In the Interest of Doe, Docket No. 33997 (Idaho App. 11/13/2008)
| Decision Date | 13 November 2008 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 33997.,Docket No. 34008. |
| Parties | IN THE INTEREST OF JANE DOE I, A CHILD UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE. STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JANE DOE II, Real Party of Interest-Appellant. IN THE INTEREST OF JANE DOE I, A CHILD UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE. STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOHN DOE I, Real Party of Interest-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. John P. Luster, District Judge; Hon. Robert B. Burton, Magistrate.
Appellate decision of the district court affirming the magistrate's order that parents of juvenile probationer submit to random drug testing, reversed.
Palmer George & Madsen, PLLC, Coeur d'Alene, for appellant Jane Doe II. Christopher D. Schwartz argued.
Brown, Justh & Romero, PLLC, Coeur d'Alene, for appellant John Doe I. Jonathan Hull argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Daniel W. Bower, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Daniel W. Bower argued.
These consolidated appeals by the parents of a juvenile offender challenge a magistrate court's order requiring that the parents submit to random drug tests as a condition of their daughter's juvenile probation. We conclude that the magistrate's order must be reversed because it violates the parents' Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches.
Jane Doe I, a minor, was charged under the Juvenile Corrections Act ("JCA"), Idaho Code section 20-501, et seq., with two counts of petit theft, I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), 18-2407(2). She admitted to these crimes, and the magistrate placed her on informal probation for one year. As a term of the juvenile's probation, her parents, John Doe and Jane Doe II (collectively "the parents" or "the Does"), were required to submit to random drug and alcohol testing. They did not challenge this term at that time. Six months later, the State alleged that the juvenile had violated the terms of her probation in a number of ways. Additionally, the magistrate received information that the parents had been using marijuana and that both had tested positive for that drug. The magistrate converted the juvenile's informal probation into a formal probation and again included the term that the parents must submit to random urinalyses and not violate any controlled substance law. The parents appealed this order to the district court, which affirmed. They again appeal.
The Does contend that the magistrate's order compelling them to submit to drug testing is invalid, both because it exceeds the magistrate's statutory authority and because it constitutes a violation of their privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We consider first the statutory inquiry.
The magistrate's order that the Does submit to random urinalyses was issued pursuant to I.C. § 20-520(1)(i), which then provided:
(1) Upon the entry of an order finding the juvenile is within the purview of the act, the court shall then hold a sentencing hearing in the manner prescribed by the Idaho juvenile rules to determine the sentence that will promote accountability, competency development and community protection. . . .
(i) In support of an order under the provisions of this section, the court may make an additional order setting forth reasonable conditions to be complied with by the parents . . . including, but not limited to, restrictions on visitation by the parents or one (1) parent, restrictions on the juvenile's associates, occupation and other activities, and requirements to be observed by the parents.1
A parent who violates such an order is subject to contempt proceedings. I.C. § 20-520(5).
The Does argue that I.C. § 20-520(1)(i) does not authorize a magistrate to order parents to conform to conditions against their will because such an interpretation contradicts the express terms and the legislative intent of a related statute, I.C. § 20-522. Section 20-522 provides, inter alia, that "[w]henever a juvenile is found to come under the purview of [the JCA], the court shall have jurisdiction and authority to have the juvenile and the juvenile's parent(s) . . . sign a probationary contract with the court containing terms and conditions that the juvenile and the juvenile's parent(s) . . . must adhere to as a condition of the juvenile's probation." In State v. Watkins, 143 Idaho 217, 141 P.3d 1086 (2006), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the term "contract" as used in that statute contemplated a voluntary commitment and therefore did not empower a magistrate to order a parent to sign a contract under threat of jail. Because the contract at issue in Watkins was compelled and therefore invalid, the Court said, sanctions could not be imposed on the father for failure to comply. Id. at 220-21, 141 P.3d at 1089-90.
The Does rely upon Watkins in their challenge to the order at issue here, but Watkins has no application in this case, for the magistrate here did not purport to act pursuant to I.C. § 205-22, nor did he order the Does to sign a contract. Instead, the magistrate acted under I.C. § 205-20(1)(i), which expressly authorizes magistrates to order parents to comply with reasonable conditions. In Watkins, it was specifically noted that the legislature "equipped the courts dealing with juvenile offenders with authority under I.C. § 20-520 that is not based on consent." Id. at 221, 141 P.3d at 1090. Section 20-520 could hardly be clearer in its authorization for magistrates to order parents' compliance with reasonable conditions and to enforce such orders through contempt proceedings. Therefore, the Does' argument that the magistrate lacked statutory authority to order them to conform to conditions against their will is without merit.
The Does next argue that even if it was statutorily authorized, the order for their submission to drug tests is unconstitutional because it infringes upon the protection against warrantless searches afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Fourth Amendment safeguards "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." To comply with the Fourth Amendment, searches generally must be authorized by a warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the intended search will yield evidence of a crime. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790, 792-93, 852 P.2d 1387, 1389-90 (1993); State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213, 215, 938 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Ct. App. 1997). Searches conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 486, 95 P.3d 635, 637 (2004); State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297, 304, 141 P.3d 1166, 1173 (Ct. App. 2006). Nevertheless, limited exceptions to the warrant requirement are recognized; the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is one of reasonableness. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Action, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). To determine whether a warrantless search satisfies this reasonableness standard, courts must balance the intrusion upon the individual's Fourth Amendment privacy interest against the government's legitimate interest in conducting the search. Action, 515 U.S. at 652-53; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment is not offended in circumstances where "special needs" render a search reasonable even if it is not justified by any level of individualized suspicion. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624. It is this special needs doctrine upon which the State relies in the present case to justify the magistrate's order that the Does submit to random urinalyses.
The "special needs" label was coined by Justice Blackmun in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) and later adopted by the Court in O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987), and Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). It refers to circumstances, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, that render the warrant and probable cause requirements impracticable. Warrantless and suspicionless searches that the Supreme Court has held meet constitutional muster under the special needs doctrine include drug testing of students as a precondition to their participation in school athletics or other extracurricular activities, Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Action, 515 U.S. 646; searches of probationers, Griffin, 483 U.S. 868; drug testing of railroad employees involved in train accidents, Skinner, 489 U.S. 602; drug testing of United States Customs Service employees seeking promotion to certain sensitive positions, Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); and government employer searches of employee offices, O'Connor, 480 U.S. 709. As noted by the Tenth Circuit,
The Supreme Court has not told us what, precisely, this set of cases has in common, but the cases seem to share at least these features: (1) an exercise of governmental authority distinct from that of mere law enforcement . . .; (2) lack of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, and concomitant lack of individualized stigma based on such suspicion; and (3) an interest in preventing future harm, generally involving the health or safety of the person being searched or of other persons directly touched by that person's conduct, rather than of deterrence or punishment for past wrongdoing.
Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1213-14 (10th Cir. 2003).
The question presented to this Court is whether the State has an interest amounting to a special need...
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