In re Williams Marine Const. and Services, Inc., No. 303CV293J16HTS.
| Decision Date | 27 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 303CV293J16HTS. |
| Citation | 350 F.Supp.2d 975 |
| Parties | In re: WILLIAMS MARINE CONSTRUCTION AND SERVICES, INC., as owner of the Barge 0-1, and Workboat Colt, both undocumented, in a cause of action for exoneration from or limitation of liability, Petitioner. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Thomas Albert Boyd, Jr., Boyd & Sutter, P.A., Jacksonville, FL, for Timothy Hood, Claimant.
Michael A. Garfield, Moseley, Warren, Prichard & Parrish, Jacksonville, FL, for Williams Marine Construction and Services, Inc., In Re.
Anna Marie Jemjemian-Conklin, Selis & Associates, P.A., Ormond Beach, FL, for Omne Staff Leasing Services, Inc., Claimant.
Patrick Michael Leahy, Moseley, Warren, Prichard & Parrish, Jacksonville, FL, for Williams Marine Construction and Services, Inc., Petitioner.
James F. Moseley, Moseley, Warren, Prichard & Parrish, Jacksonville, FL, for Williams Marine Construction and Services, Inc., In Re.
Scott Alan Selis, Selis & Associates, P.A., Ormond Beach, FL, for Omne Staff Leasing Services, Inc., Claimant.
G.J. Rod Sullivan, Jr., Sullivan & Company, Jacksonville, FL, for Timothy Hood, Claimant.
Before the Court are Claimant Hood's Amended Motion for Summary Judgment on Limitation of Liability (Dkt. 57); Claimant Hood's Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim of Omne Staff Leasing (Dkt. 79); and Petitioner Williams Marine Construction of Services, Inc.'s ("Williams Marine") Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 99). Williams Marine filed a Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Claimant Hood's Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 59), and Claimant Omne Staff Leasing Services, Inc. ("Omne") filed a Response to Claimant Hood's Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 60). Omne also filed a Response to Hood's Motion for Summary Judgment on Omne's claim (Dkt. 81), and Hood has responded to Williams Marine's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 105). The Court will address each of the three motions for summary judgment separately below.
This case had its origin in Duval County Circuit Court when, on November 15, 2002, Claimant Timothy W. Hood ("Hood") filed an action against Williams Marine and Omne based on general maritime and admiralty law, as well as the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688. Hood claimed that while working on board Barge 0-1, he sustained injuries to his left foot on October 9, 2002. Hood was allegedly attempting to climb atop the housing of a boom crane on board the barge when his foot became entangled in the machinery, ultimately requiring the partial amputation of his foot.
This Court's involvement began on April 11, 2003, when Williams Marine, owner of Barge 0-1 and the Workboat Colt, filed its Verified Complaint for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability Pursuant to Rule 9(h), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 46 U.S.C.App. § 183, et seq. (Dkt. 1). According to the Complaint, as of October 9, 2002, the Barge 0-1 and Workboat Colt, along with the Link-Belt Speeder Model 78 boom crane located on the barge, were "tight, staunch, properly equipped, supplied and crewed, and in all respects seaworthy and fit for their intended use" while located in Florida territorial waters at a construction site in Naples, Florida. Dkt. 1, ¶ 2. The construction site was permitted for the purpose of driving of pilings from the barge and the crane located on board the barge, the building of a dock or jetty, dredging and creating a mitigation area. Id. at ¶ 3.
The barge and Workboat Colt were participating in the construction of a condominium/apartment complex, and on the day of Hood's accident, the barge was allegedly located near the seawall, was spudded down and was in the process of shutting down for the day for routine maintenance. Id. at ¶ 4. Williams Marine alleges that the accident occurred on board the barge without its privity or knowledge, and as such is should be exonerated or exempt from liability. In fact, none of Williams Marine's principles were on board the barge when Hood was injured, as only Tony Martin, a leased employee from Omne similar to Hood, was on board to operate the crane. Id. at ¶ 6. Hood's claims against Omne in state court are also based on duties it owed as leasing employer under the Jones Act and maritime law.
Williams Marine alleges that because the Plaintiff is claiming he is entitled to all seaman's remedies pursuant to the Jones Act and general maritime law, it is entitled to a limitation of liability as a shipowner under 46 U.S.C.App. § 183, et seq. It claims that the value of the Barge 0-1, with the crane, and the Workboat Colt, together with their apparel and fittings, was $91,000 immediately after the accident. Id. at ¶ 13. As such, should Williams Marine be adjudged liable for any of the damages claimed in the state court complaint, it claims that the loss occurred without its privity, fault or knowledge, limiting its liability to the value of the vessels and equipment at issue. Id. at ¶ 15. Williams Marine filed a bond in the amount of $102,420 with the Court, representing its limitation fund of $91,000, plus interest. Id. at ¶ 16; Dkt. 2. On April 16, 2003, the Court entered an Order (Dkt. 3) enjoining all claims and proceedings, including those in the Duval County Circuit Court, against Williams Marine, Barge 0-1, the crane and the Workboat Colt. The state court case by Hood against Omne is presumably ongoing.
Both Omne and Hood have filed claims against Williams Marine and its vessels pursuant to Supplemental Rule F, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Omne makes its claim under a Client Service Agreement between it and Williams Marine, wherein Omne was to employ the then-current employees of Williams Marine and then lease the employees back to Williams Marine, providing payroll services and workers' compensation for the employees. Dkt. 21, ¶ 3. Hood was listed under the employment agreement as one such "leased back" employee. However, Omne states that the true nature of Hood's job responsibilities on board the barge took him outside of state workers' compensation laws, and as such, Omne has cross claimed against Williams Marine for breach of the Client Service Agreement Id. at ¶ 11. Omne claims that Williams Marine must indemnify it for any liability found pursuant to Hood's claims, due to the alleged breach of agreement. Omne currently alleges damages in excess of $15,000 that Omne has paid for Hood's living expenses and medical bills. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14. In total, Omne is seeking the entire limitation fund submitted by Williams Marine as the total amount of its damages. Id. at ¶ 20.
In Hood's four-count Claim against Williams Marine, he alleges that he has been employed by Williams Marine as a deckhand and boat operator of the Colt, which was used to transport Barge 0-1, along with other vessels on the Regatta Condominiums project, including Barge 0-4 and its associated crane and push boat. Dkt. 26, ¶ 2. According to Hood, he was working aboard the Barge 0-1 on October 9, 2002, building a seawall as part of the Regatta project, when he climbed the crane located on the barge at about 2:45 p.m., resulting in the ultimate injury to his foot. He claims that Williams Marine owed him a duty of reasonable care to provide a safe place to work, which it breached by failing to provide the necessary equipment for safe maintenance of the crane, failing to secure and guard the moving parts of the crane and to stop any machinery movement during maintenance, and by failing to instruct and supervise Hood during the maintenance operations. Id. at pp. 2-3. Hood further claims that Williams Marine violated federal regulations, including the Occupational Health and Safety Act ("OSHA"), by failing to provide a safe work environment. Id. at pp. 3-4. Hood therefore injects his Jones Act claim into the limitation of liability proceedings before this Court.
Hood also brings his claim for unseaworthiness of the Barge 0-1 and its crane before this Court. He alleges that the vessel and its crane were unseaworthy because there were inadequate means for access to the crane on the barge and because the guarding of the crane's moving parts was inadequate Hood therefore claims that Williams Marine is strictly liable for his injuries due to the unseaworthiness of the vessel. Hood also asserts his claims for maintenance and cure under general maritime law, as well as his claim under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. § 901, et seq., in this action, alleging that if he was not a "seaman" under the Jones Act, then he was a "harbor worker" under the LHWCA.
Williams Marine's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 99) goes only toward the Jones Act claim, as Williams Marine's sole argument is that Hood is not a "seaman" as required for a claim under the Act, 46 App. U.S.C. § 688(a). Hood, on the other hand, argues in his Motion (Dkt. 57) that Williams Marine is not entitled to a limitation of liability as a matter of law because it was within its "privity and knowledge" to prevent the conditions rendering the barge and crane unseaworthy and in violation of OSHA and federal regulations. In addition, Hood claims that because Williams Marine did not secure compensation under the LHWCA, it cannot claim limitation of liability or comparative negligence as defenses to the Plaintiff's claims. Lastly, Hood claims entitlement to judgment as a matter of law against Omne on its claims, arguing that its personal contract claims with Williams Marine are not subject to a limitation of liability, nor are its indemnity claims for liability for Hood's injuries or maintenance and cure provided to Hood.
The Court should grant a motion for summary judgment only if "there is no genuine issue of material fact [such] that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Pettis v. Bosarge Diving Inc.
...connection to the Xpress and to the Bosarge Diving Fleet is substantial in terms of its nature. See In re Williams Marine Const. and Services, Inc., 350 F.Supp.2d 975, 986 (M.D.Fla.2004) (“In other words, courts should examine the claimant's overall job assignments as they existed at the ti......