In the Interest of J.B.
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
| Writing for the Court | PER CURIAM |
| Citation | In the Interest of J.B., 58 S.W.3d 575 (Mo. App. 2001) |
| Decision Date | 07 August 2001 |
| Docket Number | ED78372 |
| Parties | In the Interest of J.B. ED78372 Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District 0 |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Hon. Susan E. Block
Counsel for Appellant: Scott Woodruff and David E. Gordon
Counsel for Respondent: Nancy L. Sido
Opinion Summary: John and Mary Brown, parents of minor child J.B., appeal the court's judgment taking jurisdiction of J.B. due to their educational neglect under section 211.031.1(1)(a), RSMo 2000. The Browns argue the court erred in (1) applying the compulsory attendance law to a six-year-old child; (2) restricting evidence of homeschool instruction to ten months rather than twelve months; (3) taking jurisdiction over past neglect because the statute under which the petition was filed only confers jurisdiction over present neglect; (4) refusing to dismiss the petition pursuant to section 210.167 because it alleges violations of the compulsory attendance law based on truancy alone, entitling the Browns to the rights and protection of a criminal prosecution; and (5) excluding evidence of present compliance with the homeschool statute.
Division Four holds: J.B. was subject to the compulsory attendance law because he was a seven-year-old throughout the 1998-1999 school term that began September 1. Evidence of the Browns' compliance with the homeschool instructional requirement was improperly excluded. However, the error was immaterial because there is no evidence in the record that, had this evidence been admitted, the Browns would have met the threshold requirement of 1,000 hours of instruction during the 1998-1999 school term. Furthermore, the court properly considered allegations of past neglect. The court also correctly denied the Browns' motion to dismiss because section 210.167 does not divest the court of jurisdiction to hear a petition based on educational neglect. Finally, evidence of the Browns' present compliance with the homeschool record-keeping requirements was properly excluded because that evidence was not relevant to the allegations in the petition.
Parents, John and Mary Brown, of minor child J.B. ("Child") appeal from the trial court's judgment taking jurisdiction of Child due to Parents' educational neglect under Section 211.031.1(1)(a) RSMo. (2000).1 Parents argue the trial court erred in (1) applying the compulsory attendance law to a six-year-old child; (2) restricting evidence of instruction to ten months rather than twelve months; (3) taking jurisdiction over past neglect because the statute under which the petition was filed only confers jurisdiction over present neglect; (4) refusing to dismiss the petition pursuant to Section 210.167, because the petition alleges violations of the compulsory attendance law based on truancy alone, entitling Parents to the rights and protection of a criminal prosecution; and (5) excluding evidence of present compliance with the homeschool statute. We affirm.Facts
We state the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's order. In Interest of R.G., 885 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Mo.App. E.D. 1994). The Juvenile Officer ("Officer") filed a petition to take jurisdiction of Child alleging that Parents neglected or refused to provide education during the 1998-1999 school term because Parents failed to enroll Child, who was subject to compulsory school attendance, in school or provide a program of homeschool academic instruction. At the hearing before the commissioner, Officer's only witness was Child's mother, and she testified that Child had been homeschooled since his birth on August 10, 1991. She further stated that she began keeping written records of Child's homeschooling on September 1, 1998, after Child had turned seven. However, Child's mother admitted she failed to keep records showing 1000 hours of instruction between July 1, 1998 and June 30, 1999, detailing Child's progress or demonstrating Child's work and evaluations.
Parents' expert witness, psychologist Dr. Steven Duvall, testified that he believed Child was autistic or nearly autistic. He stated that he did not hear Child talk during the five hours he spent with Child who was then 8 1/2 years old. Dr. Duvall also testified that Child's mother believed Child was simply a late talker and that she had joined a support group for families of late talkers.
The commissioner found that Parents failed to keep a portfolio of samples of Child's academic work and a record of evaluations of Child's academic progress as required by Section 167.031.2(2)(a)b. and c, and they did not provide 1000 hours of instruction during the 1998-1999 school term mandated by Section 167.031.2(2)(b). Based on those findings, the commissioner entered an order taking jurisdiction over Child, continuing Child's custody with Parents subject to supervision by the Division of Family Services, ordering Child to be evaluated by a licensed psychiatrist, and ordering Child to be evaluated to determine his educational needs. The trial court adopted the commissioner's findings and recommendations and denied Parents' motion for rehearing. Parents filed this timely appeal.Analysis
We review proceedings of a petition for neglect similar to court-tried civil cases. See In Interest of R.G., 885 S.W.2d at 763. The trial court's order is the judgment from which this appeal is taken. On review, we will sustain the judgment of the trial court unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Id., citing Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). Furthermore, we defer to the trial court on issues of fact and the credibility of witnesses. In the Interest of R.G., 885 S.W.2d at 763. As to jurisdiction under section 211.031.1(1)(a), the court must find clear and convincing evidence that the child is in need of education which has arisen because parents neglected to provide the education necessary for the child's well-being. See In the Interest of E.S., 851 S.W.2d 676, 681 (Mo.App. W.D. 1993). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences which might be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment. See In the Interest of L.J.M.S., 844 S.W.2d 86, 91 (Mo.App. E.D. 1992).
In interpreting the statutes at issue here, we ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used and give effect to that intent if possible. Budding v. SSM Healthcare System, 19 S.W.3d 678, 680 (Mo. banc 2000). Further, words used in the statute will be given their plain and ordinary meaning. L.C. Development Co., Inc. v. Lincoln County, 26 S.W.3d 336, 340 (Mo.App. E.D. 2000). However, we will not construe a statute so as to work an unreasonable, oppressive, or absurd result. Christian Disposal, Inc. v. Village of Eolia, 895 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Mo.App. E.D. 1995). We construe the provisions of a legislative act together and if reasonably possible, all provisions must be harmonized. St. Louis County v. B.A.P., Inc., 25 S.W.3d 629, 630 (Mo.App. E.D. 2000). Additionally, related clauses are to be considered when construing a particular portion of a statute. Marre v. Reed, 775 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Mo. banc 1989).
Parents' first point alleges that the trial court erred in applying the compulsory attendance law to a six-year-old. Specifically, Parents contend that because Child was not seven on July 1, 1998,2 they were not required to comply with the homeschool record-keeping and instructional requirements.
Parents incorrectly argue that the compulsory attendance requirement is tied to the definition of the "school year." The compulsory attendance statute requires that a child between the ages of seven and sixteen be enrolled in some type of school, and that the child must regularly attend "not less than the entire school term of the school which the child attends" (emphasis added). Section 167.031.1. Although "school term" is statutorily defined,3 the definition is not applicable in the homeschool context; therefore, we ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase. "Term" is defined as "one of several divisions of the year in a school...representing a continuous period during which instruction is regularly given to students." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2358 (1967). We hold that, in the context of a homeschool, a "school term" is a period not greater than twelve months during which instruction is regularly given to students.
Here, the petition to take jurisdiction of Child alleged educational neglect during the 1998-1999 school term. The trial court found the homeschool term began on September 1, 1998, and ended on June 30, 1999. For that school term, there was evidence of educational neglect before the trial court, in that Parents failed to administer the required hours of instruction or to keep proper records of Child's work and progress. We find that although Child was only six on July 1, 1998, he was subject to the compulsory attendance law because, having turned seven on August 10, 1998, he was a seven year-old throughout the 1998-1999 school term that began on September 1st. We also note that Parents treated Child as one who was required to attend school. They provided regular instruction, and as of September 1, 1998, kept a logbook of the number of hours and topics of instruction as required by the homeschool statute. Therefore, the trial court did not err in applying the compulsory attendance law to Child. Point denied.
In their second point, Parents...
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