In re Wright, 97-BG-623.

Decision Date13 November 1997
Docket NumberNo. 97-BG-623.,97-BG-623.
PartiesIn re Edward Wesley WRIGHT, Respondent, A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Edward Wesley Wright, respondent pro se.

Leonard H. Becker, Bar Counsel, and H. Clay Smith, III, Assistant Bar Counsel, entered appearances for petitioner, the Office of Bar Counsel.

Before TERRY and SCHWELB, Associate Judges, and BELSON, Senior Judge.

PER CURIAM:

The Board on Professional Responsibility has recommended that respondent Wright, a member of our bar, be suspended from the practice of law for thirty days, and that he be required to demonstrate his fitness to practice law and to make restitution of $2,000 to a former client, with interest, before being reinstated. The Board found that Mr. Wright had violated several of the Rules of Professional Conduct, following a hearing at which Mr. Wright failed to appear. A copy of the Board's report is appended to this opinion.

Mr. Wright has not challenged the Board's recommendation in any respect. He has not filed a brief or presented any argument before this court. From our own review of the record, we can find no reason to reject the Board's recommendation, especially when it is uncontested. See In re Goldsborough, 654 A.2d 1285, 1288 (D.C.1995). We are satisfied that the Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence and that the proposed suspension, coupled with the requirements of restitution and a showing of fitness, is an appropriate sanction for Mr. Wright's misconduct. It is therefore

ORDERED that respondent, Edward Wesley Wright, is suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for a period of thirty days, effective thirty days from the date of this opinion. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that before being reinstated to membership in the bar, respondent Wright shall demonstrate his fitness to practice law,1 and that he shall make restitution in the amount of $2,000 to his former client, Derrick Anthony DePass, with interest from August 25, 1991, at an annual rate of six percent. We call respondent's attention to Rule XI, § 14(g), of this court's Rules Governing the Bar, which requires the filing of an affidavit containing certain information, and to Rule XI, § 16(c), which sets forth the consequences of a failure to file the affidavit within the time prescribed by Rule 14(g).

APPENDIX

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

IN THE MATTER OF EDWARD W. WRIGHT, ESQUIRE,

RESPONDENT

Bar Docket No. 123-94

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Hearing Committee Number Two concluded that Respondent violated District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3(a), 1.3(c), 1.4(a) and 1.5(b), arising from his conduct in representing a single client, and Rule 8.4(d) and District of Columbia Bar Rule XI, § 2(b)(3), arising from his failure to respond to inquiries of Bar Counsel and an order of the Board on Professional Responsibility. The Hearing Committee's conclusions were reached as the result of a hearing at which the Office of Bar Counsel presented witnesses and exhibits. Respondent did not appear at the hearing.

The Findings of Fact are adopted substantially in the form presented by the Hearing Committee.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Respondent, Edward Wesley Wright, is a member of the Bar of the District of Columbia, having been admitted on December 19, 1980.

On or about August 25, 1991, Derrick Anthony DePass retained Respondent to represent him in a civil action against the District of Columbia. Respondent did not provide Mr. DePass a written statement setting forth the basis or rate of his fee. Mr. DePass paid $2,000 to Respondent in legal fees in connection with the representation.

On September 3, 1991, Respondent filed a civil complaint on behalf of Mr. DePass in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, styled Derrick Anthony DePass v. United States, C.A. No. 91-2231.

On May 18, 1992, defendants served interrogatories and requests for production of documents upon Respondent. Respondent did not object to the discovery requests or seek an extension of time to respond. Respondent transmitted the discovery requests and transmitted his responses to Mr. DePass, who prepared responses to each of the discovery requests and transmitted his responses to Respondent one week later. Respondent failed to file responses to the defendants' discovery requests.

Beginning in July 1992, Mr. DePass made numerous attempts to communicate with Respondent regarding the status of his case. The Hearing Committee found that, as of the hearing in July of 1996, Respondent had not communicated with Mr. DePass concerning the status of his case since May 1992.

On November 3, 1992, the defendant District of Columbia filed a motion to compel responses to interrogatories and requests for production of documents, and for sanctions. Respondent did not respond to the motion or seek an extension of time to file a response. On February 10, 1993, the defendant District of Columbia filed a motion for continuance of pretrial and trial and for an order to show cause. As grounds for the motion, defendant asserted, inter alia, that plaintiff had failed to respond to its discovery requests or to its motion to compel responses to its discovery requests.

On February 16, 1993, the Court issued an order requiring the plaintiff to appear before the Court on March 8, 1993, to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. Respondent did not appear at the show cause hearing or file a pleading on behalf of his client in response to the Court's order. The Court dismissed Mr. DePass's case with prejudice.

On March 14, 1994, Bar Counsel received Mr. DePass's complaint against Respondent. On March 15, 1994, the Office of Bar Counsel sent a letter and a copy of the complaint to Respondent at 1673 Columbia Road, N.W., Suite 702, Washington, D.C. XXXXX-XXXX, his address listed with the District of Columbia Bar. Bar Counsel requested a response to the complaint by March 25, 1994. No response was received, and the letter was not returned.

On April 12, 1994, Bar Counsel sent a second letter to Respondent at 1673 Columbia Road, NW, Suite 702, Washington, D.C. XXXXX-XXXX, requesting a response to the complaint by April 17, 1994. No response was received, and the letter was not returned.

The 1673 Columbia Road, N.W., Suite 702 address was the address that Respondent showed on the complaint that he filed on behalf of Mr. DePass. When Corporation Counsel moved to compel responses to the discovery requests, its filing was accompanied by a "Certificate of Good Faith Efforts to Resolve Discovery Disputes," in which an Assistant Corporation Counsel certified that he spoke with Respondent by telephone and communicated by letter with Respondent at the Columbia Road address. The court docket for the case gives no indication that mail sent to Respondent by the court was returned.

A process server made the following efforts to serve Bar Counsel's letters upon Respondent:

On May 13, 1994, at 7:10 a.m., the process server attempted to serve Respondent at his usual place of abode at 1673 Columbia Road, N.W., Suite 702, Washington, D.C. XXXXX-XXXX. On this occasion, no one came to the door.
On May 16, 1994, at 6:45 a.m., the process server attempted to serve Respondent at his usual place of abode. On this occasion, no one came to the door.
On May 18, 1994, at 8:20 p.m., the process server attempted to serve Respondent at his usual place of abode. On this occasion, he was unable to gain access to the building.
On May 23, 1994, at 6:30 a.m., the process server attempted to serve Respondent at his usual place of abode. On this occasion, he heard a television or radio playing within when he arrived. When he knocked on the door, the television or radio was turned off, and no one answered his repeated knocking on the door.
On May 23, 1994, at 6:05 p.m., the process server attempted to serve Respondent at his usual place of abode. On this occasion, once again, he heard a television or radio playing within, only to hear it turned off when he knocked on the apartment door.
On May 25, 1994, at 7:55 a.m., the process server attempted to serve Respondent at his usual place of abode. On this occasion, once again, he heard a television or radio playing within, only to hear it turned off when he knocked on the apartment door.
On May 31, 1994, at 1:15 p.m., the process server attempted to serve Respondent at his usual place of abode. On this occasion, no one came to the door.
On June 1, 1994, at 8:00 a.m., the process server attempted to serve Respondent at his usual place of abode. On this occasion, although he could hear movement within the apartment, no one came to the door. Accordingly, he left his card requesting that Respondent contact him to accept service.
On June 2, 1994, at 6:10 p.m., the process server attempted to serve Respondent at his usual place of abode. On this occasion, he could not gain entrance to the building.
On June 6, 1994, at 9:40 p.m., the process server attempted to serve Respondent. On this occasion, he could not gain entrance to the building.
On June 7, 1994, at 7:15 p.m., the process server attempted to serve Respondent at his usual place of abode. On this occasion, no one came to the door.

On June 13, 1994, the process server placed a copy of the complaint and Bar Counsel's March 15 and April 12, 1994, letters beneath the door at 1673 Columbia Road, N.W., Suite 702, Washington, D.C. XXXXX-XXXX, Respondent's usual place of abode. Respondent submitted no response to Bar Counsel's inquiries.

On July 5, 1994, Bar Counsel filed with the Board and served upon Respondent, via first-class mail, a motion of Bar Counsel for an order compelling a response to the ethical complaint. Respondent did not file a response to Bar Counsel's motion.

On August 9, 1994, the Board ordered Respondent to provide Bar Counsel a...

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