In re Yokoyama
Decision Date | 28 January 1959 |
Docket Number | No. 81-59.,81-59. |
Citation | 170 F. Supp. 467 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
Parties | In the Matter of William K. YOKOYAMA, for Writ of Habeas Corpus. |
Norbert Baumgarten, Lompoc, Cal., for petitioner.
Laughlin E. Waters, U. S. Atty., Richard A. Lavine, Jordan A. Dreifus, Asst. U. S. Attys., Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent.
The facts in the case are simple. The petitioner is held at the Lompoc Barracks, Santa Barbara County, California, within the jurisdiction of this court, under the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed on July 26, 1958 by a court-martial, convened at Camp Zana, Honshu, Japan. At the time, he was a civilian employee of the Armed Forces of the United States. He was charged with appropriating eight military payment certificates of the value of $50 each, was found guilty and ordered committed for four years and to pay a fine of $3,000. The sentence was later reduced by the reviewing authorities to two years and $3,000.
The proceedings in the military court have not become final. But I am of the view that, when a prisoner convicted by court-martial attacks the military tribunal's jurisdiction, not only over the crime, but over him, no question can be raised as to whether he has exhausted his remedies through military channels. This, for the reason that he challenges the very basis of the court's jurisdiction. And jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine. It is formed from two Latin words — juris and dictio — meaning to pronounce the law.
And so the problem here is whether the court which convicted the petitioner had jurisdiction over him.
The petitioner's contention that no such jurisdiction exists is grounded chiefly upon an opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.2 Much as I respect the members of that court, I am forced to disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority, a conclusion which the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit3 and some District Judges4 have since declined to follow:
And the Court held that the soldier, while in prison in military barracks, could not, in peace time, be prosecuted by court-martial for conspiracy to murder. Mr. Justice Douglas 79 S.Ct. 281, in writing the opinion for the majority of the Court, stated that "we were at peace" at the time of the commission of the offense, although no treaty of peace had been entered into. Giving a broad interpretation of the term "peace-time", he disregards the fact that the President's proclamation declaring a state of peace was not issued until a later date. He concludes that to all intents and purposes, we were at peace since "the shooting war" had terminated:
8
Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Clark dissented. Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent is very interesting for it shows the interpretation that he places upon Reid v. Covert,9 to be discussed further on in the opinion:
10
We come now to the main problem confronting us, which is whether the provision of the law contained in the Uniform Code of Military Justice subjecting civilians to the authority of courts-martial for non-military offenses is valid. It reads:
The trial of civilians serving with the Armed Forces for non-military offenses is a practice which antedates the American Revolution. The British Articles of War adopted in 1765 placed civilians connected with the army under military discipline.12
The American Revolutionary Army had a similar provision in the Articles of War adopted by the Continental Congress on June 30, 1775, which read:
"All officers, conductors, gunners, matrosses, drivers or any other persons whatsoever, receiving pay or hire, in the service of the continental artillery, shall be governed by the aforesaid rules and articles, and shall be subject to be tried by courts-martial, in like manner with the officers and soldiers of the Continental troops."13
The Articles of War enacted by the Congress after the Constitution was adopted, beginning with the enactment of April 10, 1806,14 and ending with the adoption of the present Uniform Code of Military Justice15 contained similar provisions.
In Reid v. Covert,16 the Supreme Court was confronted with the problem whether a wife charged with the murder of her husband, and who was not an employee of the United States, but merely accompanied her husband, could be prosecuted for a capital offense by court-martial. Four of the justices held that she could not. Two other justices concurred in the decision on special grounds, to which reference will be made further on in the discussion.
To my mind, the case decides only one matter, i. e., if we apply the words "accompanying the armed forces" to a wife so as to make her subject to military law, when she is charged with a capital offense, we are doing violence to her constitutional rights. The argument that the section insofar as it applies to civilian employees must also fall as lacking substance.17
If a statute covers several categories, and the application to one category is found to be unconstitutional, the validity of the other categories, which are distinct and have a valid basis for separate classification, is not affected.18
Mr. Justice Black's opinion makes it plain that in matters other than capital or in the case of a civilian employee, the same ruling would not necessarily apply. The following quotations from the opinion indicate this clearly:
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