In re Witko
Citation | 374 F.3d 1040 |
Decision Date | 25 June 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 03-16188.,03-16188. |
Parties | In re: Alfred J. WITKO, Debtor. Alfred J. Witko, Defendant-Appellant, v. Deborah C. Menotte, Trustee, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) |
Michael Richard Bakst, Adorno & Zeder, PA, West Palm Beach, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before BLACK and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and SMITH*, District Judge.
Alfred J. Witko (Witko) appeals the district court's award of his legal malpractice claim to his bankruptcy estate. On appeal, Witko argues that he filed his bankruptcy petition before his legal malpractice cause of action accrued and that the legal malpractice, upon which he bases his claim, did not damage the bankruptcy estate. We conclude that Witko's cause of action is not property of his estate and, accordingly, we reverse.
On September 8, 1999, Witko filed a petition for voluntary bankruptcy. On January 13, 2000, in a separate proceeding regarding Witko's marital dissolution, a state trial court denied his request for alimony, which a state appellate court affirmed on December 15, 2000. Witko, thereafter, sued his divorce counsel for malpractice. The trustee of Witko's bankruptcy estate, Deborah C. Menotte, intervened, seeking a determination that Witko's malpractice claim was estate property. The bankruptcy court held that Witko's cause of action was property of the estate because "the better rule is that where pre-petition acts form part of a chain of events that lead to a post-petition `redressable harm,' the cause of action is `sufficiently rooted in the debtor's pre-petition past....'" The district court affirmed and Witko now appeals to this Court.
Witko's appeal is timely and this Court has jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).
This Court reviews de novo the question of law whether a debtor's interest is property of the bankruptcy estate. Bell-Tel Fed. Credit Union v. Kalter (In re Kalter), 292 F.3d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir.2002).
Pre-petition causes of action are part of the bankruptcy estate and post-petition causes of action are not. Specifically, the debtor's filing of a petition with the bankruptcy court commences a voluntary bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 301. The commencement of a voluntary bankruptcy case creates an estate generally consisting of the "legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Although the estate is construed broadly, United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205, 103 S.Ct. 2309, 2313, 76 L.Ed.2d 515 (1983), Congress expressly cautioned that the Bankruptcy Code S.Rep. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868; H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, at 367-68 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323.
In Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 511, 15 L.Ed.2d 428 (1966), for example, the Supreme Court concluded that the debtor's loss-carryback tax refund claims were property of the estate because they were "sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past." Id. at 380, 86 S.Ct. at 515. Although the Segal debtor could not claim the refunds until the tax year closed, which was post-petition, the predicates for receiving the refunds (payment of taxes in prior years and a net operating loss) occurred pre-petition. Id. The debtor had more than a mere hope that his losses might generate revenue in the future; he "possessed an existing interest at the time of filing," even though his enjoyment of that interest was postponed. Drewes v. Vote (In re Vote), 276 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir.2002); see Sliney v. Battley (In re Schmitz), 270 F.3d 1254, 1258 (9th Cir.2001). The Supreme Court did not allow the Segal trustee to assert more rights than the debtor had at the commencement of the case; it merely allowed the trustee to seek the interests existing, though still undetermined in quantity, at the time the debtor filed his petition.
The issue here is whether Witko's legal malpractice claim is property of his bankruptcy estate. This Court must determine whether the courts below correctly classified Witko's cause of action as a pre-petition interest. As reflected by the parties' briefing and oral arguments, recent cases arguably have clouded previous choice of law authority. See Johnson v. Alvarez (In re Alvarez), 224 F.3d 1273, 1276 (11th Cir.2000) () (footnotes omitted). We now reiterate that federal law determines whether an interest is property of the bankruptcy estate, Segal, 382 U.S. at 379, 86 S.Ct. at 515, and Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 918, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979); see also Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398, 112 S.Ct. 1386, 1389, 118 L.Ed.2d 39 (1992) (); Charles R. Hall Motors, Inc. v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 137 F.3d 1280, 1283 (11th Cir.1998) (quoting Southtrust Bank of Ala. v. Thomas (In re Thomas), 883 F.2d 991, 995 (11th Cir.1989)) ("[T]he nature and existence of the debtor's right to property is determined by looking at state law.") (brackets omitted). State law thus controls Witko's legal malpractice cause of action and determines whether that claim existed at the time Witko filed his bankruptcy petition.
Applying the appropriate state law, Witko's legal malpractice cause of action did not exist until his alimony action concluded with an adverse outcome that was proximately caused by his attorney's negligence. "Under Florida law, a cause of action for legal malpractice has three elements: (1) the attorney's employment; (2) the attorney's neglect of a reasonable duty; and (3) the attorney's negligence was the proximate cause of loss to the client." In re Alvarez, 224 F.3d at 1276 (citing Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So.2d 931, 933 (Fla.1999)). Discussing the third element, the Florida Supreme Court unambiguously held that until the underlying action is concluded with an outcome adverse to the client (i.e., harm), "a malpractice claim is hypothetical and damages are speculative." Silvestrone v. Edell, 721 So.2d 1173, 1175 (Fla.1998); see Blumberg v. USAA Cas....
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