In re Williams
| Citation | 978 F.Supp.2d 123 |
| Decision Date | 04 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:05–GP–18(RNC). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | In re Stephen John WILLIAMS. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Stephen John Williams, Storrs, CT, pro se.
Wick R. Chambers, Winnick Ruben Chambers Hoffnung & Peabody LLC, Hamden, CT, for Federal Grievance Committee.
RULING AND ORDER
This grievance proceeding presents the question whether reciprocal discipline should be imposed on respondent Stephen John Williams, a member of the bar of this Court, based on a suspension order of the Connecticut Superior Court, which has become final.
Local Rule 83.2(f)(2) provides that on a presentment of the Grievance Committee petitioning the Court to impose reciprocal discipline, the identical discipline must be imposed unless it clearly appears on the face of the record in the prior disciplinary proceeding:
a. that the procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or
b. that there was such an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the Court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the discipline imposed; or c. that the imposition of the same discipline by the Court would result in grave injustice; or
d. that the misconduct established is deemed by the Court to warrant substantially different discipline.
D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 83.2(f)(2). If the Court finds that one or more of these exceptions exists, it may enter “such other order as it deems appropriate.” Id.1 Respondent submits that the prior proceeding violated his right to due process, there is an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct found by the state court, and no discipline should be imposed. Counsel for the Grievance Committee disagrees and urges that reciprocal discipline is clearly appropriate.
The standard of review in this proceeding is highly deferential to the state court's determination. See, e.g., Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 282, 77 S.Ct. 1274, 1 L.Ed.2d 1342 (1957); In re Roman, 601 F.3d 189, 192–94 (2d Cir.2010); In re Edelstein, 214 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir.2000). Respondent bears the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that reciprocal discipline should not be imposed. In re Roman, 601 F.3d at 194 (). Rarely is this burden met or even attempted to be met. In most instances, the respondent simply accepts reciprocal discipline. When the presentment is contested, as it has been here, the Court is not to act as a rubber stamp in the name of reciprocity. Instead it must determine whether the record of the prior proceeding discloses a substantial defect covered by one of the exceptions to reciprocal discipline. Such a defect would exist if the prior proceeding was fundamentally unfair due to a lack of adequate notice or opportunity to be heard or if the state court's determination was unsupported by evidence. Having reviewed the record of the prior proceeding with care in light of respondent's many arguments, the Court finds that although some of respondent's arguments have merit, he has not sustained his heavy burden of showing that reciprocal discipline should not be imposed.
On July 18, 2005, the Connecticut Superior Court entered an order suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of six months, commencing August 7, 2005, with reinstatement contingent on successful completion of “a Connecticut Bar Association approved course of instruction on legal ethics and Connecticut practice and procedure.” See State v. Williams, No. MI04–6287590 (Conn.Super. July 18, 2005). The Court found that respondent had violated Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client; 3.5(3), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal; 4.4, prohibiting a lawyer from using means that have no purpose other than to embarrass, delay or burden a third person; and 8.4(4), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.2
The disciplinary order arose in the following context. On March 30, 2004, respondent was stopped in Windham, Connecticut and given a ticket for speeding, which carried a fine of $148. At the time of the stop, respondent provided a street address in Hong Kong. Before the answer date, he returned the ticket to the Central Infractions Bureau with a plea of not guilty. The return address he provided was a post office box in Hong Kong. The Superior Court in Danielson scheduled a hearing for November 5, 2004 (“the November hearing”). Prior to that time, respondent notified the Central Infractions Bureau that he had closed the post office box in Hong Kong and asked that future correspondence be directed to his street address there. The Clerk's Office sent notice of the hearing to respondent using the post office box. Because the box had been closed, the letter was returned. Respondent was not given notice of the November hearing by any other means. When he did not appear for the hearing, the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles was notified by the Clerk and respondent's driving privileges were suspended. Notice of the suspension was sent by the DMV to the same post office box in Hong Kong and thus was not received by respondent. On February 23, 2005, respondent was stopped in Connecticut and given a misdemeanor summons and complaint for operating a motor vehicle under suspension. By that time, the case arising from the speeding ticket had been closed.
On March 8, 2005, respondent filed several motions in the case involving the speeding ticket: (1) a motion to reopen the case, which stated that respondent had not received notice of the November hearing and thus had not willfully failed to appear; (2) a motion asking the Court to waive the $60 reopening fee based on the Clerk's failure to provide proper notice of the November hearing; and (3) a motion for mandamus requiring the Clerk to produce a letter acknowledging (a) that respondent did not receive proper notice of the hearing and therefore the matter was wrongly referred to the DMV and (b) that the DMV was not provided with the correct postal address by the Clerk and therefore notice of the suspension was sent to an incorrect address.3
At a hearing in the speeding case on March 16, 2005, the Court (Hon. Michael E. Riley) granted respondent's motions to reopen and waive the reopening fee. Assistant State's Attorney Jennifer Barry asked for a hearing on the motion for mandamus so the State could subpoena the Deputy Chief Clerk to testify. The Court agreed to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the mandamus motion.
On April 7, 2005, the day before the scheduled hearing on the mandamus motion, respondent served a request for disclosure on the Clerk's Office relating to the motion. The request asked the Clerk to produce for inspection and copying “all written guidelines, rules, regulations, policies, etc., relevant to this matter and specifically relevant to the handling of incoming correspondence, the sending of notices of hearing, the sending of notices to the Department of Motor Vehicles and the closing out of cases under C.G.S. § 14–140.”
That same day, respondent hand-delivered a letter to the Deputy Chief Clerk in Danielson, Gina Mancini Pickett. The letter was prepared on respondent's professional letterhead. The letter stated that a hearing on the mandamus motion was scheduled for the next day, that Ms. Barry had indicated an intention to subpoena Ms. Pickett to testify, and that the hearing would address “why the Clerk's records were not properly updated, why the notices were not sent to the correct address and why this error was not caught even when the file was being closed out under C.G.S. § 14–140.” The letter went on to state, “It appears that this hearing is intended as an opportunity for you to be heard and to defend yourself and your office.” The letter continued:
I think it is obvious that a mistake was made by the Clerk's Office and that the notices were not sent to the correct address. The Court has already waived the re-opening fee based on that argument. I respectfully suggest that the hearing scheduled for Friday serves no useful purpose and that a more efficient solution would be for your office to issue the requested letter without an order of mandamus. If your office agrees to do so then I will withdraw my motion. Otherwise, I intend to proceed with the matter.
In preparation for that hearing, please provide me with all written guidelines, rules, regulations, policies, etc., relevant to this matter and specifically relevant to the handling of incoming correspondence, the sending of notices of hearing, the sending of notices to the [DMV] and the closing out of cases under C.G.S. § 14–140. I would also appreciate a written statement of what happened in this case and why the notice was not sent to the correct address as well as the actual policies followed in this case. As Clerk, it is your responsibility to provide this information to [the] public on request.
Finally, I should point out that this motion for mandamus bears no relation to the underlying prosecution. The issue before the Court is solely whether you should be ordered to issue the requested letter. The matter is more in the nature of a separate adversarial proceeding. As such, the office of the prosecution has no role in this matter. I also believe it would be an ethical violation for the office of the prosecutor to represent your interests before the Court due to the obvious conflict of interest. Therefore, you should consider whether you wish to obtain independent legal counsel.
To allow you more time to comply with my request, I am asking the Court to postpone Friday's hearing until F...
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In re Zelotes
...of Review Local Rule 83.2(f)(2) governs when reciprocal discipline should be imposed in federal court. See In re Williams, 978 F. Supp. 2d 123, 123-24 (D. Conn. 2012). Under Local Rule 83.2(f)(2), when the Grievance Committee petitions for the imposition of reciprocal discipline via a prese......
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Fed. Grievance Comm. v. Miller
...Court considers reciprocal discipline, its standard of review "is highly deferential to the state court's determination." In re Williams, 978 F. Supp. 2d at 125 (citing Theard, 354 U.S. at 282); see also In re Roman, 601 F. 3d 189, 192-94 (2d Cir. 2010). At the District Court, the burden fa......
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