In re WRG, No. 26087-5-II

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Citation: 40 P.3d 1177,110 Wash.App. 318
• Decision Date: 15 February 2002
• Docket Number: No. 26871-0-II., No. 26087-5-II
• Parties: In the Detention of W.R.G. State of Washington, Respondent, v. W.R.G., Appellant.

40 P.3d 1177
110 Wash.App. 318

In the Detention of W.R.G.
State of Washington, Respondent,
v.
W.R.G., Appellant

Nos. 26087-5-II, 26871-0-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

February 15, 2002.

40 P.3d 1178

Pattie Mhoon (Court Appointed), Tacoma, for Appellant

Pamela H. Anderson, Allison Margaret Stanhope, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.

SEINFELD, J.

W.R.G. appeals two separate involuntary commitment orders, each of which authorized the State to detain him for a 180-day treatment period at Western State Hospital (WSH). The treatment periods have expired in both instances and, thus, the cases are moot. Nonetheless, we review his jury instruction challenge, finding that it presents an issue of continuing and substantial public interest. The instruction, which was based on RCW 71.05.320(2), said that there had been a finding in an earlier commitment proceeding that W.R.G. came "into custody as a result of conduct in which he attempted or inflicted serious harm upon the person of another" and that the State did not need to reprove that fact. We conclude that this instruction was improper because the evidence did not support it and it was an unconstitutional comment on the evidence.

FACTS

I. No. 26087-5-II

In April 2000, WSH staff filed a petition seeking a 180-day involuntary commitment period for W.R.G. The petition alleged that W.R.G. had been taken into custody as a result of conduct by which he attempted or inflicted serious physical harm upon another or himself, that he continued to present a likelihood of serious harm, and that he was gravely disabled. The petition also alleged that there was no appropriate less restrictive alternative to involuntary commitment.

WSH professionals testified at trial that W.R.G. suffered from bipolar disorder and pedophilia, that he had stated that upon his release he would contact and reunite with his ex-wife and two daughters who are in hiding, and that he had violated staff rules by collecting pictures of children. They opined that W.R.G. was gravely disabled and that he continued to present a likelihood of serious harm to others.

Over W.R.G.'s objection, the trial court gave instruction 4, which stated in part:

[T]here has been a finding, based on a prior proceeding that the Respondent did come into custody as a result of conduct in which he attempted or inflicted serious harm upon the person of another. That finding is conclusive evidence and the Petitioners are not required to reprove the events that led to Respondent's detention.

Clerk's Papers (CP) at 49. The jury found that W.R.G. suffers from a mental disorder, that he is gravely disabled, and that he presents a likelihood of serious harm to others. On May 15, 2000, the trial court ordered W.R.G. detained at WSH for a period not to exceed 180 days, a period that has now elapsed.

40 P.3d 1179

II. No. 26871-0-II

In October 2000, WSH staff again petitioned for a 180-day involuntary commitment period for W.R.G. The testimony at this second commitment hearing was generally consistent with that of the earlier proceeding. WSH staff reported the same diagnosis and again opined that W.R.G. continued to be gravely disabled and that he presented a likelihood of serious harm to others. There were no challenges to the jury instructions and the jury again found that W.R.G. has a mental disorder, that he is gravely disabled, and that he presents a likelihood of serious harm. On December 13, 2000, the trial court entered an order committing W.R.G. for a 180-day involuntary treatment period; this period has also elapsed.

DISCUSSION

I. MOOTNESS

As the 180-day detention periods have expired in both cases, we can not provide effective relief and the appeals are moot. See In the Detention of Swanson, 115 Wash.2d 21, 24, 793 P.2d 962, 115 Wash.2d 21, 804 P.2d 1 (1990); In the Detention of Cross, 99 Wash.2d 373, 376-77, 662 P.2d 828 (1983). Nonetheless, we may reach the merits of moot cases that involve matters of continuing and substantial public interest. Dunner v. McLaughlin, 100 Wash.2d 832, 838, 676 P.2d 444 (1984). In making that determination, we consider "(1) the public or private nature of the question presented; (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination which will provide future guidance to public officers; and (3) the likelihood that the question will recur." Dunner, 100 Wash.2d at 838, 676 P.2d 444.

The need to clarify the civil commitment statutory scheme is an issue of continuing and substantial public interest. In the Detention of LaBelle, 107 Wash.2d 196, 200, 728 P.2d 138 (1986); Cross, 99 Wash.2d at 377, 662 P.2d 828. But challenges that turn on facts unique to a particular case and that are unlikely to recur will not support review. In the Detention of R.A.W., 104 Wash.App. 215, 221, 15 P.3d 705 (2001) (whether trial court had good cause to continue detainee's hearing involved facts unique to detainee's case and was unlikely to recur).

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

W.R.G.'s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence turns on facts unique to his particular cases and the trial court's discretionary decision to give the case to the jury. Thus, these claims do not involve matters of continuing and substantial public interest justifying review. See, e.g., In the Detention of R.W., 98 Wash.App. 140, 143-44, 988 P.2d 1034 (1999) (issue of admissibility of transcript testimony was moot because it involved private question, would not likely recur, and was a matter of discretion). As W.R.G. does not raise any other issues in cause No. 26871-0-II, we affirm that commitment order.

B. Instruction 4

W.R.G. also contends that instruction 4 in cause No. 26087-5-II relieved the State of a portion of its burden of proof and constituted a comment...