In Re Willey's Estate.

Citation48 A.2d 789
PartiesIn re WILLEY'S ESTATE.
Decision Date03 September 1946
CourtNew Jersey Prerogative Court
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Orphans' Court, Essex County.

In the matter of the estate of John H. Willey, deceased. On appeal from a decree settling the final account of the Bank of Montclair and another as executors and trustees under the will.

Decree affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

A last will created a small trust fund and directed the trustees to pay the income to testator's wife for life and ‘to pay so much of the principal of the fund from time to time to my wife as may be required to meet emergencies or to maintain her comfortably, the amounts so used to be determined in the sole discretion of the trustees.’ Held, that it was proper for the trustees to take into consideration the independent income of the widow and her separate resources. It was their function to determine from time to time whether or not the situation was such that they ought use trust corpus to maintain her. They decided not to use it and instead employed other funds of the widow to supplement her income. Their decision should not be disturbed.

John Ferguson, of Montclair, for appellant.

Philip Goodell, of Montclair, for Bank of Montclair, co-executor and trustee.

Boyd, Dodd, Keer & Booth and Howard S. Dodd, all of Montclair, for appellee, First Methodist Church of Montclair.

BIGELOW, Vice Ordinary.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Essex County Orphans' Court settling the final account of the executors and trustees of the will of John H. Willey, deceased. The will gave to testator's widow a legacy of $30,000, and bequeathed the residuary estate to the executors in trust,

‘To pay the income from such trust fund to my wife Ella Stickney Willey, during her life, in monthly or weekly payments.

‘To pay so much of the principal of the fund from time to time to my wife as may be required to meet emergencies or to maintain her comfortably, the amounts so used to be determined in the sole discretion of the trustees hereinafter named.

‘Upon the death of my wife, or upon my death should I survive her, the balance of principal and accrued income of this fund shall be paid to the First Methodist Church of Montclair to be used for educational purposes.’

The corpus account as allowed by the Orphans' Court shows that $29,831 has been paid on account of the widow's legacy, leaving $169 still due thereon, and that the residuary trust fund, after paying executors' commissions and counsel fees, is $12,712. In the sum paid on the widow's legacy are a large number of items, totaling $9,568, for her necessary maintenance. The accountants paid none of the income to the widow, but accumulated it and have on hand a balance of net income, $1,375. The will directs payment of income monthly or weekly, and it seems clear that the income should have been applied for Mrs. Willey's benefit rather than accumulated and thus leave all these expenses to be paid out of her legacy. But there is no disagreement on this score, for the matter can be righted by directing the executors and trustees to pay to the widow's administrator the balance of income on hand. The testamentary direction that, upon the death of the widow, the accrued income shall be paid to the remainderman, the Methodist Church, means only the small balance which might be on hand after the last weekly or monthly payment, or perhaps income accrued but not received by the trustees. Either way the amount is so small that it can be disregarded and the whole balance of net income be taken as due to the widow's administrator.

The only question on the appeal is whether the balance of the maintenance payments, $8,193, was properly charged against the $30,000 legacy, or should have been paid out of the trust corpus. The appellant argues that it was the duty of the trustees to furnish the total amount necessary for the maintenance of the widow out of the residuary fund without regard to her other means. Whether or not this is correct depends, of course, on the intention of the testator.

In Cox v. Wills, 49 N.J.Eq. 130, 22 A. 794, 795; Id., 49 N.J.Eq. 573, 25 A. 938, 939, testator gave the residue of his estate to his widow in confidence, believing that she would, by her will, distribute among his relatives so much of it ‘as she may not use for comfortable maintenance.’ Upon receipt of the fund from his executor, she mingled it with her own property and thereafter lived upon the income from the whole. At her death, 19 years later, the combined fund had been greatly increased by the accumulation of unexpended income. The Court of Errors and Appeals held that the widow had had the right to use so much of her...

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