In re Will of Uchtorff, 04-0288.

Citation693 N.W.2d 790
Decision Date18 March 2005
Docket NumberNo. 04-0288.,04-0288.
PartiesIn the Matter of Trust Fund A and the Trust Under Item VI, Both Under the WILL OF Alfred E. UCHTORFF, Deceased. Christa E. Uchtorff, Appellant, v. Sally Hanson, Taylor Armstrong-Lucas, and Julie Kurt, Appellees.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Steven J. Havercamp of Stanley, Lande & Hunter, Davenport, for appellant.

Steven H. Jacobs and Linda K. Neuman, of Betty, Neuman & McMahon, L.L.P., Davenport, for appellees.

STREIT, Justice.

H.L. Mencken once said the capacity of human beings to bore one another seems vastly greater than that of any other animal. The subject-matter of this appeal — a medieval interest known as a remainder — proves Mencken's point, although we shall do our best to bring matters to resolution as painlessly and interestingly as possible. Much is at stake.

At issue is a trust fund. After the family patriarch who controlled the trust fund died, his only child, a son, followed him to the grave. Years later the patriarch's wife passed away. The district court ruled the son was not entitled to the trust fund unless he survived his mother. The son's widow appeals. She claims her late husband's interest vested upon his father's death, and therefore she should receive the trust fund because the son left everything to her. We agree with the widow and reverse.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

The facts are not disputed. Alfred Uchtorff died in 1979. Alfred's will is a hairy beast almost twenty pages in length. Fortunately, the parties only dispute "Item VI" of the will. In Item VI, Alfred exercised his power of appointment over "Trust A," a trust fund his father established before a majority of the members of this court were born. In relevant part, Item VI provided:

B. I appoint [the trust fund] property to [a bank] and to my wife Pearl E. Uchtorff, in trust, nevertheless, and to hold as a trust fund for the following uses and purposes, to wit:
1. During the lifetime of my wife Pearl E. Uchtorff ... the trustees shall pay to her ... the net income from the trust fund.
....
3. The provisions of this subdivision 3 shall be effective in any of the following stated events: (i) the event of the death of my said wife before my death; (ii) the event of remarriage of my said wife after my death without renunciation by her; (iii) the event of the death of my said wife after my death, without renunciation by her and without remarriage by her; or (iv) the event of incompleteness or insufficiency or failure for any reason of the appointment hereinbefore made for the benefit of my said wife....
In any of the stated events ..., I appoint said [trust fund]..., in the manner in this subdivision 3 ... provided.
(a) In the event that my son, Richard E. Uchtorff shall survive me, I appoint the [trust fund] to the said Richard E. Uchtorff, as an indefeasibly vested interest in fee.
(b) In the event that my son, Richard E. Uchtorff shall not survive me, I appoint the same to [a bank], and to Carolyn Uchtorff, ..., in trust nevertheless and to hold as a trust fund for [a class composed of the representative issue of the marriage of Richard and Carolyn, subject to divestment under certain circumstances.]

(Emphasis added.)

When Alfred died, he was survived by his wife, Pearl Uchtorff, and their son and only child, Richard Uchtorff. Richard was married to Carolyn Uchtorff. Richard and Carolyn had three children, Sally Hanson, Taylor Armstrong-Lucas, and Julie Kurt ("the children"). Richard and Carolyn eventually divorced, and Richard later married Christa Uchtorff.

Richard died in 1988. Richard disinherited his three children in his will, writing:

I make no provisions in this will for my children for several reasons which I consider sufficient, and generally because of their longstanding and continuous disrespectful conduct to me.

Richard left everything to Christa instead.

Pearl enjoyed the income from the trust fund until her death in 2003. She never renunciated her beneficiary interest in the trust fund, nor did she ever remarry. Today the trust fund contains hundreds of thousands of dollars.

After Pearl's death, the bank, as surviving co-trustee of the trust fund, petitioned the district court for construction of Alfred's will. Two factions claimed the trust fund as their own. Christa argued Richard's remainder interest in the trust fund vested upon Alfred's death and should now pass, like the rest of Richard's assets, through Richard's will to her. The children rejoined, asserting Christa's claim must fail because Richard did not survive Pearl. The district court ruled Alfred's will was ambiguous and did not specifically state what should happen if Richard predeceased Pearl. The court held Iowa's new trust code therefore mandated the children receive the trust fund. Christa appealed.

II. Principles of Review

A declaratory judgment action to construe a will is tried in equity. Iowa Code § 633.33 (2003); see, e.g., In re Estate of Rogers, 473 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa 1991)

; Houts v. Jameson, 201 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa 1972). Our review is de novo. Iowa R.App. P. 6.4; see In re Estate of Hurt, 681 N.W.2d 591, 593 (Iowa 2004).

III. The Merits
A. Vested or Contingent Remainder

The first question presented in this appeal is whether Richard had a vested or a contingent remainder in the trust fund once he survived Alfred.1 Contrary to the district court, we think the plain and unambiguous language of Alfred's will indicates Richard's remainder interest in the trust fund vested at Alfred's death.

1. General Principles

This appeal involves a remainder interest, long one of the law professor's favorite instruments of torture. Stated in its most general terms, a remainder

is a future interest created in someone other than the transferor that, according to the terms of its creation, will become a present estate (if ever) immediately upon, and no sooner than, the expiration of all prior particular estates created simultaneously with it.

Thomas F. Bergin & Paul G. Haskell, Preface to Estates in Land and Future Interests 62 (1984) (footnotes and emphasis omitted) [hereinafter Bergin & Haskell]. Alfred's will clearly gave Richard a remainder interest in the trust fund. Richard's interest was a future interest that could become a present estate immediately upon and no sooner than when Pearl's prior interest expired, i.e., when Pearl died, remarried, or renounced her life interest, but only if Richard survived Alfred.

A remainder is either vested or contingent. Moore v. McKinley, 246 Iowa 734, 745, 69 N.W.2d 73, 80 (1955).

A vested remainder, whereby the estate passes by the conveyance, but the possession and enjoyment are postponed until the particular estate is determined, is where the estate is invariably fixed to remain to certain determinate persons. Contingent remainders are where the estate in remainder is limited to take effect either to a dubious or uncertain person or upon a dubious or uncertain event, so that the particular estate may be determined and the remainder never take effect.

Id. at 746-47, 69 N.W.2d at 81 (citing Fulton v. Fulton, 179 Iowa 948, 957, 162 N.W. 253, 256 (1917)); see also In re Estate of Ruhland, 452 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Iowa 1990)

(same definitions); Pringle v. Houghton, 249 Iowa 731, 741, 88 N.W.2d 789, 794-95 (1958) (same); Dickerson v. Morse, 200 Iowa 115, 117, 202 N.W. 601, 603 (1925) (same). A remainder may be vested even when enjoyment is postponed until the happening of some future condition; it is contingent only if the remainder interest is "dependent on some dubious circumstance, through which it may be defeated...." Taylor v. Taylor, 118 Iowa 407, 409, 92 N.W. 71, 71 (1902) (emphasis added). Vested remainders are devisable and alienable. Moore, 246 Iowa at 746,

69 N.W.2d at 80.

To determine whether a remainder is vested or contingent, our well-settled canons of will interpretation apply. We need not repeat all of those familiar maxims here. See Rogers, 473 N.W.2d at 39 (reciting basic principles). It will suffice to simply remark that

whether a testamentary remainder is vested or contingent must be determined by the intent of the testator as expressed by the language of the will, if it is plain and unambiguous, and nothing else, considering the will as a whole, and giving effect to every provision thereof if it is reasonably possible.

Moore, 246 Iowa at 749, 69 N.W.2d at 82. Whether a remainder is contingent or vested must also be constantly reassessed as time passes, events happen, and contingencies are fulfilled. 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estates § 255, at 273 (2000); see, e.g., Katz Inv. Co. v. Lynch, 242 Iowa 640, 654, 47 N.W.2d 800, 809 (1951)

(holding previously contingent remainder vested upon a death).

2. The Terms of the Will: Richard's Remainder Vested Upon Alfred's Death

To decide the nature of Richard's remainder, the parties direct our attention to Item VI, paragraph 3(a) of the will. That provision states:

(a) In the event that my son, Richard E. Uchtorff shall survive me, I appoint the [trust fund] to the said Richard E. Uchtorff, as an indefeasibly vested interest in fee.

This provision of the will initially rendered Richard's remainder interest contingent, because appointment of the trust fund to Richard was expressly conditioned upon one uncertain event, i.e., that Richard survive Alfred. Once Richard survived Alfred, this condition, the only uncertain event upon which appointment of the trust fund to Richard was predicated, was fulfilled. Richard's interest in the trust fund vested when Alfred died and needed only to wait until Pearl's interest ended to become an estate in possession. See 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estates § 255, at 273 (2000) ("[U]pon the happening of the contingency upon which the estate in remainder is limited, the remainder becomes vested in right and awaits only the termination of the precedent particular estate to become an estate in possession.").

Survival to Time of Possession Not Required

It could be argued the...

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