In re Zakai F.
Decision Date | 22 July 2020 |
Docket Number | SC 20234 |
Parties | IN RE ZAKAI F. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Benjamin M. Wattenmaker, assigned counsel, for the appellant (respondent mother).
Albert J. Oneto IV, assigned counsel, for the appellee (petitioner).
David B. Rozwaski, assigned counsel, for the minor child.
Joshua Michtom, assistant public defender, filed a brief for the Office of the Chief Public Defender as amicus curiae.
Louise Truax and Leslie I. Jennings-Lax, Southport, filed a brief for the Connecticut Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers as amicus curiae.
Stacy L. Schleif and Jay E. Siklick filed a brief for the Center for Children's Advocacy, Inc., as amicus curiae.
William Tong, attorney general, Clare Kindall, solicitor general, and Michael Besso, Benjamin Zivyon, Evan O'Roark and Sara Nadim Swallen, assistant attorneys general, filed a brief for the Commissioner of Children and Families as amicus curiae.
Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn, and Ecker, Js.**
In this certified appeal, we must determine whether there is a constitutional presumption that reinstatement of guardianship rights to a parent under General Statutes § 45a-6111 is in the best interests of the child and, if so, whether a heightened standard of proof is required to rebut that presumption. The respondent mother,2 Kristi F., appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's denial of her motion for reinstatement of guardianship rights with respect to her minor son, Zakai F., on the basis that reinstatement was not in Zakai's best interests. See In re Zakai F ., 185 Conn. App. 752, 755, 776–77, 198 A.3d 135 (2018). On appeal, the respondent contends that she is entitled to a presumption that reinstatement is in the best interests of the child and that she is also entitled to a heightened standard of proof.
We conclude that, under § 45a-611, once a parent demonstrates that the factors that resulted in the removal of the parent as guardian have been resolved satisfactorily, the parent is entitled to a presumption that reinstatement of guardianship rights is in the best interests of the child. We also conclude that the party opposing reinstatement must rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. In the present case, because it is unclear whether the trial court applied this presumption, and because it did not determine that the petitioner had rebutted that presumption by clear and convincing evidence, we conclude that the trial court improperly denied the respondent's motion for reinstatement of guardianship. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. Zakai was born in early 2011 and resided with the respondent until approximately July, 2013, when the respondent voluntarily agreed that the petitioner, Nikki F., the respondent's sister and Zakai's maternal aunt, would care for Zakai. The parties agreed that the petitioner would temporarily care for Zakai while the respondent pursued employment opportunities and obtained appropriate housing and a reliable vehicle. The respondent reassumed custody and care of Zakai in late January or early February, 2014. Thereafter, Zakai was physically assaulted by the respondent's live-in boyfriend, Montreal C., while the respondent was at work. Although both Montreal and the respondent were initially criminally charged after the assault, the charges against the respondent were dropped.
Given the respondent's continued work commitments and Zakai's emotional and physical state following Montreal's abuse of Zakai, the respondent agreed that Zakai again would stay temporarily with the petitioner.
Less than one week later, the respondent requested that the petitioner return Zakai to her care. The petitioner did not respond to the respondent's request but, instead, filed a petition for immediate, temporary custody and an application for removal of guardianship in the Probate Court for the district of Derby in February, 2014, alleging, among other things, that Montreal continued to live at the respondent's home despite a restraining order barring him from contact with Zakai. The Probate Court issued an ex parte order granting the petitioner immediate, temporary custody of Zakai but did not rule on the petitioner's motion for removal of guardianship.
In July, 2014, "the respondent filed a motion in the Probate Court for transfer of the case to the Superior Court. On July 16, 2014, the motion was granted, and the case was transferred to the family division of the Superior Court in Milford. [In August], 2014, the respondent filed a motion to vacate the Probate Court order granting the petitioner temporary custody of Zakai. On September 29, 2014, by agreement of the parties, the court ordered that (1) a guardian ad litem be appointed for Zakai; (2) the respondent continue to engage in anger management counseling, therapy, and parenting classes; and (3) the respondent be afforded supervised visitation with Zakai at a location other than the home of the petitioner up to twice a week, subject to the requirements that the length of visitation be determined by the petitioner, visitation occur only at sites acceptable to the petitioner, and only persons acceptable to the petitioner be present during visitation.
(Footnote omitted.) Id., at 756–57, 198 A.3d 135.
In December, 2015, by agreement of the parties, the court modified the visitation schedule to allow a private agency to arrange two weekly visits between the respondent and Zakai. Thereafter, in January, 2016, the court increased the length of Sunday visits from two to four hours. Then, in March, 2016, the trial court granted an ex parte motion to suspend unsupervised visitation.3
A hearing on the respondent's motion to vacate the order of temporary custody and the petitioner's motion to transfer guardianship was scheduled for September 21, 2016. Before the hearing, however, the court approved an agreement resolving all outstanding issues. By agreement of the parties, the court transferred guardianship of Zakai to the petitioner, ordered unsupervised daytime visits between the respondent and Zakai, and ordered that, until the protective order was resolved or modified, the petitioner would have a third party present in her home while exchanging custody of Zakai with the respondent. The stipulation also required that any further expansions of the visitation schedule, including overnight visits, would be arranged through family therapy.
Approximately nine months later, in June, 2017, the respondent filed a motion to reinstate her guardianship rights to Zakai. 4 Id., at 758, 198 A.3d 135.
On February 2, 2018, the guardian ad litem filed a motion to suspend overnight visitation, alleging that the respondent had violated the court's December 12, 2017 order by allowing an unrelated male to stay at her home while Zakai was there. The guardian ad litem also represented that Zakai reported to his therapist that the respondent had hit him and his sister. Thereafter, the court reconvened the proceedings to hear testimony and receive other evidence regarding both the motion to suspend overnight visitation and the respondent's June, 2017 motion to reinstate her guardianship rights. The court heard additional testimony from numerous witnesses on February 15, February 28, and March 1, 2018.
On March 1, 2018, the court issued a memorandum of decision addressing the respondent's motion to reinstate guardianship and the guardian ad litem's motion to suspend overnight visitation. First, the court noted that, since the 2014 inception of this case, "there has never been a judicial adjudication of neglect or abuse as to Zakai, and no court has ever committed Zakai to the care and custody of [the Department of Children and Families]," and that Zakai's placement with the petitioner, initially in 2013 and then following the February, 2014 assault, was by family agreement. The court next explained that § 45a-611 (b) was the appropriate statutory framework within which to consider the respondent's motion for reinstatement of guardianship. See footnote 1 of this opinion. Under that statutory framework, the court found that ...
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