In re Williams, Bankruptcy No. 87-0175-BKC-DTH

• Decision Date: 20 October 1989
• Docket Number: Bankruptcy No. 87-0175-BKC-DTH,Adv. No. 89-4079.
• Citation: 108 BR 119
• Parties: In re Ira WILLIAMS and Faye Williams, Debtors. Ira WILLIAMS and Faye Williams, Plaintiffs, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK, ROSEDALE, MISSISSIPPI, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Mississippi

108 B.R. 119 (1989)

In re Ira WILLIAMS and Faye Williams, Debtors Ira WILLIAMS and Faye Williams, Plaintiffs, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK, ROSEDALE, MISSISSIPPI, Defendant.

Bankruptcy No. 87-0175-BKC-DTH, Adv. No. 89-4079.

United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Mississippi.

October 20, 1989.

Levi Boone, III, Cleveland, Miss., for Ira and Faye Williams.

Robert Johnston, Cleveland, Miss., for First Nat. Bank of Rosedale, Miss.

OPINION

DAVID W. HOUSTON, III, Bankruptcy Judge.

On consideration of the complaint filed by the debtors, Ira Williams and Faye Williams, hereinafter referred to as debtors or plaintiffs; answer and affirmative defenses having been filed by the defendant, First National Bank, Rosedale, Mississippi, hereinafter referred to as First National Bank; all parties being represented by their respective attorneys of record; and the Court having heard and considered same hereby finds as follows, to-wit:

I.

The Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of and the parties to this proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). This is a core proceeding as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (K), (L), and (O).

II.

The debtors filed their voluntary Chapter 13 bankruptcy case on September 23, 1987. Their Chapter 13 plan was confirmed by the Court on November 16, 1987, and provided for the following payments, to-wit:

A. Unifirst Bank, original principal indebtedness in the sum of $54,450.00 — the debtors proposed to pay the sum of $621.00 per month outside the plan, representing the regular monthly installments on the indebtedness, in addition to the payment of $69.00 per month through the plan to cure a prepetition arrearage in the sum of $2,486.79.

Unifirst Bank currently holds a first deed of trust which is secured exclusively by the debtors' principal place of residence.

B. First National Bank, Rosedale, Mississippi, original principal indebtedness in the sum of $24,235.68 — the debtors proposed to pay the sum of $288.52 per month outside the plan, representing the regular monthly installments on the indebtedness, in addition to the payment of $24.04 per month through the plan to cure a prepetition arrearage in the sum of $865.56.

At the time that the debtors' plan was confirmed, they were under the impression that the indebtedness owed to First National Bank was secured by a second deed of trust, exclusively encumbering their principal place of residence, which was subordinate to the Unifirst Bank deed of trust. Subsequently, the debtors ascertained that this indebtedness was secured by other collateral which is discussed immediately hereinbelow.

When the debtors ascertained that the indebtedness owed to First National Bank was secured by collateral other than their principal place of residence, i.e., a rental house, they initiated the instant adversary proceeding on May 8, 1989, with the filing of a complaint seeking to modify First National Bank's second deed of trust.

First National Bank had previously filed a motion to dismiss the bankruptcy case and a motion to strike. A hearing was conducted by the Court on these motions on May 23, 1989. At said hearing, the Court made certain findings of fact from the bench which are incorporated in this Opinion by reference. Also, at said hearing, the Court ascertained that the debtors had amassed a post-petition arrearage on the payments owed to First National Bank, which were to be paid outside the plan, in the sum of $4,056.09. The Court informed the parties that a post-petition default in an amount this significant would ordinarily warrant the dismissal of the bankruptcy case. However, because the debtors had treated the claim of First National Bank in their original Chapter 13 plan either erroneously or inadvertently, the Court was of the opinion that the issue of modification should be considered further. The Court overruled the motion to dismiss, but lifted the automatic stay so that First National Bank could commence the foreclosure of its deed of trust encumbering the rental property. An order was entered to this effect on June 9, 1989. At that point, there were three questions that required resolution, to-wit:

1. What was the balance of the indebtedness owed to Unifirst Bank? (By letter dated July 24, 1989, Unifirst Bank advised that as of September 23, 1987, the principal balance of the indebtedness was the sum of $51,194.10. The balance at the present time is still unknown.)

2. What was the value of the debtors' residential real property? (At a subsequent hearing conducted on July 20, 1989, which was set to consider the debtors' complaint, the parties agreed that the value of the residential real property was the sum of $55,000.00.)

3. Are the debtors precluded by the theories of res judicata or collateral estoppel from modifying their plan post-confirmation to "cram down" the secured claim of First National Bank? (This question has been briefed by the parties and will be resolved in this Opinion.)

III.

Because the debtors proposed to cure the prepetition arrearage owed to First National Bank, as well as, pay the regular monthly installments due under the indebtedness, First National Bank did not object to the confirmation of the debtors' plan. Since the debtors are now seeking to modify First National Bank's claim substantially, First National Bank has posited the defense that the plan cannot be modified post-confirmation because of the theories of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. In support of this defense, First National Bank has relied on the cases of In re Rush, 1 CBC 2d 904 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1980), In re Johnson, 25 B.R. 178 (Bankr.N.D.Ga. 1982), Matter of Abercrombie, 39 B.R. 178 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1984), and In re Kitchen, 64 B.R. 452 (Bankr.D.Mont.1986). These cases all prohibit the modification of a secured creditor's claim post-confirmation, generally under the theory that the confirmation order is res judicata as to all justiciable issues which were decided or which could have been decided at the confirmation hearing.

Two persuasive cases which hold to the contrary are In re Stone, 91 B.R. 423 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1988) and In re Jock, 95 B.R. 75 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1989).

In Stone, the surviving debtor, after the death of his spouse, moved to amend the Chapter 13 plan post-confirmation in order to abandon a vehicle, which secured an indebtedness owed to GMAC, and to pay reduced payments on the resulting unsecured deficiency claim. The deficiency clain was calculated as the difference between the value received by GMAC following the sale of the vehicle and the original amount of the secured indebtedness less the payments made subsequent to the plan being confirmed. Judge William Bodoh perceptively analyzed this issue and offered the following comment:

GMAC argues that confirmation of the Plan prohibits reclassification of a secured party\'s claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 1327(a). Indeed, GMAC\'s position appears to have been accepted by the courts in In re Abercrombie, 39 B.R. 178 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1984) and In re Johnson, 25 B.R. 178 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1982). For the following reasons, however, this Court declines to follow the Abercrombie and Johnson decisions.

11 U.S.C. Sec. 1327(a) provides:

a) The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan.

It is upon this Section that GMAC bases its argument that "confirmation of the Plan forbids a reduction and reclassification of a secured claim." In re Abercrombie, 39 B.R. at 179. However, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 1329 provides, in part:

(a) At any time after confirmation of the plan . . ., the plan may be modified, upon request of the debtor, . . . to —

(1) increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims of a particular class provided for by the plan;

(2) extend or reduce the time for such payments; or

(3) alter the amount of the distribution to a creditor whose claim is provided for by the plan, to the extent necessary to take account of any payment of such claim other than under the Plan. (b)(1) Sections 1322(a), 1322(b), and 1322(c) of this Title and the requirements of Sec. 1325(a) of this Title apply to any modification under subsection (a) of this Section.

(2) The plan as modified becomes the plan unless, after notice and a hearing, such modification is disapproved.

Initially, it should be noted that a confirmed Plan does not unalterably and permanently define the rights and obligations of the parties involved. Section 1329(b)(2) provides that an approved, modified Plan automatically displaces the previously confirmed Plan. The provisions of Sec. 1327(a) must be construed in light of the rights to modification contained in Sec. 1329. Furthermore, Sec. 1329(a)(3) permits a debtor to request modification of a Plan in order to "alter the amount of the distribution to a creditor. . . ." The amount of distribution to a creditor can be altered not only by reducing the amount paid to a creditor due to payments received from outside the Plan, but also by reclassifying a previously secured claim as an unsecured claim. The right to post-confirmation alteration of the rights of secured claimants is recognized in 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, Sec. 1329.01 (rev. 15th ed. 1988):

Of course, a post-confirmation modification which changes the rights of a holder of an allowed secured claim provided for by the modified plan must either be accepted by the holder, relinquish the collateral to the holder, or contain a cram down provision meeting the requirements of section 1325(a)(5)(B).

Id. at 1329-7. In the present case, the Debtor surrendered the collateral to GMAC. Thus, this Court finds that a debtor is expressly authorized under Section 1329(a)(3) to reclassify a secured claim as unsecured when the creditor has liquidated its collateral but still claims a deficiency to be due from the debtor.

This

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