In re Wygle

• Citation: 910 N.W.2d 599
• Decision Date: 13 April 2018
• Docket Number: No. 16-1732,16-1732
• Parties: IN RE the DETENTION OF Nicholas WYGLE, Nicholas Wygle, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

910 N.W.2d 599

IN RE the DETENTION OF Nicholas WYGLE, Nicholas Wygle, Appellant.

No. 16-1732

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed April 13, 2018

Michael H. Adams, Chief Public Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller and Keisha F. Cretsinger, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

APPEL, Justice.

In this case, Nicholas Wygle appeals a district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the State’s petition for his civil commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under Iowa Code chapter 229A (2016). Wygle had been previously convicted of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. At the time the State initiated the civil commitment proceedings, Wygle had discharged his sentence for his underlying sexual offense but was residing at the Curt Forbes Residential Facility while serving a special sentence under Iowa Code chapter 903B.

The State makes no claim that Wygle committed a recent overt act, a requirement required for civil commitment under Iowa Code chapter 229A.4(2). The sole issue in this case is whether Wygle, by virtue of his residency at Curt Forbes Residential Facility pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 903B, is "presently confined" under Iowa Code section 229A.4(1) and thus qualifies for SVP commitment under this section of the statute.

For the reasons expressed below, we conclude that Wygle is not "presently confined" under Iowa Code section 229A.4(1), and as a result, the State cannot commence an SVP proceeding in the absence of a recent overt act, as required under Iowa Code section 229A.4(2). We therefore reverse the decision of the district court and remand the case with directions to dismiss the complaint.

I. Factual Background and Proceedings.

In July 2012, Wygle was convicted of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. The district court sentenced Wygle to serve an indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed two years. In addition, the district court sentenced Wygle to serve a ten-year special sentence pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 903B. On August 7, 2015, Wygle was released from prison after having discharged his sentence on the assault with intent to commit sexual abuse charge. Wygle remained, however, subject to the ten-year special sentence under Iowa Code section 903B. Upon his release from prison, Wygle boarded a commercial bus and travelled to a residential facility in Marshalltown. From there, he transferred to the Curt Forbes Residential Facility in Ames.

On March 14, 2016, the State filed a petition to have Wygle civilly committed as a sexually violent predator under Iowa Code chapter 229A. At the time the petition was filed, Wygle was residing at the Curt Forbes Residential Facility. The district court found probable cause pursuant to Iowa Code section 229A.5(2) and ordered a trial.

On August 30, Wygle filed a motion to dismiss because he was no longer "presently confined" under Iowa Code chapter 229A.4(1) and the State had not alleged a recent overt act that might otherwise support a section 229A.4(2) proceeding. The district court denied the motion.

Wygle filed an application for interlocutory appeal which we granted. For the reasons expressed below, we conclude the district court erred in not dismissing the petition.

II. Standard of Review.

This case involves a question of statutory interpretation. Review is for errors at law. In re Det. of Geltz , 840 N.W.2d 273, 275 (Iowa 2013).

III. Discussion.

A. Introduction. Iowa Code chapter 229A governs petitions for commitment of sexually violent predators. Iowa Code section 229A.4"plots two separate courses" of civil commitment. In re Det. of Shaffer , 769 N.W.2d 169, 173 (Iowa 2009). First, the state may file a petition when the person is "presently confined" for a sexually violent offense. Iowa Code § 229A.4(1). Second, the state may file a petition when a person has committed a recent overt act under certain circumstances. Iowa Code § 229A.4(2) ; see In re Det. of Gonzales , 658 N.W.2d 102, 104–05 (Iowa 2003) (stating that the "confinement" referenced in the statute "means confinement for a sexually violent offense").

The sole issue in this case is whether under the facts and circumstances Wygle was "presently confined" under Iowa Code section 229A.4(1). As we have recently noted, although due process generally requires a recent overt act to support the drastic depravation of liberty that results from a civil commitment, it is not necessary for the state to allege a recent overt act under this section. In re Det. of Stenzel , 827 N.W.2d 690, 693 (Iowa 2013).

B. Constitutional Context of Overt-Act Requirement for Civil Confinement Based on Dangerousness. Preventive detention is very limited in American law because it is seen as antithetical to fundamental liberty interests and the presumption of innocence. As Justice Jackson noted over half a century ago in Williamson v. United States , "Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort to it...." 184 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1950).

Further, our legal tradition has emphasized that involuntary civil commitment is a "massive curtailment of liberty," Humphrey v. Cady , 405 U.S. 504, 509, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 1052, 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1972), and a "grievous loss," Vitek v. Jones , 445 U.S. 480, 488, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1261, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980). As Justice Kennedy has observed, "[I]ncarceration of persons is ... one of the most feared instruments of state oppression and ... freedom from this restraint is essential to the basic definition of liberty in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Foucha v. Louisiana , 504 U.S. 71, 90, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 1791, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In addition to the dramatic deprivation of liberty, cases have noted the social stigmatization that arises from involuntary commitment. See Addington v. Texas , 441 U.S. 418, 425–26, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1809, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) ; Stamus v. Leonhardt , 414 F.Supp. 439, 449 (S.D. Iowa 1976) ; Godwin v. State , 593 So.2d 211, 214 (Fla. 1992) ; In re Det. of Harris , 98 Wash.2d 276, 654 P.2d 109, 111 (1982) (en banc).

"Courts have traditionally been the protector of individual rights against state power ...." David L. Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization and the Adversary Process , 75 Colum. L. Rev. 897, 910 (1975). Given the truly weighty interests at stake, the power of the state to involuntarily commit individuals is subject to due process protections. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution contains a substantive component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions "regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them." Zinermon v. Burch , 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975, 983, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams , 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S.Ct. 662, 665, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) ); see James W. Ellis, Limits on the State’s Power to Confine "Dangerous" Persons: Constitutional Implications of Foucha v. Louisiana, 15 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 635, 644–45 (1992).

In order to narrowly limit the scope of involuntary civil commitments to situations involving nonspeculative danger and satisfy the demands of due process, many courts in the past have required the state to show an overt act, attempt, or threat. For instance, in Stamus , the federal district court held that the lack of an overt-act requirement was a factor in finding an Iowa involuntary hospitalization statute unconstitutional on due process grounds. 414 F.Supp. at 450–51 ; see also Suzuki v. Yuen , 617 F.2d 173, 178 (9th Cir. 1980) ; Doremus v.Farrell , 407 F.Supp. 509, 514–15 (D. Neb. 1975) ; Lynch v. Baxley , 386 F.Supp. 378, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1974). The rationale for an overt-act requirement is that the present "dangerousness" required for civil commitment is an amorphous concept that must be supported by some concrete, individualized evidentiary showing to prevent arbitrary confinement. See In re Kochner , 266 Neb. 114, 662 N.W.2d 195, 202 (2003) ("The recent violent act requirement is meant as a safeguard to ensure that the liberty of the subject is not unjustly restrained."); see also Reed Groethe, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional Requirement for Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill , 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 562, 574–79 (1977).

Beginning in the 1990s, states began to enact SVP-type statutes. See John Q. La Fond, The Costs of Enacting a Sexual Predator Law , 4 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 468, 474 (1998). Unlike the usual general civil commitment statutes, the new SVP statutes often did not require that an individual have a "mental illness," but only a "mental abnormality." See Kaitlyn Walsh, Note, Antisocial Personality Disorder and Donald DD.: Distinguishing the Sex Offender from the Typical Recidivist in the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders , 44 Fordham Urb. L.J. 867, 884 (2017). Further, the statutes required the state to show various formulations of dangerousness in order to commit an individual as a sexually violent predator. See Deirdre M. Smith, Dangerous Diagnosis, Risky Assumptions, and the Failed Experiment of "Sexually Violent Predator" Commitment , 67 Okla. L. Rev. 619, 661 (2015) [hereinafter Smith].

SVP statutes were attacked as arbitrary on several grounds. First, many critics found the concepts of mental abnormality or mental disorder to be "so vague and broad that it excludes almost no one." Eric S. Janus, Closing Pandora’s Box: Sexual Predators and the Politics of Sexual Violence , 34 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1233, 1237 (2004) [hereinafter Janus]; see, e.g. , Grant H. Morris, The Evil That Men Do: Perverting Justice to Punish Perverts , 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1199, 1206–07 (2000) ; Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger, Flight from Culpability , 4 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 250, 265 (1998).

Second, the ability to link the mental abnormality...