant's trial?
DISCUSSION
It is not disputed that a judge may testify on matters not touching upon his official duties. At issue is the extent to which a judge may be required to testify about a case over which he previously presided.
The South Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct provides little guidance by confining its directives only against judges serving as character witnesses. See Rule 501, Canon 2(B) cmt., SCACR. Our search of relevant South Carolina case law has produced only State v. Talbert, 41 S.C. 526, 19 S.E. 852 (1894).
In Talbert, the defense sought a judge's testimony concerning an arrest warrant issued against the defendant. The State's objection was sustained at trial.
The issue on appeal was whether the trial court should allow a judge to testify as a witness concerning actions taken in his official capacity. This Court affirmed, reasoning the defendant's position was "clearly untenable" because the warrant
This reasoning is echoed by the modern trend of courts not allowing a judge to testify regarding a case in which he previously presided unless the testimony is: 1) critical; and 2) can be obtained by no other means. See United States v. Dowdy, 440 F.Supp. 894 (W.D.Va.1977); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 10 Mass. L. Rptr. 333 (Mass.1999) available at 1999 WL 855196; ...
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State v. Sims, S-06-249.
...of Schweikert, 110 Ohio St.3d 1209, 850 N.E.2d 714 (2005); Inscoe v. Inscoe, 121 Ohio App.3d 396, 700 N.E.2d 70 (1997); In re Whetstone, 354 S.C. 213, 580 S.E.2d 447 (2003). Necessity is generally shown when the information sought by the proposed testimony both is relevant on a crucial poin......
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State v. Ostrowski, Appellate Case No. 2018-000423
...There are limits on when a judge may "testify as a witness concerning actions taken in [her] official capacity." See In re Whetstone , 354 S.C. 213, 215–16, 580 S.E.2d 447, 448 (2003). However, it is not unheard of for magistrates to testify about the issuing of search warrants. See, e.g., ......
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State v. Ostrowski, 5872
...[11] There are limits on when a judge may "testify as a witness concerning actions taken in [her] official capacity." See In re Whetstone, 354 S.C. 213, 215-16, 580 S.E.2d 447, 448 (2003). However, it is not unheard of for magistrates to testify about the issuing of search warrants. See, e.......
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State of Kan. v. COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH of PLANNED PARENTHOOD of Kan., 100
...1102, 1108 (7th Cir.1978) (compulsion of judge's testimony “create[s] sensitive problems requiring delicate attention”); In re Whetstone, 354 S.C. 213, 580 S.E.2d 447, 448 (2003) (collecting cases). Generally, “[a]bsent a showing of extraordinary need, a judge may not be compelled to testif......
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State v. Sims, No. S-06-249.
...of Schweikert, 110 Ohio St.3d 1209, 850 N.E.2d 714 (2005); Inscoe v. Inscoe, 121 Ohio App.3d 396, 700 N.E.2d 70 (1997); In re Whetstone, 354 S.C. 213, 580 S.E.2d 447 (2003). Necessity is generally shown when the information sought by the proposed testimony both is relevant on a crucial poin......
-
State v. Ostrowski, Appellate Case No. 2018-000423
...are limits on when a judge may "testify as a witness concerning actions taken in [her] official capacity." See In re Whetstone , 354 S.C. 213, 215–16, 580 S.E.2d 447, 448 (2003). However, it is not unheard of for magistrates to testify about the issuing of search warrants. See, e.......
-
State v. Ostrowski, 5872
...are limits on when a judge may "testify as a witness concerning actions taken in [her] official capacity." See In re Whetstone, 354 S.C. 213, 215-16, 580 S.E.2d 447, 448 (2003). However, it is not unheard of for magistrates to testify about the issuing of search warrants. See, e.g......
-
State of Kan. v. COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH of PLANNED PARENTHOOD of Kan., No. 100
...1102, 1108 (7th Cir.1978) (compulsion of judge's testimony “create[s] sensitive problems requiring delicate attention”); In re Whetstone, 354 S.C. 213, 580 S.E.2d 447, 448 (2003) (collecting cases). Generally, “[a]bsent a showing of extraordinary need, a judge may not be compelled to testif......