In re White
| Decision Date | 13 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 19-CV-900S |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF the Complaint for Exoneration From or Limitation of Liability of Frederick WHITE and Jocelyn Sikorski, as owners and/or owners pro hac vice of a 1985 34-foot J-Boat sailing vessel, Petitioners. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
James E. Mercante, Michael E. Stern, Rubin, Fiorella & Friedman LLP, New York, NY, for Petitioner Jocelyn Sikorski.
Kathryn J. White, Pro Se.
Timothy Michael Hudson, Brown Chiari LLP, Buffalo, NY, for Tracy DeLeo.
DECISION AND ORDER
This is an action under the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions brought by petitioners-in-limitation Jocelyn Sikorski and the Estate of Frederick White ("Petitioners"). They seek exoneration from or limitation of liability arising from the dismasting of the 34-foot sailing vessel Sound Wave during a recreational sailboat race on Lake Ontario.
Presently before this Court is Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of claimant-in-limitation Tracy DeLeo's ("Claimant") claims for maintenance and cure, breach of the warranty of seaworthiness, and negligence. For the following reasons, Petitioners’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.
The Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 ("the Act"), 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501, et seq., for present purposes, limits a vessel owner's liability to the value of the vessel and its freight for any damage, including personal injury, caused by a collision that occurs "without the privity or knowledge of the owner." See 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (b) ; In re Bensch, 2 F.4th 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2021). The Second Circuit has explained the Act as follows:
The animating premise of the statute is that the owner of a vessel is generally an absentee who entrusts the vessel to the command of a captain whom the owner has limited ability to supervise or control once the vessel is on the sea. Thus, in what we have described as an effort "to encourage the development of American merchant shipping," the Act loosens the normal rules of respondeat superior in admiralty cases by allowing shipowners to insulate their personal assets (beyond the value of the ship) in cases where any negligence is committed without the owner's privity or knowledge.
Bensch, 2 F.4th at 73 (quoting Complaint of Dammers & Vanderheide & Scheepvaart Maats Christina B.V., 836 F.2d 750, 754 (2d Cir. 1988), in turn quoting, Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147, 150, 77 S. Ct. 1269, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1246 (1957) ). "In effect, the statute creates a federal admiralty forum in which the owner may seek limitation of liability by establishing that he was not at fault with respect to the collision." Bensch, 2 F. 4th at 73 ; Tandon v. Captain's Cove Marina of Bridgeport, 752 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. 2014) ().
To secure relief under the Act, a vessel owner must file a complaint for limitation of liability—more often referred to as a "petition," see Tandon, 752 F.3d at 240 n.1 —in federal district court within six months of receiving written notice of a claim and must post security in the amount of his or her interest in the vessel and any freight. See 46 U.S.C. § 30511 (a) ; Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions ("Supp. R.") Rule F (1). The complaint "may demand exoneration from as well as limitation of liability," and, by rule, must contain specific factual allegations, such as "the facts on the basis of which the right to limit liability is asserted and all facts necessary to enable the court to determine the amount to which the owner's liability shall be limited." Supp. R. F (2). The complaint must further contain specific facts concerning the voyage at issue, the amount of all known demands and claims arising from the voyage, the status (i.e., whether damaged, lost, or abandoned) and value of the vessel, and the amount of any freight. See id.
Once a compliant complaint is filed, "all claims and proceedings against the [vessel] owner or the [vessel] owner's property with respect to the matter in question shall cease." Supp. R. F (3). Upon the plaintiff's application, the court must "enjoin the further prosecution of any action or proceeding against the plaintiff or the plaintiff's property with respect to any claim subject to limitation in the action." Id. The rules then require notice and publication of notice to all persons asserting claims with respect to which the complaint seeks limitation. See Supp. R. F (4). The notice must "admonish[ ] [potential claimants] to file their respective claims with the clerk of the court and to serve on the attorneys for the plaintiff a copy thereof on or before a date to be named in the notice," which date shall not be less than 30 days from issuance of the notice. Id.
Thereafter, claims must be timely filed and served and must specify "the facts upon which the claimant relies in support of the claim, the items thereof, and the dates on which the same accrued." Supp. R. F (5). "If a claimant desires to contest either the right to exoneration from or the right to limitation of liability the claimant shall file and serve an answer to the complaint unless the claim has included an answer." Id.
After pretrial proceedings are concluded, the court sits in admiralty, without a jury, to conduct a concursus proceeding, "during which the court determines whether there was negligence, whether the negligence was without the privity and knowledge of the owner and, if limitation is granted, how the limitation fund should be disbursed." In re Nagler, 246 F. Supp. 3d 648, 656 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) ; see also Otal Investments Ltd. v. M/V CLARY, 673 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2012) ( ) (quoting In Re Moran Towing Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 773, 775 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) ). "[T]he court must determine whether the accident was caused by conduct that is actionable, for ‘if there was no fault or negligence for the shipowner to be privy to or have knowledge of within the meaning of the statute, there is no liability to be limited,’ and the owner would then be entitled to exoneration." In re Messina, 574 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting The 84-H, 296 F. 427, 432 (2d Cir. 1923) ). The claimant " ‘bears the initial burden of proving negligence,’ after which the burden shifts to the shipowner to prove lack of knowledge or privity." Otal, 673 F.3d at 115 (quoting Moran Towing, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 775 ). "If the petition for limitation of liability is granted, the owner can be liable on the covered claims only up to the total value of his vessel and its pending freight; that amount will then be distributed pro rata among the proven claims." Tandon, 752 F.3d at 244 (citing Supp. R. F (8)).
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed. Frederick White owned a 34-foot J-Boat sailing vessel called Sound Wave. See Petitioners’ Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Petitioners’ Statement"), Docket No. 35, ¶¶ 2, 3. It was built in 1985 and had a 52-foot-high mast. See id. ¶ 2; Deposition of Jocelyn Sikorski ("Sikorski Dep."), Docket No. 40-7, p. 16.1 White's stepdaughter, Petitioner Jocelyn Sikorski, sailed the Sound Wave with White's permission in recreational "club races" sponsored by the Olcott Yacht Club.2 See Petitioners’ Statement, ¶¶ 4, 5. Claimant DeLeo also participated in these races aboard the Sound Wave. See id. ¶ 7.
On August 23, 2018, Sikorski, DeLeo, and several other women were participating together in a Thursday-evening, women-only "club race" on Lake Ontario. See id. ¶¶ 1, 2, 5. Sikorski was the Sound Wave's "skipper," which placed her in charge of the vessel and crew. See id. ¶¶ 4, 16, 31; Sikorski Dep., pp. 14, 33. DeLeo served in the "floor deck" position, which required her to "call the line" at the start of the race and to guide the jib sail around the mast when necessary. See Petitioners’ Statement, ¶ 15; Sikorski Dep., pp. 11, 15, 33. Another woman, Patricia Schneider, served as "trimmer" of the jib sail. See Petitioners’ Statement, ¶ 21; Sikorski Dep., p. 33; Deposition of Patricia Schneider ("Schneider Dep."), Docket No. 42-1, pp. 36-37. White did not participate in the race but watched it from a nearby pier. See Petitioners’ Statement, ¶ 6; Deposition of Frederick White ("White Dep."), Docket No. 42, p. 9.
The race occurred on a beautiful night in a light wind of approximately eight knots. See Deposition of Tracy DeLeo ("DeLeo Dep."), Docket No. 41, p. 30; Schneider Dep., pp. 41, 44, 63. But as the Sound Wave tacked around a mark, it dismasted. See Petitioners’ Statement, ¶¶ 1, 2, 5, 28; DeLeo Dep., pp. 32, 35; Sikorski Dep., p. 41; White Dep., p. 18; Schneider Dep., pp. 45, 46, 77. Schneider described the dismasting as follows: "... Schneider Dep., p. 97.
DeLeo testified that she was on the low side of the boat at the time of the dismasting "skirting the jib" to ensure that it did not become stuck as it was being brought in. DeLeo Dep., pp. 36, 37. Schneider testified that DeLeo was sitting on the cabin top aft of the mast as the mast began to fall and then scrambled to the high side of the boat as it keeled. Schneider Dep., pp. 52, 82-83. Sikorski testified that DeLeo was on the high side of the boat and that the mast came down on the low side....
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